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There is much historical evidence to show that the problem
of integrating a given weapon within the structure of the military
establishment is by no means a recent one.^ Entirely aside from
the question of introducing a new weapon, there exists the problem
of adequately exploiting it. Much of the difficulty encountered
in properly employing an unconventional weapon«~once it has been
accepted— .seems to be rooted in man’s innate tendency to retain
the familiar in preference to the novel. As Admiral Alfred
Thayer Mahan, the great theorist of sea power, pointed out:
Changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes 
in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but the interval 
between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless 
arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due 
to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics 
have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but 
it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by . . . care­
ful study of the powers and limitations of the new . . .  
weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of 
using it to qualities it possesses, which will constitute 
its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that 
military men generally will take the pains to do this, but 
that the one who does will go into battle with a great
^Air Force ROTC, Evolution of Aerial Warfare (Maxwell 
AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1959), 1-11, contains a concise
historical account.
2advantage— a lesson in itself of no mean value.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution this age-old 
dichotomy between the availability of a weapon and its full 
utilization appeared with increasing frequency. In the Civil 
War "the North fought with the same weapons available to the 
South and made slight use of the superior arms within its grasp." 
The failure of the military in World War I to properly understand 
the potential of newly introduced weapons such as the machine 
gun, the submarine, the tank, and, most of all, the air weapon 
was repeatedly scored during the 1920’s by the Italian air 
theorist. General Giulio Douhet. He shrewdly observed that 
"victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the 
character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves 
after the changes occur.General J. F. C. Fuller, after 
analyzing instances typifying the characteristic resistance of 
the military to new weapons, commented in 1926 that "soldiers 
are mostly alchemists," and concluded that the underlying cause 
was a lack of systematic, objective method in observing, study­
ing, and evaluating the changes wrought by the technology of war.^
^Quoted in Air Service Tactical School (ASTS), Air Tactics 
(Langley Field, Va.: 1922), Section II, 19.
^Irving B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven:
Yale, 1953), 10.
^Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Rome: Air Ministry,
1921), trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-Me Gann, 194-2), 30.
F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War 
(London: Hutchinson, 1926) , 22.
4
Almost two decades later. Brigadier General Frank P. Lahm, one 
of America's pioneer military airmen, agreed that "conservatism 
has always been the watchword in our recognition and adoption of 
new implements of war, especially in times of peace.Recently 
an American student of this ]3roblem concluded that it is "still 
far from being entirely solved."^
This study is chiefly concerned with the development of 
doctrine for the employment of the aerial weapon. Here several 
basic factors are to be noted. First, the air weapon is a multi» 
use one, susceptible to development for several tactical functions. 
Secondly, the question of which function to emphasize is related, 
among other factors, directly to the geographical and military 
position which a given country occupies vis»a-vis others.
Thirdly, in any systematic utilization of the aerial weapon 
itself, three major phases may be discerned, each of which is 
related to the other: (1) the technological development; (2)
the organizational problem involved in the proper constitution 
of the parts of the air force and their relationship with each 
other and the other armed forces; and (3) the question of 
doctrine or conceptual utilization and employment of the force 
in a strategic and/or tactical sense. Though all these factors 
are interrelated, the major treatment here is confined to certain 
aspects of the evolution of military air power doctrine in the
^Charles De F. Chandler and FrarC: P. Lahm, How Our Army 
Grew Wings (New York: Ronald Press, 1943), 279.
7Holley, 10.
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United States from 1920 to 1935, Objectives include (1) identify­
ing the predominant concepts of employment; (2) determining how 
and from what sources those concepts were derived; and (3) 
ascertaining how and when they were adopted or.adapted and applied. 
Within this general frame of reference attention is focused on the 
personalitj.es, ideas, and theories of William Mitchell and Giulio 
Douhet— the two most important air pioneers of the period— and 
their influence on American air power doctrine, particularly as 
it evolved at the Air Corps Tactical School,® the tap root of 
doctrinal growth in the United States Army's air arm during the 
twenties and early thirties. Their much debated interpersonal 
influence is likewise critically examined.^
Before undertaking any investigation of inter-war 
doctrinal development, however, it is deemed advisable to obtain 
some degree of perspective by viewing the problem in its historical 
context. The general treatment in this chapter is to sketch,
®The Field Officers School (1920) became the Air Service 
Tactical School in 1923, and in turn the Air Corps Tactical 
School in 1926. It was moved from Langley Field, Va. to Maxwell 
Field, Ala. in 1931.
gThe study of air doctrine during the inter-war period is 
somewhat complicated by the fact that in practice formulation of 
doctrine occurred at several levels. Official War Department 
doctrine was expressed in the Field Service Regulations which 
were supposed to set the tone for the rest of the service. Then 
there were the Air Service Regulations, which, though prepared 
by the Chief of Air Service, were closely aligned with the think­
ing of the General Staff of the War Department, The teachings 
propounded by the ground and air service command and staff schools 
were supposedly in conformity with departmental dogma. See 
glossary for definitions of doctrine and concept.
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briefly, the development of the air weapon and its employment in 
this country to the time of the involvement of the United States 
in World War I; to trace eontemporaneous developments in Europe; 
and to show the origins of American doctrine and the extent of 
American experience during the World War,
Early History of the Air Weapon and Air Doctrine 
The United States
While many fundamental scientific and technological
achievements necessarily preceded the actual invention of the
air machine, including the high speed internal combustion engine,
the achievement of the Wright brothers on December 17, 1903, was
monumental: sustained, controlled power flight became a reality
at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. In October 1905 Wilbur and
Orville Wright made the first flight of substantial duration
in a heavier-than-air vehicle— a record run of nearly twenty-
five miles in a little over half an hour.^^ In February 1908
the Wrights undertook, in a contract signed with the United
States Signal Corps, to meet severe specifications for those
days*— an airplane with a speed of 9-0 miles per hour, 125-mile
range, and a useful, load of 350 pounds.Two others who were
1 ?awarded contracts failed. Later that year the test of the
^^Dept. of the Air Force, AFP 210-1-1: Historical Data—
a Chronology of American Aviation Events (Washington: 1955),
59-, 57, Hereafter cited as AFP 210-1-1.
llHolley, 27,
12AFP-210-1-1, p. 59,
"Wright Flyer" proved successful at Fort Meyer, Virginia, and the 
United States Army had a new weapon.
For some years thereafter progress was made at a snail’s 
pace. By 1913 the Signal Corps had IS aircraft on hand and seven 
on o r d e r , T o  man them, 19 trained pilots were available, 
Promising advances were made before 1919- by the aeronautical 
division of the Signal Corps in (1) airplane radio-telegraph 
testing; (2) flight testing of aircraft machine guns against 
ground targets; (3) development of a rudimentary bombsight; (4) 
experimentation with bomb dropping on a limited scale; and (5) 
artillery adjustment by aerial control,By the outbreak of 
war in Europe the airplane in the United States had already indi­
cated its value for various military purposes, although the Chief 
Signal Officer, who was mainly responsible for the development 
of the aerial weapon at that time, was strongly inclined to value 
only its reconnaissance and artillery adjustment functions. 
Doubting very much the utility of the air weapon for offensive 
purposes, he told the House Military Affairs Committee in Dec­
ember 1914 that "as a fighting machine the airplane has not , , , 
justified its existence,
13Chandler and Lahm, 152-53. 
l^Ibid., 267.
ISlbid.
16aFP 210-1-1, pp. 61-69, 
l^Quoted in Holley, 26,
Nor was it at all easy to learn at second hand lessons 
of value from the combat experience of the belligerent powers 
in Europe. Such lessons proved difficult to obtain, both be­
cause of the screen of secrecy with which they cloaked the per­
formance of their aircraft and the Wilson administration’s 
deliberate policy of strict neutrality. From August 191h to 
April 1917 United States relations with the governments of the 
Allies were limited almost exclusively to diplomatic channels. 
War Department efforts to establish direct liaison at the front 
through assignment of qualified observers were repeatedly re­
buffed until the spring of 1917. Conjoined with administrative 
neglect to pursue vigorous development of possible combat uses 
of aircraft, this situation resulted in our technical isolation, 
despite increased appropriations for aeronautics during this 
period of ostensible "preparedness."^®
Accordingly, the American declaration of war in April 
1917 found the air arm in critical condition. Not only was the 
Aviation Section of the Signal Corps seemingly inadequate to 
cope with the task of developing the air weapon but there ex­
isted "only the haziest notions regarding the doctrines of 
aerial warfare. An Air Force study of the early history of
the air arm concludes that one thing was certain: "At the out­
break of war little or nothing was on hand either of planes, 




experience that would indicate what was needed. . . .  Conse­
quently, the first men charged with the training program had to
2 nlearn by the trial-and-error method before teaching others."
According to Colonel H. H, Arnold, who was second in command of
the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps during 1917-18, the
Air Service in May 1917 consisted of but 55 officers and 1100
enlisted men, including 26 actually qualified pilots, manning
2155 airplanes of which 51 were obsolete and four obsolescent.
In comparison with European air forces, the Army’s Air Service 
was "a negligible qu.antity.
Early Development of Aviation in Europe
A glance at the following tables shows the relative pre­
war position of the United States and other countries with 
respect to funds appropriated for aviation purposes, number of 
aircraft available, and number of pilots:
*̂̂ USAF Historical Studies, No. 98: The United States Air
Arm, 1867-1917 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 1958), 197.
^^Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper,
199-0), 50; Benedict Crowell, America’s Munitions: 1917-1918
(Washington, 1919), 29-0, avers that there were 200-odd air­
planes on harrd, mostly trainers.
^^Mason M. Patrick, The United States in the Air (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1928), 99. General Patrick was Chief of Air
Service during much of the war period and later served in the 
same capacity from Oct. 1921 to Dec. 1927.
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Comparative Aeronautical Appropriations, 1913 Fiscal Year^̂
France . . .  .......  . . . . . . .  $7,400,000
Germany . . . . . . . . . . .  5,000,000
Russia............ ............. 5,000,000
England . . .  ..................  3,000,000
Italy .  ...................... 2,100,000
Mexico .......................... 400,000
United States ...............  .. 125,000*
*1908-1913 total expenditure of War Department for aircraft: 
$250,000
2 4Aircraft and Pilots in Leading Countries, August, 1914




United Kingdom 168 135
Italy 153 175
Russia 200 (est.) 80
Japan 23 20
United States 17 19
As these data indicate, the French government was quickest to 
recognize and turn to national advantage the military potential 
of the airplane.It was Henri Farman who took up the first 
passengers in an airplane and Louis Blériot who first flew over 
the age-old barrier of the English Channel. As early as 1911
^^Holley, 29, citing Report of Secretary of War, Annual 
Report of the War Department, 1913, I, pp. 25-26.
^^Adapted from Major G. R. Perara, A Legislative History 
of Aviation in the United States and Abroad (Washington: Office
of the Chief of Air Corps, 1940), 1, citing Report of Hearings 
on H. R. 5304, 63rd Congress, p. 7.
Z^New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960), XII, 277.
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France boasted possession of the first true aircraft factory.
During those early prewar years the International Flying Meets
at Rheims stirred world^wide enthusiasm, encouraged widespread
participation, and promoted pioneering efforts in the a i r . I n
the Michelin competitions for bomb-throwing held in France in
1912 Riley E. Scott, a former officer of the United States Coast
Artillery, who had invented a bomb-sight in 1911 and experimented
with aerial bombing as a civilian at the College Park, Maryland,
air station in 1912, won a first prize, hitting his targets from
an altitude of 2,600 feet.^^ As early as 1910 and 1911 France
was using airplanes effectively for observation purposes during
2 8annual army maneuvers. Elsewhere governments hastened to set 
up similar aviation sections in their armed forces. In the air­
craft engineering field, construction and performance improved 
remarkably during the prewar years. "The fuselage was enclosed, 
landing wheels were added, and more efficient power units were 
installed.Direct military application, however, was rela­
tively slight prior to 1914.
During the Tripoli campaign of 1911 the Italians employed 
"quite a large number of machines" to advantage in reconnaissance
^®Air Force ROTC, Foundations of Air Power (Maxwell AFB, 
Ala.: Air University, 1958), 133-134; AFP 210-1-1, p. 61.
2?Chandler and Lahm, 206-207, 276-277; AFP 210-1-1,
p. 66.
28ciaude Grahame-White and Harry Harper, The Aeroplane 
in War (London: Laurie, 1912), 228-235,
Z^Air Force ROTC, Foundations of Air Power, 134.
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work and dropped a few bombs with inconclusive results. 0̂ Spain
also used the airplane in the course of her Moroccan campaign
during 1913, bombing a few towns on the Haira River in tactical
cooperation with ground forces in the area.Meanwhile, in the
Balkan Wars Bulgarian and Greek forces carried out occasional
bombing sorties. Thus by 191*4 "the groundwork had been laid
. . , for the airplane’s eventual use as an offensive weapon,"
although military commanders remained generally skeptical of
33employing it in this capacity.
Wartime Growth of Military Aviation
The common aeronautical problem confronting the leaders 
of all the major belligerents from the beginning to the end of 
the World War was how to develop and apply the air weapon in 
their hands to the maximum national advantage. The problem 
embraced not only weapons technology and organization of forces 
but concepts or doctrines of employing them. Only the merest 
sketch of these aspects is here presented, and treatment is con­
fined to the British and German air forces, for between them they 
covered the entire spectrum of capabilities demonstrated by the 
air weapon during World War I.
^^Grahame-White and Harper, 236-239.
^^Lieut. Kenneth N. Walker, Lecti’re, "Doctrine of Employing 
an Aerial Force," ACTS, Langley Field, Va., Oct. 23, 1929, 3.
Isaac D. Levine, Mitchell— Pioneer of Air Power (New 
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, rev. ed., 1958), 82-83.
^^Walker, 3.
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From the very beginning events bore out the prewar promise 
of the airplane's value as an ideal instrument for reconnaissanee. 
For example, observers of the British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) 
were the first to report the wheeling movement of von Kluck’s 
First Army to the southeast of Paris in August 1914.34 pn East 
Prussia the battle of Tannenberg was based in part on fore­
knowledge gained from air observer reports that the Russian
35Second Army was virtually isolated in the Masurian Lakes region. 
Through such feats as these, the air arm "almost entirely re­
placed cavalry as a medium for distant r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . "36
Moreover, as the conflict in the West degenerated into 
trench warfare, the contending armies further discovered that 
the airplane provided the best means of close reconnaissance of 
enemy trench systems. Photographic rather than visual observa­
tion became the rule. They also used flying craft as a major 
means of spotting and adjusting ground artillery fire, first by 
means of light signals, later through the use of air-to-ground 
wireless or r a d i o . 37 Through the performance of such functions—  
in addition to special transportation and fast liaison, the air­
plane quickly became indispensable to the effective operation of
34"The Era of Violence, 1898-1945," New Cambridge Modern 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), XII,
278.
36cen. Ernst W, von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der 




the ground forces. Hence, in a war characterized by almost static 
surface positions, by far the larger part of the military avia­
tion effort on both sides was devoted to reconnaissance, trench 
photography, artillery adjustment, and protection of those func­
tions. Ready execution of services for the ground forces hinged 
upon at least partial control of the air, that is, the provision 
of security from enemy air interference at a given place and/or 
for a certain length of time. Control of the air therefore be­
came the prerequisite to effective use of the various branches 
of the air service working with the a r m i e s . 8̂ from almost the 
start of the conflict the rival air forces endeavored to stop 
hostile aerial prying and surveillance while assiduously seeking 
to carry out identical tasks for their own armies. As a result 
fighting in the air started in 191M-. It rose steadily in pitch 
and volume as aviators intensified their efforts. Machine guns 
soon replaced rifles strapped to struts in Allied air forces in 
October 1914 and in the German in early 1 9 1 5 .
Tactical Employment: Pursuit
As early as 1913 and 1914 the Royal Flying Corps had 
recognized that "it was not by shooting from the ground but 
only by fighting aircraft with aircraft that decisive results
^^Evolution of Aerial Warfare, 19.
S^New Cambridge Modern History, XII, 278; Hoeppner,
23.
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could be obtained,Yet, it was the Germans who, despite their 
initial disadvantage in air armament, were first in the field with 
an effective specialized fighter plane, the Fokker, which per­
mitted the pilot to shoot through the propeller.With machine
guns affixed to the plane itself, there was no longer need of an
observer. The resultant gain in speed, maneuverability, and 
ceiling was extraordinary and effected a revolution in tactics.
The consequences which followed the Fokker*s appearance in the 
fall of 1915 were aptly described by the eminent British military 
historian, H. A. Jones:
An order issued from Flying Corps Headquarters on the IHth
of January 1916 . . .  brought about, at a stroke, one of
the drastic changes in the air war— formation flying, and 
crystalized the effects of the whole Fokker dominance. The 
order reads:
Until the Royal Flying Corps are in possession of a 
machine as good as or better than the German Fokker 
it seems that a change in tactics employed becomes 
necessary. . . .  It must be laid down as a hard and 
fast rule that a machine proceeding on reconnaissance 
must be escorted by at least three other fighting 
machines. These machines must fly in a close forma­
tion. *̂2
*+OQuoted in Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, "Develop­
ment of RAF Doctrine," Royal Air Force Quarterly II,(April, 1950), 
p. Ill, citing Royal Flying Corps, Training Manual, Part II,
Proof #7, March 1914, pp. 4-6, M-9.
^̂ Ibid.; Hoeppner, 39,
A. Jones, The War in the Air, Based on Official 
Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence (5 Vols, 11-VI; Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1928-37), II, 155-56. Vol. I was written by Sir Walter Raleigh, 
The War in the Air (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), and the task
taken over by Jones upon Raleigh*s death.
16
This doctrinal decision by Royal Flying Corps Headquarters 
followed Anglo-French air staff conversations in the autumn of 
1915 regarding means of shielding their air reconnaissance and 
artillery flyers from the Fokker, The commanding officers of the 
British and French air forces. Major General Trenchard and 
Commandant Du Peuty, respectively, after comparing the experiences 
of the two air services concluded finally "that the corps observa­
tion aeroplanes could best be protected by . , , offensive [meansj , 
that is, by fighting and subduing the enemy airmen far away from 
the aeroplanes flying in direct co-operation with the Army.
Such offensive employment of air forces contrasted sharply 
with the "barrage" system which had been widely used up to that 
time. The barrage system entailed the "stationing" of a number 
of aircraft over a given geographical area in order to drive away, 
defeat, or deter enemy airmen seeking to dominate it and thus 
permit friendly reconnaissance, photographic, and artillery ad­
justment craft to operate under their protective umbrella. Be­
cause its success depended largely upon waiting for the enemy to 
appear in a given area, it was extremely costly in terms of air­
planes and pilots required to patrol and clear large stretches of 
the f r o n t . T h e  new concept called for pursuit forces to pro­
tect a given sector of operation by means of active forays into 




down his air forces in defensive battle.
One of the consequences of this step in the evolution of 
doctrine was the further specialization and reorganization of 
Allied aviation. Between April and August 1916 General Trenchard 
transferred all observation craft to aviation units serving 
directly with the ground forces. "By the middle of August . . .  
no Corps squadron had fighters on its strength and the principle 
of differentiating between offensive fighting and Corps [observa­
tion] work was definitely established."^^ Thus as early as 1915- 
16 the Royal Flying Corps clearly recognized certain fundamental 
doctrinal tenets and tactical practices of aerial warfare, viz., 
that adherence to the offensive afforded the best defense in the 
air and that tactical realization of this concept required both 
the organization of specialized fighter squadrons and the adoption 
of new tactical techniques, notably formation flying.
The new doctrine was tested on the Somme in June, The 
effectiveness both of British fighter sweeps over the front lines 
and bombing attacks in rear areas during the early summer of 1916 
was affirmed by General von Buelow of the German First Army en­
gaged in the battle of the Somme.Partially as a result of 
growing enemy counter-action, Trenchard felt compelled on Sept­
ember 22, 1916 to issue an important paper entitled "Future Policy
^%ones, II, 167-168,
*̂ Q̂uoted in ibid., II, 270-271; see also Maj, George P. 
Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War, trans, J, E,
Gurdon (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), 219-220; Hoeppner,
72-73.
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in the Air,” in which he elaborated that principle:
It is sometimes argued that our aeroplanes should be able to 
prevent hostile aeroplanes from crossing the line, and this 
idea leads to a demand for a defensive policy. Now is the 
time to consider whether such a policy would be possible, 
desirable, and successful. . . . The aercylane is an 
offensive and not a defensive weapon, [italics added]
This policy was subsequently sanctioned in instructions issued by
the Royal Flying Corps in March 1917 under the title, "Fighting
in the Air." The guiding principle of fighting in the air, it
was emphasized; was "to seek out and destroy the enemy's forces.
[italics added]
Meanwhile, the German high command— heavily committed to 
the offensive against Verdun— refused at first to divert any 
fighter forces to the Somme and only very gradually permitted 
some reinforcement.^® However, in the wake of the major command 
shakeup of August 29, 1916, the new general headquarters quickly 
reversed command policy, suspended the offensive at Verdun, and 
relentlessly thinned out air forces on all other fronts in favor 
of the Somme.®® At the same time "a vast reorganization and ex­
pansion of the German Air Forces was begun,"®®- and General von 
Hoeppner was put in charge of the new centralized administration,
^^Jones, II, Appendix IX.
^®Ibid., III, Appendix XI, par. 2; see also Appendix Vol., 
Appendix XX, "Fighting in the Air," dated Feb.1918.
Hoeppner, 74, 76.
SOlbid., 76-78.
®®-Jones, II, Appendix VII, "Some Notes on the German Air 
Service on the Somme (1916)," Translated extracts from . . .  
Reichsarchiv, Potsdam.
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with Colonel Thomsen, former chief of air forces in the field, as 
his chief of s t a f f , A s  early as August Colonel Thomsen had 
recognized the need for reassessment of doctrine and organiza­
tional structure.
Up to that time fighters had either been allocated to
escort various reconnaissance flights or had been temporarily
echeloned for combat into special groups such as Boelcke*s
"Kommandos” at Verdun, To cope, however, with the persistent,
aggressive British onslaughts over and behind the German lines
at the Somme, more than centralized control was required, A
fundamental change in unit organization and tactics was initiated,
and integral pursuit squadrons, or Jagdstaffeln, were formed,
beginning in August,The need for more effective employment
of air power was formally set forth in the following order from
von Hoeppner in October 1916:
The present system of aerial warfare has shown the inferiority 
of the isolated fighting aeroplane, , , , Fighting squadrons 
must be trained most carefully to operate in close formation 
as a single tactical unit, which is the manner in which they 
must carry out attacks. Each Jagdstaffel must have its own 
area and length of front,
The sole duty of these new tactical units was to fight. Thus by
the summer of 1916 both British and German air forces had formed
^^Ibid,; Hoeppner, 82-84; Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, 
Air Bombardment (New York: Harper, 1961), 15.
S^Ibid,; Hoeppner, 92-93.
*̂̂ Quoted in Jones, II, Appendix VII, par,-, c. The Germans 
also realized the futility of the barrage or aerial patrol system 
of protecting ground force activity, Hoeppner, 52.
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regular, specialized pursuit units. Tactical air power was to 
assume still another form before long—«one that directly affected 
the battle on the ground—-attack aviation.
Tactical Employment: Ground Attack
Though the British had used aircraft at the Somme to great 
advantage in pressing attacks against ground troops, the Germans 
are generally credited with being first to make organized, 
systematic low-level attacks against enemy troops and guns on 
the battlefield.^^ During the winter of 1917-18 they conducted 
a war game with the idea of employing the full force of tactical 
air power directly on the battlefield itself, the object being 
to help the ground forces break the stalemate in the West. So 
much importance was attached to the positive results of this 
field exercise that the Germans, througu reorganization of their 
air forces and transfers from Russia, established 38 units of a 
new type— attack or battle squadrons ("Schlachtstaffeln").
Great care was taken to avoid revelation of this force’s composi­
tion and planned deployment. Largely as a result, the attack 
units scored great initial successes and contributed markedly to 
the progress of the early offensives of 1918,^^ This new 
function of air power was exploited to advantage by the Allies
^̂ Capt. George Kenney, Lecture, "History and Principles of 
Attack Aviation,” ACTS, Langley Field, Va., Mar. 11, 1930. See 





too% although comparably specialized planes and units were not 
yet in use by war's end. On the other hand, both sides had mean­
while developed aerial bombing well beyond the initial bomb-
throwing stage, with crude bomb sighting mechanisms coming into
\general use during 1915,,
Tactical Employment: Bombardment
Until the last year of the war almost all aerial bombing
in the West was of a tactical nature, i, e., directed against
enemy forces or nearby goegraphical targets essential to their
operations, including depots, airdromes, and railheads. Practice,
however, varied considerably for some time. While the Germans
seemed to be persuaded "from the beginning" of the advantages of
concentrating their bombing effort against a given target^^—
though they did not always do so— British aerial bombing was for
the most part characterized by dispersion of force over a variety
59of targets, with generally inconsequential effects. Though in 
practice real concentration was rarely achieved, there was grow­
ing doctrinal recognition at RFC Headquarters of the need to 
obtain mass, both over the target and for protection in the air,^^ 
A change became perceptible in late 1915. In November of that
^^Hoeppner, 20; see also Saundby, 20.
59saundby, 12-15, 17, 21,
G^Among the reasons for failure to achieve mass in bombard­
ment effort were the following: division of the British air ser­
vices, RFC (later RAF) and RNAS; decentralization of control over 
most of the RFC units, the Army insisting an observational and 
other front line tasks; division of opinion at RPC headquarters.
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year the Royal Flying Corps dispatched nine airplanes on a par­
ticular raid whose most notable result seemed to be the confusion 
among the German anti-aircraft defenses, caused apparently by the 
size of the enemy force. The success of this mission and similar 
ones tended to dispel the hitherto common notion that to fly in 
groups offered enemy gunners an exaggerated target. Raids carried 
out in December 1915 and January 1916 were characterized by the 
"concentration of all the available aeroplanes of the wing to 
bomb one single objective togethe r.T he bombing forays of 
this period, then, bore witness to a change in bombardment em­
ployment concepts and operational tactics, with so-called "biass 
bombing of single targets"^^ becoming more characteristic. These 
small groupings of airplanes assumed formation patterns and dis­
tance intervals of various kinds. By January 1916 formation and 
escort flying, which had been introduced initially to safeguard 
observational work, became standard practice in British bombard­
ment missions. "The systems of formation varied . . .  but all 
had this in common, that they aimed at compactness."^^ Neverthe­
less, differences of opinion continued with respect both to the 
effectiveness of bombardment behind the enemy lines and to the 
most judicious employment of available air power.
Whatever the merits of the respective cases, a directive




from British air headquarters in February 1916 forbade bombing 
"done at a distance greater than a few miles from our front lines 
unless the results obtained and the object in view were . . .  
commensurate with the possible losses in pilots and machines.
To enhance bombing effectiveness and reduce losses, commanders 
were ordered shortly afterwards to take every opportunity to bomb 
at n ig h t . T h e Germans had already turned primarily to night 
bombing and generally maintained that practice for the rest of 
the war.GG Nevertheless, both sides continued day and night 
bombing throughout the war.
Surprisingly advanced bombing procedures were contained 
in the Royal Flying Corps headquarters memorandum of March 1917. 
Not only did it emphasize formation flying, but it underscored 
the true nature of the tasks of both bombets and escorting 
fighters: "The duty of the bombing machines is to get to their
objectives and to drop their bombs on it, and the duty of the 
escort is to enable them to do so, and only to fight in the exe­
cution of their d u t y . B o m b e r  pilots were also warned of the 
necessity of keeping in close formation in order to provide mutual 
protection to and from the target. Contrary to earlier instruc­




G/Jones, III, Appendix XI, par. 18.
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area, to change to single line formation in order to drop their 
bombs individually.Apparently better results were found to be 
obtained in this manner (The Germans too had found this to be the 
case^9)^ Afterwards, they were to rally at a given point chosen 
beforehand in order to collect their forces and resume formation 
flying for the return to base. Such refinement of bombing pre­
cepts and tactics helped to pave the way for a different kind of 
bombing— more ambitious in goal, wider ranging in its field of 
action, and more vulnerable to enemy opposition in the air and 
hence more demanding of its pilots and crew— in a word, strategic 
bombing,
Origins and Development of Strategic Aviation and Air Defense
Which of the two opposing coalitions was first to conceive 
the idea of strategic air warfare remains debatable. If strategic 
air operations are viewed as aimed at the enemy’s military as 
well as industrial, political, economic, and social systems, 
the available evidence would seem to indicate that the British 
Admiralty shared with German naval circles the distinction of 
conceptual leadership in this field. Jones asserts that "the 
question of long distance bombing raids against naval and military
GGjbid.
®^Hoeppner, 119-120.
^^Strategic bombing is defined as "the bombing of a 
selected target or targets vital to the war-making capacity of 
a nation," in The United States Air Force Dictionary, editor: 
W. A. Heflin (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1956),
4-93. Consult glossary for related definitions,
^̂ USAF Dictionary, 4-93.
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centers in Germany had been constantly before the Admiralty from
72the outbreak of the war." Nevertheless, it was the German air­
ship forces which, in early 1915, after much hesitation in the 
highest echelons of command, started systematic attacks against 
British targets, extending from Scotland to London.Despite 
the great difficulty of high altitude operation and the inherent 
vulnerability of the hydrogen-filled dirigibles, the German naval 
and military air services continued to operate Zeppelins high 
over the North Sea against Britain throughout 1915 and 1916 un­
til British fighters and antiaircraft batteries proved more than 
a match for t h e m . " A s  strategic bombers, the hydrogen-filled 
rigid airships of 1914—1918 failed, as in retrospect they were 
almost bound to do. . . .  But for two years of war the rigid 
airship was the premier long-range weapon of airborne destruc­
tion."̂ 5 In the meantime the evolution of the airplane had pro­
ceeded at so rapid a pace that during the latter half of the war 
it became possible through this means to strike directly at dis­
tant centers of enemy power.
By increasing the range and reliability of their airplanes 
and making good use of their advanced bases in the Channel area,
72jones, II, 4-51.'
73o. H, Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, 1912-1918 (London: 
Foulis, 1962), 54—56; see also K. Poolman, Zeppelins over England 
(London: Evans, 1960).




the Germans were able to conduct the strategic air war more 
efficiently, though still only sporadically. Their comparative­
ly small attacks took the form of daylight raids in the summer 
of 1917 and night raids in late 1917 and mid-1918. For Britain 
these attacks carried important policy implications, both for 
air defense and air offense. Adequate air defense became im­
perative on June 13, 1917 when 19- German bombers flew with 
apparent impunity over London in broad daylight, bombed Liver­
pool Station and the dock area, and caused nearly 600 casualties.^® 
Forced to devise and implement an effective means of combatting 
the new aerial threat, the British government from time to time 
diverted considerable pursuit strength from France. For the 
German government this proved to be one of the chief benefits 
of the strategic attacks.To police the aerial portion of 
the key London defense area alone, the British government felt 
constrained by April 1918 to retain at home ten operational 
fighter squadrons with 282 combat-ready aircraft, while thousands 
of other officers and men stood by to operate searchlights, 
communications, gun batteries, and an elaborate "apron” of 
balloons.Another important consequence of the raid of June 
13 was the crystallization of the British government's attitude
Evolution of Aerial Warfare, 27-29, Strategic bombing 
account is based largely on Jones, IV, V, and von Hoeppner, 
Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft.
77jones, V, 153-159-.
^^The latter forced raiders to fly either at more pre­




For, meanwhile, despite the remarkable progress in the de­
velopment of the new art, fighting in the air over the Western 
Front seemed— like the war on the ground— inconclusive, with the 
German air force tending to offset marked Allied superiority in 
numbers by managing generally to retain a slight technological 
edge and by maintaining their ability to shift their forces more 
rapidly to threatened sectors,French circles realized by 1917 
''that it was wrong to talk of command of the air being obtained 
so long as the enemy sources of supply remained i n t a c t , A  
similar view was held in I t a l y , I n  the spring of 1917 the 
French government therefore proposed the creation of an independent 
or strategic bombing force to strike at the industrial centers of 
German power, but the British government, under pressure from Sir 
Douglas Haig, commander of the British expeditionary forces in 
France, opposed the proposal on the ground thaL it would divert 
needed air support from the army. At that time the Royal Flying
Corps had in France 21 observation squadrons, 27 fighter squadrons,
82and but two bombardment squadrons. Meanwhile, the French 
aeronautical industry— despite its early European leadership— was
79jones, VI, 945; Holley, 131; James M, Spaight, The Be­
ginnings of Organised Air Power (London: Longmans, Green, 1927),
293, established the ratio as 3 to 1 against the German air force,




taxed even to supply the tactical air requirements of its large 
ground forces. This inability stemmed, apparently, from weakness
03in organizational and administrative structure. Thus it was 
that Britain, under the pressures generated by the German day­
light attacks of June 1917, assumed, albeit not without hesita­
tion, the mantle of Allied leadership in this new domain of war.
In Britain the Air Board had already been created to 
formulate both air policy and doctrine; later in the year it 
was supplanted by the Air Ministry, which exercised control 
over both military and civil aviation and provided for procure­
ment; in the following spring the Royal Air Force, embracing all 
land-based and sea-borne aviation, was created. By the middle of 
1918 a special strategic task force was established within the 
Royal Air Force and designated the "Independent Force." Its 
purpose was described by Sir William Wier, the Secretary of 
State for the Royal Air Force, as "the continuous bombing of 
German industrial c e n t e r s . A t  the outset it was composed of 
five squadrons— of which two were of the long range, night bomber 
type. This independent air force, as it became popularly known, 
was placed under the command of General Trenchard. Although the
Spaight, 221-237.
B^Holley, 43, 54, 202.
Jones, Appendix Vol, Appendix VII, "Memorandum . . .  
on the Responsibility and Conduct of the Air Ministry," May,
1918:
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independent air foree never comprised more than nine squadrons, 
despite a much larger planned strength, it dropped 550 cons of 
bombs on a large number of German targets between June and 
November, 1918— more than the Germans had unloosed over Britain 
during more than three years of strategic bombardment and more 
than four times as many tons as the entire United States Army 
Air Service dropped during the comparable period of 1 9 1 8 . 8 6  
The number of Allied bombings of Germany rose sharply 
during 1918, as indicated by the following data taken from 
Jones:
Year By Day By Night Estimated Nr 
of Bombs
1915 44 7 940
1916 21 75 917
1917 45 130 5,234
1918 119 235 7,117
TOTAL 229 446 14,208
The major effects of the strategic bombardment campaign against 
Germany itself were listed by Jones in the following order of 
importance: (1 ) weakening of the national resistance; (2) de­
crease in manufacturing output of war equipment and materials, 
chiefly through loss of time occasioned by raids; (3) diversion 
of much aerial strength to the work of air defense.
8 6jones, V, 153-154-; USAF Historical Studies, No. 89; 
Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Corps, 1917-1941 
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1955), 9, Hereafter cited
as USAF Historical Studies, No. 89.
87lbid:, 141.
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Had the Intern-Allied War Councilplan of August 1918 
for the strategic bombing of Germany materialized, these effects 
would no doubt have been accentuated. But as with the earlier 
hopes of the French government for strategic bombers from America, 
the inter-allied strategic bombing force, in which the United 
States Air Service might have played a leading role, never be­
came a reality, largely owing to the inability of the United 
States to provide the necessary types of aircraft. Much of this 
failure stemmed in turn from the American government^s failure to 
realize the importance of doctrine,®^
This deficiency, along with other difficulties encountered 
by the Air Service, may have derived largely from '̂ one common 
source: , , our unpreparedness and the necessity of prepar­
ing for war while hostilities were in progress," In any event, 
the poorly prepared air force experienced much "difficulty in 
keeping abreast of progress in this newest arm of warfare," 
Fortunately the American Air Service officers and men were finally 
free to utilize and draw upon the Allies’ resources of doctrine,
o norganization, and equipment. Truly, as William Mitchell, the 
highest combat commander of the Air Service, later declared,
"We were nurtured during the , , . war under the protecting 
skirts of the French Republic and the British Empire and , , .
S^Holley, 50, 63, 134, 136,
89Final Report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF, to the 
Commander-in-Chief, AEF (Washington, 1921), 133-134, 157,
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in everything we did they were our chaperons and mentors.
American Air Experience in World War I 
Doctrinal Roots
While no doubt the evolving air power doctrines of the 
Allies impressed quite a number of American officers, very pos­
sibly the most important and lasting influence of Anglo-French 
ideas was exerted through the medium of that unique individual, 
William Mitchell. His temperament, outlook, and status in the 
militarŷ ]- already predisposed him to act positively, quickly, 
and aggressively and to adopt a favorable attitude toward change.
He was highly receptive to new ideas and new ways of doing things. 
During a visit to the French sector of the front in April 1917 
the young American major readily perceived a contrast in French 
and American Army attitudes and mentality. He noted that where­
as American Army officers were characterized by adherence to 
"peace-time efficiency based on excellence in paperwork," French 
officers were "men of quick and sure decision" which they were 
not afraid to act on, and which they carried into effect vigorously
^^Typescript, "Our Stamped Out Aviation," ca. 1925, p. 21, 
General William Mitchell Papers (Library of Congress, Washington,
D. C.), Box 32. (Misfiled in 1920 Organization of Air Service 
folder). Hereafter cited as Mitchell Papers.
^^Gerald E. Wheeler, "Mitchell, Moffett, and Air Power," 
Airpower Historian, VIII (April, 1961), 79-80. Mitchell’s non- 
West Point status and his need to prove himself by deeds in 
competition with his fellow officers are underscored.
92infra, chap. II, for biographical data.
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Q  gat once.^^ A few days later Mitchell flew over enemy lines— the 
first American serviceman to do so— and was deeply impressed 
by the fact that he "could cross the lines of . . . contending 
armies in a few minutes in an airplane,"^5 while on the surface 
the rival ground forces had been locked in static trench war­
fare for three years. Were it not for the desperate plight of 
the Allies, he contended, time could be devoted to the building 
of "a suitable air force to hit the Germans where they are the 
weakest— that is, back in the interior of their country."^®
About the same time Major Mitchell formulated "with the 
aid of a few gifted French officers" a plan for an American air 
force to be built around three proven French types and intended 
for operation by the fall of 1917. Wlien the proposed program, 
cabled to Washington on April 20, evoked no response, Mitchell 
besought the French government to exert pressure on ours,^^ His 
ensuing collaboration with officers in French General Headquarters 
was apparently instrumental in the dispatch therefrom of a 
communication on May 6 specifying air requirements the United 
States should be asked to provide. This, in turn, became the
script, European Diary, Chap. I, 35, Mitchell Papers,
^^AFP 210-1-1, p.' 73.
^^William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I (New York:
Random House, rev. ed., 1960), 59. Hereafter cited as Memoirs.
^GEuropean Diary, chap. I, 105.
^^Levine, 98; Arnold, 50.
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basis of French Premier Ribot^s subsequent cable to Washington 
officially establishing such requirements. Out of the Ribot cable 
grew America’s World War aeronautical program.Mitchell’s 
rapidly budding doctrinal concepts were soon stimulated greatly 
by contact with a British air leader who was to exercise a pro­
found influence on him— a leader who "had a complete philosophy 
of air power. " 1 0 0
It was May 1917 when Major Mitchell fell under the 
apparently magic spell of the commander of the Royal Flying 
Corps, General Sir Hugh Trenchard. Commenting on his four-day 
visit to British air headquarters, Mitchell described Trenchard 
as "a man of about six feet in height, erect of carriage, decided 
in manner, and very direct in speech"; he related that they soon 
"became fast friends"; and added that he had never worked with or 
known a man he more greatly respected or in whose judgment he had 
more confidence.
Asked by the British air chief what he wanted to know, 
Mitchell explained that he "desired to learn about his organiza­
tion, his equipment, his system of supply, and . . .  [opera­
tions] , ” 1 0 2 host related 1 in detail the policies and doctrines
OOjbid., 97-101; Arnold, 50-51.
OOr. H. Ransom, "Lord Trenchard— Architect of Air Power,"





which had evolved in the air force from the outset of the war.
As to strategic air warfare. General Trenchard declared 
"that aviation should be used over the enemy^ s country as far 
as possible. In his opinion it was perfectly practicable for 
airplanes . . .  to attack the rear of the German army through 
the air and destroy all its means of supply, subsistence, and 
replacement,”103
Mitchell immediately commented in his diary in his usual
enthusiastic manner:
With an increase in the radius of operation . . .  Berlin 
could be reached, . . . .  These things are perfectly 
possible of accomplishment from a praetical standpoint.
All that is needed is the development of the airplane and 
the method of handling them. . . .  The ground troops do 
not yet realize that they are perfectly incapable by them­
selves of dealing a blow at the heart of the enemy’s 
country, or his vital centers. . . .  Aircraft can fly 
straight to these vital points, and if sufficient air­
craft could be gotten together, a great decision could be 
obtained through the air alone [italics added] by destroy­
ing all of the enemy’s vital centers, his manufactures . . .  
supply points . . . railroads and roads . . . bridges and
. . . his armies.104
As late as April 1918 Mitchell apparently entertained the 
opinion that "if we had had sufficient bombardment aviation, we 
could have brought the war to a close by carrying it to the vital 
points in the interior of Germany and making the people sue for 
peace.....
103Ibid.
10^European Diary, chap. II, 26, 
lO^Memoirs, 197.
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Referring to those who stood in the way of independent 
air power, Mitchell did not overlook the British Navy’s opposi­
tion to Trenchard, a parallel to his own later experience with 
the United States Navy:
Another element that militates against the development of 
air power is the navy. The . . .  Naval Air Service . . .  
has organized squadrons that are fighting on land . . .
[The Third Bombardment Wing at Luxeil in eastern France"], 
They have their own way of operating. . . .  The navy also 
opposes any air operations against the enemy that are not 
under their control and wishes to control, for that matter, 
all air operations. It is General Trenchard’s opinion that 
eventually air power will be much stronger than sea power, 
[italics added] The old conservative elements in the navy 
see this and oppose any change,1 ^ 6
When Trenchard asserted that "the only way to handle air
power was to unify it all under one command," Mitchell found
himself in complete agreement:
I thoroughly concur in General Trenchard’s ideas on this 
subject, because we have had a terrible time in our own 
country in attempting to coordinate the interests of the 
army and navy, which are always diametrically opposed to 
aviation and which have resulted in holding up and prac­
tically wrecking American airpower. It is holding us up 
now in organizing our air forces for the European war.
. . , What should be done in America is to establish an 
independent air department at once. . . .̂ 7̂
In the course of the American major’s stay at RFC Head­
quarters Trenchard read a paper representing "his opinions and 
policy at the t i m e . T h i s  was the British air commander’s 
"Future Policy in the Air," in which he advocated incessant 
offensive as the tactical doctrine best calculated to insure




unhindered operation of one’s own observation aviation while keep­
ing similar enemy operations over one’s territory to the minimum. 
Regarding this concept, Mitchell made the following important 
entry as he reviewed the tactics which Trenchard had outlined:
This was all the bombardment aviation and pursuit he could 
get together so that he could hurl a mass of aviation at any 
one locality that needed an especial air attack. His idea 
was to send them across in one big formation, attack the 
objective with their bombs and machine guns, fight whatever 
air battles were necessary, and then get back. This, of 
course, is the proper way to use air power, I am sure the 
future will see operations conducted in this way by thousands 
of airplanes.
It was precisely this concept of tactical employment that Mitchell 
used to advantage in the air battle over St, Mihiel in the follow­
ing year.
With reference to British tactical organization based upon 
specialization of function, Mitchell observed that "General 
Trenchard’s method of handling the air forces actually with the 
troops was to place with each army the airplanes that were nec­
essary for the use of the ground troops in action; for their own 
domestic use, as he put it. . . .  General Trenchard assembled 
the bulk of the aviation in what he called a General Headquarters 
Wing or Brigade, From this fundamental principle of organiza­
tion Mitchell never departed.
In February of the following year Mitchell made what he 
termed a "special study" of the German employment of aviation.
^^^European Diary, chap. II, 28.
HOlbidZ
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What apparently impressed him most lastingly was the flexibility 
of the German system, that is, the rapidity of reflex action 
which it permitted. He observed that "the rear of the German 
army was well covered with good flying fields and airdromes, 
connected by telegraph to one another and with the supply points 
in their vicinity. Thus their air forces could be shifted from 
one side of the line to the other in a very short time. . . .
They could almost always concentrate in one place more quickly 
than the A l l i e s . I n  later years Mitchell urged adoption of 
a similar system for shifting American air power from the 
interior to the coast or from one coast to another.
Despite the benefits to be derived from available European 
doctrine, the fledgling air force in Europe was unable to obtain 
the kind of force structure it wanted, even when its leaders in 
the Paris headquarters were in agreement. In the stern school 
of war it proved impossible to remedy quickly the results of years 
of neglect and unpreparedness. Both organization and employment 
of the Air Service, AEF were necessarily affected by the number, 
kinds, and quality of aircraft produced within the Allied coali~ 
tion.
Other Limiting Factors: Equipment and Time
The Air Service’s actual operational experience— itself 
destined to exercise a major influence on postwar doctrines of 
employment— was determined not onJ.y by contemporary concepts of 
employing aircraft in military operations but by the types of
H^Memoirs, 180-181.
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airplanes actually supplied by the United States and the Allies. 
Availability of certain types of aircraft for operational use was 
in turn dependent to a great degree upon the structure and pro­
duction emphasis of the American aircraft industry and the surplus 
capacity, if any, of Allied production.
In any event, the types of aircraft produced in America 
were considerably different from what either the Allies, es­
pecially. the French, or the Air Service, AEF had expected. In 
his cable of May 1917, Premier Ribot had requested 4,SOU planes, 
plus replacements of 2 , 0 0 0 a month, for operation by the spring 
of 1918; the greater part were to be bombing planes and pursuit 
escorts designed for strategic air operations. However, for some 
inexplicable reason, that portion of the cable dealing with types 
of aircraft was apparently deleted and never received in Washing­
ton.
The decision as to types to be produced rested uneasily 
among a number of organizations of varying competence. Of these 
the Office of the Signal Corps remained critically important 
throughout that period in 1917 when decisions were made as to 
types finally put into production. The consistently conserva- 
time position of the Signal Corps was that the value of the air­
plane was limited to reconnaissance work. On the other hand, 
the Bolling mission— dispatched to Europe in June 1917 to gather 
data and report on types of aircraft to be produced— had seem­
ingly been impressed by strategic bombing concepts, but it failed
ll^Holley, 42f.
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nevertheless to emphasize this point in its report. Instead 
it recommended production priorities in the following order: (1 ) 
training aircraft; (2) tactical aircraft, largely observation 
and protective pursuit, to operate with army forces in the field; 
and (3) once the tactical requirements of the ground force in 
France had been met, bombers, protected by pursuit planes. Thus 
its influence was seemingly thrown in the direction of tactical 
rather than strategic type aircraft. The consequence was that 
89 per cent of the total number of aircraft produced in the 
United States were designed either for observation or fighter 
defense of observation functions.
The Air Service, AEF itself seemed to be aware of the 
implications of aircraft production facts and tried, persistently 
but apparently in vain, to influence from afar the scope and 
direction of the production program. In the end, however, the 
Air Service, AEF"s final attempt at formulation of a program—  
the "202 Program"— seemed to stem more from a realization of the 
de facto situation prevailing in the production program than 
from its desire for a particular kind of force structure.
That the programs of the Air Service, AEF were in them­
selves, however, lacking in internal consistency of conceptual 
aim and planned application of force was clear from the succession 
of air force designs, shown below, which emanated from its Paris 




Number and Types of Squadrons Requested 
by Air Service, AEF-̂-̂^
Pursuit Observation Bomber Total
17 Oct. 1917 120 80 60 260
9 Apr. 1918 Itf 50 56 120
6 Jun. 1918 120 4-0 101 261
29 Jul. 1918 60 101 4-1 202
Obviously such fluctuations were hardly the product of combat 
experience, which dated only from April 1918, Rather they re­
flected to a considerable extent changing British and French 
views of the role of air power in war. Actual flying equipment 
in American hands bore little resemblance to these production 
plans.
In June 1918 the Air Service in France had five squadrons 
equipped entirely with aircraft of foreign manufacture, not one 
of which was designed for bombardment operations.By the end 
of the war the American flying force in France counted at the 
front and behind it 24- observation squadrons— some of which 
doubled as day-bombers— and but one squadron of long-range night 
b o m b e r s . O f  the 6,287 aircraft on hand in November 1918, 
slightly over 1,200 had come from the United States, Of the 
latter, which consisted entirely of DH-4- observation craft—
^^^Ibid., 4-9. Aircraft actually on contract in April 1918: 
2,000 pursuit, 1,050 bombers, and 8,000 observation craft. Ibid.
l̂ Êdgar' .S. Gorrell, The measure of Americans World War 




already obsolete and sub-marginal in performance, 960 were at 
the front; the remaining 5,000 aircraft were composed of nine 
other types of Allied craft. The majority of the latter— M-,791—  
came from French s o u r c es.Not a single United States-made 
pursuit plane or night (strategic) bomber reached the front by 
war’s end.^^^ Moreover, the time within which experience could 
be obtained diminished steadily, and in early 1918 the pressure 
for direct American help exacerbated the problem of hammering 
together an effective air force.
Organization
Nowhere perhaps was the problem of organization reflected 
more dramatically than in the contest Mitchell waged for leader­
ship of the Air Service in France. Though he had been appointed 
Aviation Officer, AEF as early as June 30, 1917,1^0 Lieutenant 
Colonel Mitchell was superseded in November by Brigadier General 
Benjamin Foulois, Signal Corps, who was named to be the first 
Chief of Air Service, AEF. Foulois, a flying officer and an 
able, methodical administrator,had headed the Airplane 
Division (formerly Aviation Section) of the Signal Corps since 
July and had apparently risen rapidly in rarik.̂ ^̂  The Air 
Service, AEF was distinct from the Air Service organization in
H^Gorrell, 35.
ll^Holley, 132, 196.
120AFP 210-1-1, pp. 73-79.
^^^Arnold, 79.
IZZ&FP 210-1-1, p. 73.
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the United States. (The latter remained under direct Signal 
Corps jurisdiction until May 1918, when two separate air depart­
ments in the United States were created, the Bureau of Military
1 noAeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production.) Although
in January 1918 Mitchell, promoted to Colonel, had been made 
Chief of Air Service of the newly organized First Army Corps 
with headquarters at Neufchateau,^^^ he apparently continued 
for some time to resent his displacement as ̂  facto leader of 
the European force, a mood reflected sometimes in caustic comments 
committed to his journal during the winter and spring of 1 9 1 8 .-*-25 
Finally, in May 1918 General Pershing decided to go out­
side the Air Service to find a commander capable of putting the 
air force house in order. When he appointed General Mason M. 
Patrick, an engineering officer, to be Chief of Air Service, AEF 
Pershing told him: "In this army there is but one thing that is
causing me anxiety, and that is the Air Service. In it are a 
lot of good men, but they are running around in circles. Some­
one has got to make them go straight. I want you to do it." 
Foulois controlled the air force supply services and training 
school, while Mitchell was placed increasingly in charge of air 




126Quoted in Arnold, 80,
^^^Ibid.; Memoirs, 205, 233.
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Combat: Application of Doctrinal Lessons
At the height of the German advance in July, Mitchell, who
"flew over the lines almost every day, keeping track of every
12 8unit, every commander," was responsible for the discovery that 
German units had started moving south across the Marne at five 
places in the Dormans area, though all the bridges were down, and 
gave AEF headquarters "exact knowledge" of it.129 pn the blunt­
ing of that crossing attempt. Allied tactical air power, includ­
ing the American First Pursuit Group, played an important ground 
attack role.11*̂  In ensuing operations at Chateau-Thierry, where 
American air units operated with the French, Mitchell prevailed 
upon the French air commander to discontinue the use of small, 
defensive patrols for protecting the work of observation planes 
and, instead, to adopt Trenchard-like offensive tactics aimed at 
keeping the enemy pinned down over his own territory.1^1
By early September Mitchell was able to mass at St.
Mihiel the greatest tactical air force assembled in the war—  
nearly 1500 aircraft, composed of American, French, British, 
and Italian contingents. In the intervening months he had
persuaded general headquarters to endorse the concept of an
^Levine, 112.
^^^Memoirs, 221; Arnold, 71.
ISOMemoirs, 222; Capt. George Kenney, Lecture, "History 
and Principles of Attack Aviation," ACTS, Langley Field, Va., 
March 11, 1930.
■| 81^^^Memoirs, 209, 211-213, 220.
, 238; AFP 210-1-1, p. 75.
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inter-allied air striking force. On the ground the three-day 
operation (September 12-15) involved M-00,000 men. To them 
Mitchell allotted the minimum force required for observation 
and its protection. These functions were performed by American 
observation squadrons, under the local protection of the Amer­
ican First Pursuit Group. The great bulk of the armada consisted 
of massed units which Mitchell was able to hurl in concentrated, 
systematic fashion against the German lines and rear areas, at 
first almost without air opposition. Two French air brigades, 
each containing about 4-00 planes, alternated in striking the 
flanks of the salient, executing ground attacks upon all pos­
sible targets. Meanwhile, Trenchard’s Independent Force struck 
airdromes to the rear and forced the fighting in the air. 
Similarly, the American 96th Bombardment Squadron, though rel­
atively weak, attacked the key point of Vignuelles, 30 miles 
distant from the front; air combat was joined by the pilots of 
the accompanying Second and Third Pursuit Groups. So success­
ful was the over-all effort of the Allied air force that the 
Germans, who were already in process of evacuating the exposed 
salient on the tenth, soon experienced great difficulty in 
extricating themselves without excessive losses of prisoners 
and guns. The German air force was thus "forced . . .  to measure 
strength” with Mitchell's air army and to concentrate in the St. 
Mihiel area to cover the safe withdrawal of their ground forces.
ISOMemoirs, 24-1-24-6,
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The "successful and very important part taken by the air 
forces" under Mitchell's command in this first offensive of the 
American Army was noted by General Pershing in a letter to Mitchell 
on September 16. He commended the air leader upon "the organiza­
tion and control of the tremendous concentration of air forces. 
Trenchard, too, in congratulating Pershing on the operation, was 
of the opinion "that of all the air operations in his experience 
this was the first in which no hitch had occurred, no order had
1 3 Cbeen misunderstood, and no mission had failed." For Mitchell 
this was indeed "praise from the master himself."̂ 36
Shortly afterwards, however, the scope of the tactical air 
task confronting Mitchell increased appreciably. In the H7-day 
campaign of the Meuse-Argonne, which began in late September, 
the American air leader was faced with the typical World War I 
problem of stalemate on the ground. Not only was the enemy ground 
position well fortified and organized for defense, but their 
posture in the air was much stronger than it had been at St.
Mihiel. At the same time. Allied air power was weaker in that 
it was once more divided into fragments. With some notable ex­
ceptions, only Air Service aircraft were available during the 
protracted, inconclusive carrpaign. Under such circumstances 
Mitchell deployed his air power along the central axis of the




ground advance and sought to attack and engage the enemy behind 
his lines wherever possible. Despite numerous enemy incursions 
into ÀEF air space, the American air commander was able, through 
offensive employment of his units, to furnish general protection 
to the ground units along the 30-mile-long stretch of f r o n t . ^̂ 7 
Still, he was not satisfied.
To break the stalemate, Mitchell suggested to Pershing 
the preparation and use of an airborne army to be landed by 
parachute behind enemy lines and proposed tactics for its em­
ployment. The war ended, however, before the scheme could be 
implemented. Mitchell subsequently referred to such forces as 
"independent . . . aviation, which acts by itself directly 
against the enemy aviation and its ground troops" and predicted 
that "in this class of war . . . the greatest development may be 
expected in the future as it will be able to attack not only 
enemy air forces but enemy ground troops and enemy naval forma­
tions. Clearly, Mitchell’s dominant conception of air
power had shifted from the realm of the strategic to that of 
the tactical between April and November 1918. This phenomenon 
paralleled and was part of the larger experience pattern of the 
entire Air Service, A.E.F., which was formed during the seven- 
month period of combat operations, April to November 1918.
But once the victory had been won, even the tactical
137Memoirs, 250-260.
138Q̂ Q-j-ed in Levine, 151, citing Aircraft Journal, July 5,
1919.
role of air power seemed to drop out of sight. As for strategic 
air power, certainly it had not been exercised to any appreciable 
degree during the war. At best it remained an unknown quantity, 
fit largely for speculation and theory. Certainly there was no 
body of strategic experience in the American air arm which could 
be pointed to as a basis for ready development of heavy bombard­
ment. The extreme handicaps which had limited the experience
of the American air force in World War I were but dimly perceived, 
if at all; a conception of the potential of air power was visible 
but to a gifted few. Consequently most postwar discussions 
revolved around what actually did happen, and not what might 
have happened, or what could happen in the future. As within 
the Army as a whole, so within the Air Service itself— so largely 
conditioned by the experiences of the war, there was a tendency 
to relate the future role of air power to an elaboration of the 
tactics employed in the last months of the war.
The opinion of the majority of air officers in the higher 
echelon of the Air Service was typified by Colonel Thomas DeWitt 
Milling, who commanded the air units of the First Army. He empha­
sized that the postwar air arm’s value to the military establish­
ment u.cpended upon proper correlation with the infantry and 
artillery. Both he and Colonel Frank P. Lahm, who occupied a 
comparable position with the Second Army, agreed that observation
^^9Capt. Laurence S. Kuter, ACTS, Lecture, "American Air 
Power— School Theories versus World War Facts," World War History 
Course, 1937-38. Sec also ACTS, Bombardment, 1933 (Maxwell Field, 
Ala.: 1933), p. 9.
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and other services to the ground arms constituted the main 
functions of the air service. Apparently because of differences 
of opinion within the War Department and Air Service over the 
role air power had played and the role that it might play, the 
report of the Chief of Air Service was held up until 1921. In 
that report General Patrick declared that the most important 
function of the air force was observation. The document con­
tained no systematic appraisal of air power in the winning of 
the victory; little in the way of significant lessons was culled 
from the costly wartime experience. There was a recognition of 
the need for development of tactical ground attack aviation, and 
a recommendation for the development of this type of aviation as 
a specialized function of the air force. However, neither here 
nor in any other official publications of the early postwar air 
service was there any formulation of concepts that was at variance 
with the prevailing doctrine of the primacy of observation.
Despite the claims made for strategic bombardment for a time 
during the war, there was little evidence to indicate the per­
sistence of that point of view among professional airmen at or 
shortly after the end of hostilities. In any event, almost no­
body in the Air Service seemed to be aware of the need for an 
objective, systematic, and sustained study of concepts of em­
ployment and tactical methods of operations, and there was no 
established organization within the Air Service to which such a 
task might have been routinely a s s i g n e d . N o  doubt because of
l^OHolley, 157-158, 160, 168-169.
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the void thus formed; serious students of the art of air warfare 
turned increasingly to the ideas of air leaders like William 
Mitchell and Giulio Douhet in the 1920’s.
PART II
EARLY POSTWAR AIR THOUGHT IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES
CHAPTER II
WILLIAM MITCHELL AND HIS AIR POWER 
DOCTRINE, 1921
While serious as well as fictional accounts of military 
aviation and aerial conflict had appeared in public print be­
fore 1914, it required the cataclysm of the First World War to 
bring forth the two greatest exponents of air power in the 
first half of this century— William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet.^ 
In this and the following chapter their major, formative exper­
iences are set forth and compared, followed by a functional 
exposition of their doctrinal positions in 1921.
Though born in 1879 in Nice, France, William Mitchell 
grew up in Milwaukee, Wisconsin where the family was so prominent 
that "Mitchell landmarks" were a familiar sight. Son of Senator 
John Lendrum Mitchell, an anti-imperialist who nevertheless 
supported the resolution for war with Cuba, William Mitchell 
belonged to a generation which "went to war the way a champion­
ship team goes to a tournament." Leaving George Washington 
University to enlist as a private in a Wisconsin regiment,
Ĥ. G. Wells, The War in the Air (New York: Macmillan,
1908); Claude Grahame-White and Harry H. Harper, The Aeroplane 
in War (London: Laurie, 1912).
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Mitchell soon obtained a commission in the Signal Corps and 
rapidly showed his superiors that he was "a man of ability, 
energy, and intelligence," his detachment laying more miles of 
telegraph lines than any other in Cuba. Arranging to be re­
assigned to the Philippines upon the pacification of Cuba, he 
distinguished himself during the campaign against Aguinaldo by 
improvising and building emergency telegraph communications 
under extremely formidable circumstances. Upon returning home 
in 1900 via Japan, China, India, Egypt, and Europe, he obtained 
a regular army commission and was soon assigned to Alaska where 
he spent two years constructing telegraph lines finally linking 
Nome with the United States. Leaving the northland as the 
youngest captain in the army, he served as an instructor in 
signal communications at the Army Staff College at Fort Leaven­
worth and then attended successively the army's School of the 
Line and Staff College. Reassigned as Chief Signal Officer for 
Luzon in 1909, he found time to map various off-shore islands, 
investigate purported Japanese activity therein, observe Vnilitary 
maneuvers in Japan in 1911, and tour Korea and Manchuria. By 
1912 he was back in the United States, stationed on the Mexican 
border. Before long he became, at the age of 32, the youngest
officer on the General Staff, in charge of ml"".itary intelligence
2emanating from the Balkan area, where war was blazing.
When the First World War broke out in August 1914 his
^Unless otherwise noted, data on Mitchell’s life are based 
on Levine, which remains the most reliable and complete biography 
available despite its tendency toward hero-worship.
53
task was to keep up war maps in the White House, Congress, and 
the War Department. With excellent sources of data to guide him 
and the experience of Europe before him, Mitchell in 1915 wrote 
a paper for the Army War College entitled "Our Faulty Military 
Policy." Criticizing America’s desuetude after each major war, 
he called for the creation of a Council of National Defense com­
prising the top leadership of both services; asked that the mili­
tary establishment be given a greater voice in the government; and 
recommended the adoption of a modern military program based on 
adequate preparation for war in time of peace on a scale commensurate 
with the possible military strength of our enemies, and compulsory
3military service. This marked the first of Mitchell’s indefatig­
able labors to modernize the American defense system. During 
these years he was ulso instrumental in the early application of 
radio and motor transport in the Army^ and soon decided to take 
up flying, the newest application of science. By 1916 he could 
see that we would soon be involved in the war and that aviation’s 
star was rising. He learned to fly on weekends at a school near 
Washington. Though his first solo resulted in a crack-up, "his 
flying experience was enough to gain him an appointment as head 
of the aviation section of the Signal Corps and a promotion to
^"Our Faulty Military Policy," Washington, Army War 
College (July, 1915), 21.
^Edward Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell and Seversky," in 
Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E. M. Earle (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 19M-3) , H88.
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major.
Encountering difficulty in this new type of assignment, he 
soon arranged to go to Europe as an observer instead. Apparently 
he had inadvertently speeded his departure from Washington by 
outspoken criticisms of the handling of the aviation program.® 
Within a week after Mitchell’s arrival in Spain, the United 
States entered the war, and he proceeded to France where he soon 
became a popular American hero.7 Despite the vicissitudes of 
fortune, he rose rapidly in rank from major to brigadier general, 
and during the closing weeks of the war commanded all the aerial 
operations of the Air Service. On November 7 he received the 
Distinguished Flying Cross in recognition of extraordinary
Oheroism displayed on several occasions.
After a brief stay in Germany with the occupation forces, 
Mitchell returned home and on March 10, 1919 became immediate 
assistant to the new Director (later. Chief) of Air Service,
Major General C. T. Menoher, under the title. Director of Mili­
tary Aeronautics.^ For six long frustrating years, he was to 
remain the number two man in the Air Service in Washington.^®
®Brig Gen Dales 0. Smith, United States Military Doctrine 
(New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1955), 131.
®Arnold, 9-9.
^Levine, 112-115; Arnold, 9-9, 85.
®Levine, 127, 193.
®AFP 210-1-1, 76.
^®Ruth Mitchell, My Brother Bill (New York: Harcourt,
1953), 307.
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Mitchell had returned in 1919 in anticipation of taking over 
command of the air f o r c e . I n  this position he undoubtedly 
hoped to arrest the deceleration so painfully evident in the 
course of military aviation. More than once in these years, 
therefore, Mitchell attempted to recast the organization of the 
air force with a view toward creating a more important place for 
himself in the operational or tactical part. In April 1919 he 
proposed to General Menoher a new structure comprising two major 
divisions, one of an essentially personnel and support nature to 
be called the "Air Service," and the other, a tactical organiza­
tion, to be called the "Air Force," the latter of which none but 
a flying officer might be eligible to command,This recommenda­
tion was strongly rejected by Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Westover, 
the executive officer to the Director of the Air Service, and 
one who was to serve as Commandant of the Air Service Tactical 
School in the mid-twenties and as Chief of Air Corps in the mid­
thirties. In his reply of April 18, Westover called the "proposi­
tion of a separate U, S. Air Force charged only with tactical 
operations . . .  entirely out of the question at present," and 
cited the experience of split organizations within the Air Ser­
vice during the war as more than sufficient reason not to estab­
lish two "co-ordinate activities, neither of which knows definite­
ly what it w a n t s . B u t  the shrunken state of aviation in the
Arnold, 86-87,
^^Memo to Director of Air Service, Apr. 16, 1919. 
l^Memo to Director of Military Aeronautics, Apr. 18, 1919.
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immediate postwar era continued to appall Mitchell, and despite 
this rehuff he sought by every means in his power to restore and 
reinvigorate aviation.
By March of 1920 Mitchell had become convinced that his 
role was to be that of a national savior. He wrote:
In view of the rapid disintegration of the Air Service, 
it became a vital necessity for some prompt action to pre­
vent the destruction of a valuable agent in the National 
Defense beyond the point that is necessary due to peace 
conditions. . . . In this emergency General William 
Mitchell felt it his duty to his country to enter into the 
effort to save as much as possible of the assets remaining 
and with these to build on a new but sound foundation the 
structure of a revived Air Service that will . . .  be a 
great national asset as well as the nation’s foremost line 
of defense.^Italics added]
To carry out this self-imposed task, Mitchell devised a strategy
which aimed at forcing a solution on the War and Navy Departments
from without. While continuing to proselyte within the service,
he placed increasing reliance upon instigating and building up a
"swelling tide of pressure, inspiring public hearings and wide
discussion, and forcing the issue of air power into the open.
The other mainspring of his strategy was to demonstrate in all
ways possible the superior properties and overwhelming power of
the air arm. The sinking of several heavy naval vessels off the
east coast was one of the most important aspects of his program.
During the course of preparation for the tests of the
^^Typescript, WD, ODAS, Mar. 2, 1920, no subject, Mitchell 
Papers, Box 32, filed under "Plans for Aeronautics."
^^Wheeler, Air Power Historian, VIII (Apr., 1961), 79-80.
^^Levine, 175.
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summer of 1921 which he finallÿ arranged after applying intensive 
pressure upon the navy through various channels, an incident 
occurred which Mitchell characteristically used to attack those 
whom he considered responsible for the lamentable condition of 
aviation. In late May there had been a widespread furore in the 
press over the circumstances surrounding a serious airplane crash 
and related mishaps during a severe electrical storm near Indian 
Head, Maryland which Mitchell blamed in part on the absence of a 
radio service to furnish flying directives and weather bulletins. 
He argued that only a unified air department could furnish 
efficiency and safety. Soon there were some publicly voiced 
demands that Mitchell be placed in charge of a reorganized air 
service, but in early June the Chief of Air Service instead re­
quested Secretary of War Weeks to remove Mitchell from his staff. 
Fortunately the latter occupied a strong position, being in charge 
of the impending bomb tests. Mr. Weeks, who had previously been 
quoted in the press as saying that Mitchell had "greatly annoyëd 
the Navy on several occasions," stood by him, announced that the 
bombing tests would be held under all circumstances, and assumed 
the role of peacemaker between Mitchell and Menoher, but ad­
ministered "a mild reprimand to Mitchell who was asked to offend 
no more by talking out of school.
In July Mitchell’s àir bombing exercises off the Virginia 
Capes culminated in the sinking of the ex-German cruiser Frank­
fort and the dreadnought Ostfriesland, events revolutionary in
17lbid., 229, 231-39.
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their implications for air and sea power. The latter ship, accord­
ing to Captain Hollweg of the German navy, who had brought her to 
the United States, had been constructed to be "as nearly unsink- 
able as possible" and had proved her sturdiness during the Battle 
of Jutland. Yet before the unbelieving eyes of many on-looking 
dignitaries and high-ranking army and navy commanders, the 
Ostfriesland went down under the attack of the First Provisional 
Air Brigade, personally directed by Mitchell, within 21 minutes 
from the beginning of ordered bombing on July 21.18
Though the Joint Board of the Army and Navy in its official 
report of August 21, signed by the Chief of Staff, General 
Pershing, admitted that the air weapon might play a possibly 
decisive role in coastal defense,!^ it insisted that the air­
plane had not made the battleship obsolete and continued to main­
tain that the latter remained the "greatest factor of naval
2(1strength" and hence of national defense. Thereupon Mitchell 
apparently leaked to the press his own report on the bombing 
tests which General Menoher had pigeonholed. This created 
another sensation. Mitchell’s critique would have removed the 
navy from the coastal defense mission entirely. The intrepid
IGibid., 240-263.
l^Joint Board, "Report of Aerial Tests," Aug. 21, 1921, 
quoted in War Department Statement by Brig Gen Hugh A. Drum,
Ass’t Chief of Staff, WDGS, before the President’s Board of 
Aviation Inquiry, Sep. 21, 1925, 22.
*̂̂ Ashbrook Lincoln, "The United States Navy and the Rise 
of the Doctrine of Air Power," Military Affairs XV (Fall, 1951), 
153.
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aviator asserted that, had his bombing brigade been fully employed,
it could have put the entire Atlantic fleet out of action in one
attack, and demanded a revamping of the national defense.
When General Menoher, a former commander of the "Rainbow
Division," asked to be relieved as Chief of Air Service unless
the Secretary of War backed him up in disciplining Mitchell, he
was advised to take another command if he could not handle
Mitchell, and on September 17 he resigned. Mitchell, who
initially offered to resign also, quickly changed his mind and
agreed to stay on under the new Chief of Air Service, Major General
Mason M. Patrick. The latter had been prevailed upon by General
Pershing to put the air force in order just as he had the Air
? ?Service, AEF in May 1918. A generally satisfactory relation­
ship was established between Mitchell and Patrick.23
In 1921 Mitchell’s first major book. Our Air Force—
Keystone of National Defense, was published. Aimed mainly at 
evoking public support for the claims of air power, it was also 
directed at persuading and convincing the military elite of the 
validity of a new concept of defense based on the leading role 
of the air weapon,
Mitchell’s Concept of War
Mitchell’s thought on war and the role of air power in
23-Levine, 269-270.




war varied over the years and was not always consistent, even at 
a given time. Although his early acceptance of the theory of 
strategic bombing did not outlast the war, he nevertheless con­
tinued to make occasional references to the related theme of 
total war, an admittedly popular one, without giving it a specific 
tactical or strategic orientation. For example, in 1921, he wrote 
that the next war would be ruthless, one of "all against all," 
with the dominant air power stopping at nothing to win a decision,
2 U.one that might, he inferred, come quickly. Yet, his major con­
tributions to military thought in the very same year indicated 
almost a contrary position.
In point of fact Mitchell continued for several years to 
see war in the relatively limited terms of direct combat between 
armed adversaries. Undoubtedly he was influenced to some degree 
by the fame gained by the ground forces— which had decided the 
issue— and the official endorsement of the view that tactical 
support of surface forces, centered around observation, was the 
true role of air power. At the same time there was also a grow­
ing popular antipathy toward mass bombardment, and this view was
supported in some of the highest military and civil echelons of
2 ̂government. Secretary of War Baker being a prominent example. 
Officially, the Joint Board in its statement of mission for the 
air arm rejected any strategic role for it in December 1 9 1 9 .
"̂̂ Mitchell, Our Air Force— Keystone of National Defense 
(New York: Putnam, 1921), xxi-xxiv.
^^USAF Historical Studies, No. 89, 14—15.
^^Typescript, WD, ODAS, "Notes on the Functions of the Air
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In Mitchell’s writings during the early 1920’s the pre­
dominant thought was that war was a struggle between armed forces, 
not between peoples. In January 1921 he asserted that the ulti­
mate answer in war was determined by man-to-man combat and that 
the air force supplemented the army.^/ In the spring of the 
same year he wrote that an air force would work its will initially 
through joint operations with the army and later through oceupa- 
tion.28 In 1922 Mitchell stated emphatically that "defeat of the 
enemy forces is the purpose of the conduct of war.
Mitchell’s C ncept of Air Power Employment
The Role of Pursuit Aviation.— Harking back to the words 
of Trenchard, Mitchell started from the premise that "there is 
no defense against an air force except an air force." Because 
of its speed and mobility an air force could not be adversely 
affected by surface weapons such as antiaircraft artillery.
At the same time the offensive power of the war plane, con­
stantly being augmented by advanees in engineering and chemistry.
Service," Feb. 10, 1920, in NA, RG 18, CDF 321.9, Box 478; cf. 
"Tactical Application of Military Aeronautics" (1919). Here­
after cited as "Tactical Application."
^^Mitchell, Statement on Needs of Air Service, Jan. 4,
1921, 31, in USAFHA 248.211-16E91.
^^Typescript, "Air Supremacy and What It Would Mean,"
Mar. 31, 1921, p. 2, Mitchell Papers, Box 24.
^^Mitchell, Notes on the Multi-Motored Bombardment Group, 
n.p., ca. 1922, 108.
^Opur Air Foree, 14; Statement on Needs of Air Service,
Jan. 4, 1921, 3.
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was such that no surface operations could proceed effectively 
without assurance of control of the air,^^ Upon this basis he 
proceeded to erect the structure of his air doctrine.
Accordingly, Mitchell declared, the doctrine of aviation 
must be "to find out where the enemy air force is, to concentrate 
rapidly on that point with pursuit aviation, to attack and 
destroy the hostile aviation, and then to attack the enemy 
organizations, whether on the land or on the sea, with attack 
and bombardment units." Provided that it had obtained control 
of the air, the air force could then very largely select "the 
time, the place, and the method of attack" that it desired to 
use against a navy or an army„ The problem was to gain mastery 
of the sky. Mitchell was emphatic in his conviction that this 
could be gained "in no other way" than by the air battle of 
pursuit aviation.^Italics added] Its mission was nothing 
less than to achieve such control. By means of enveloping and 
attacking other aircraft— functions which they alone could per-
o gform— the fighter planes were destined to rule the sky.^ He 
wrote:
Nothing can resist the attack of pursuit aviation 
properly handled. . . .  The only aviation capable of 
challenging the supremacy of pursuit aviation is other 
pursuit aviation. A large lumbering airplane or collec­
tion of airplanes, no matter how well armed, cannot
^^"Air Supremacy and What It Would Mean," 5, 19.
^̂ Tÿp.dÿcript, "Mission of an Air Force," n.d., £a. 1921, 
pp. 2-3, Mitchell Papers, Box 25.
33lbid.a 3; "Tactical Application," 11.
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resist the surrounding attack of pursuit aviation,
Necessarily, then, the other components of an air force were
dependent upon support from the fighters. Mitchell asserted:
All other branches of military aeronautics are helpless 
without an adequate, strong, well-trained and well-equipped 
pursuit aviation. . . .  All kinds of bombardment aviation 
are completely at the mercy of pursuit aviation. Observa^ 
tion aviation cannot act without its protection, while the 
heavily armored attack airplanes, no matter how well pro­
tected, will be shot down without the assistance of pursuitaviation.35
It logically followed that pursuit aviation constituted 
"the basis of an air force." When questioned in Congress as to 
the types of airplanes most needed, Mitchell answered that "of 
course, the pursuit ship is the most essential always. . . .
And the next is the bombardment ship."^® Of the three branches 
of the air force, defined as the tactical organization used to 
attack an enemy, Mitchell therefore put pursuit first, bombard­
ment second, and attack third. If pursuit were successful, it 
could "communicate back to bring up attack and bombardment avia­
tion, and direct these to the objectives." Because of its 
primacy in aerial warfare, the pursuit arm would have to be 
"equipped with the fastest, the most maneuverable, and the best 
armed airplanes possible to devise," and the future would see 
even greater development of that arm, particularly in speed and
^‘̂Our Air Force, 4-6.
3Slbid., 53.




The Role of Bombardment and Attack Aviation.—-In 1921 
Mitchell viewed bombardment as an almost entirely tactical func­
tion. Reflecting upon his war experience, he regarded bombing 
mainly as a means of preventing the enemy from bringing up 
supplies and reinforcements to the field of battle in time to 
have an influence on the decision. Strategic bombing was seem­
ingly incidental. "The effect of interfering by air bombardment 
with the delivering of supplies along lines of communication was 
very great, and also of interfering with the manufacture of 
military equipment.^Italics added]
To achieve important results, however- tactical or day 
bombers required support from a screen of friendly fighters.
They risked destruction if they attempted to rely for protection 
solely upon the fire action of their machine guns. Mitchell 
wrote:
Many thought for a long time that bombardment aviation 
could protect itself by its own fire in a manner similar 
to that employed by battleships on the water. . . .  
Theoretically, fire is the best protection, . . .  Of 
more importance, however, is the fact that battleships 
act only in one dimension, that is, on top of the water. 
Bombardment airplanes . . .  cannot resist . . .  rapid 
attack . . .  in three dimensions.
Moreover, to avoid anti-aircraft fire, tactical bombers were
forced to climb to altitudes of 12,000 to 15,000 feet, thereby
•̂ Ôur Air Force, 14-, *-+6; "Tactical Application," 2; 
Typescript, "Air Power over the Water," Mar. 15, 1921, 3, 
Mitchell Papers, Box 24.
Air Porce, 55-56.
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decreasing normal bomb loads to 300-500 pounds while compound­
ing the difficulty of hitting the target. For these reasons, 
among others, it was essential that they assume compact forma­
tion patterns affording both a measure of protection to and from 
the objective and enhancing the chances of striking the target 
by achieving a "sort of shot-gun effect.
As to night or strategic bombing, Mitchell confined his 
treatment of this doctrinal area largely to a simple enumeration 
of the advantages of night operations. As night bombers relied 
chiefly upon the darkness to mask themselves from the enemy, 
they needed little speed. Slower airplanes permitted lower 
fuel consumption or greater bombloads and radius of action. 
Moreover, greater accuracy was attainable at night as the air­
craft "could fly low down, very close to their target. It
is probable that Mitchell’s reticence reflected both his greater 
familiarity with and faith in daytime tactical operations— the 
only Air Service night bombing squadron was organized at war’s 
end and quickly demobilized— and his disillusionment with 
strategic bombing.
As for attack aviation or light bombardment, the newest 
development in the tactical realm, Mitchell was enthusiastic.
The main function of this component was to seatter or retard 




machine gun nests, and hostile airdromes. Based upon his combat 
experience, Mitchell’s tactics called for low-level, surprise 
attacks timed for execution while offensive pursuit patrols held 
off enemy air attempts to interfere. While he went to some 
length in describing the heavy armament, protective armor, and 
capabilities of attack planes, he did not make it clear that the 
Air Service had not yet developed an aircraft of this type and 
continued to rely upon pursuit and observation craft for light 
bombing and strafing functions, a practice that persisted for 
some time.
To those functions of aviation which serviced the army
and navy directly Mitchell accorded relatively little significance,
deeming them simply auxiliaries— visual reconnaissance, aerial
photography, adjustment of artillery fire, infantry liaison,
UPscouting and patrol.
Air Power Doctrine and National Policy
Since the entire success of the air force, including the 
bombers, hinged on the effectiveness of pursuit, it foUowed that 
"without an adequate and efficient pursuit aviation, a nation is 
helpless.This doctrine led Mitchell to a consideration of 
what American military policy should be with respect to aviation.
At a congressional hearing on January 4, 1921, he stated:
^̂ Ibid., 69-70, 73.
*̂^Ibid. , 76-85; see also "Tactical Application," 3-7.
^3lbid. , 51̂.
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Our policy should be to keep as large an air force as we 
need for local defenses behind the Atlantic Coast, a 
similar force behind the Pacific Coast, and, between the 
two coasts, as much as is necessary so that, when it re­
inforces either coast, it will be sufficient to secure 
and maintain our ascendancy in the air. . . .  What we 
need behind the Atlantic Coast is a brigade of 600 air­
planes— 60% pursuit, 20% attack, and 20% bombardment; be­
hind the Paeific Coast a brigade of 600 airplanes similarly 
organized, and, throughout the country in general, an air 
division of two brigades of 1200 airplanes that can be 
shifted either way--or an offensive force of 24-00 air­
planes.
A united air force, Mitchell argued, was the most effi­
cient way to assure the nation control of the air. It was im­
perative that all air forces be concentrated under a single 
central jurisdiction. Fighting in the air, he insisted, was 
the same everywhere— land or sea, the only difference being the 
type of airdrome used. Inter-service competition should not
be allowed to break up the unity, coherence, and mass required
45for effective war operations. It was essential therefore to 
avoid division of the nation’s air power between the services, 
except that auxiliaries such as observation aviation would be 
assigned to the navy and army on a permanent basis by units, 
supplied from a large, central "reservoir of planes and per­
sonnel.
"̂ Statement on Needs of Air Service, Jan. 4, 1921, 25-26.
^^Mitchell Testimony, General Board of the Navy, Apr. 3, 
1919, 23 in Typescript, WD, OCAS, Mar. 2, 1920, Mitchell Papers, 
Box 32.
46]yiitchell Testimony, Hearings, Senate Committee on Mili­
tary Appropriations, Jun. 16, 1919, 56-57 in Typescript, WD, 
OCAS, Mar. 2, 1920, Mitchell Papers, Box 32.
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Moreover, Mitchell contended that responsibility for air 
defense should not be divided at the shore line between the naval 
and military provinces of air power, and therefore advocated 
creation of a separate but unified air force under a department 
of aeronautics comparable to the British Air Ministry. Unless 
the blurring of rival jurisdictions at the shore line were 
corrected, he predicted that "we are going to catch it all over 
the country in a way that has never been done b e f o r e . T h e  
only way to handle air power was to unify it all.
Wherever air power could be applied, Mitchell was firmly
M Oconvinced that no naval craft could survive. Under his scheme 
of national defense, centrally directed air force units deployed 
along the coasts would be responsible for detecting and repelling 
any hostile fleet that ventured within range. They would 
establish air control over the armada and proceed with its 
demolition.
By 1921 Mitchell's air power doctrine required not only 
substantial numbers of shore-based aircraft, apportioned on a 
60-20-20 basis among pursuit, bombardment, and attack aviation, 
but also 20 airplane carriers which were to be provided for 
planes operating over the water. "The whole thing should be 
known as the Air Force." This composite military air organiza-
Statement on Needs of Air Service, Jan. 4, 1921, 20.
^^Typescript, "Has Air Power Made the Battleship Obsolete?" 
ca. 1921, 1, 53, Mitchell Papers, Box 32.
"̂ "̂Tactical Application," 11.
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tion would constitute the first division of his proposed depart­
ment of aeronautics, the other two being those of supply and civil 
aeronautics. Thus the air force would directly control all combat 
aircraft, including those on carrier airdromes. The navy would 
depend upon the air force for aerial protection of its fleet. Of 
course this scheme never was accepted at naval quarters. After 
1921 Mitchell was to place less and less faith in the aircraft 
carrier and to rely increasingly upon the powerful aid of his 
long-range aerial artillery to drive the navy from coastal de­
fense out to the high seas beyond the range of aircraft. He was 
certain that future control of the seas would rest upon the out­
come of air battles between the opposing pursuit forces, and that 
a successful issue depended upon concentration of the nation’s 
combat aviation at the decisive point.Certainly, with the 
size of forces then existing and the demand for economy in gov­
ernment as well as for disarmament, Mitchell’s fears were not 
without foundation.
In any event, Mitchell’s bombing tests of the summer of 
1921, though executed generally at altitudes of only a few thou­
sand feet, demonstrated beyond any doubt the enormous striking 
power of land-based aircraft against the most heavily armored 
ships. Further tests made by the Air Service in September sank 
the Alabama.Truly air power, if not the air force, was rapidly
^°Our Air Force, 161-62, 201-203.
SlAFP 210-1-1, 78.
70
becoming America’s first line of national defense. Mitchell’s 
thought, however, was not limited solely to defense of continental 
waters and territories, however much he felt It necessary to 
appease Isolationist sentiment.
Transoceanic Employment of Air Forces.— By 1920, apparent­
ly, Mitchell already contemplated In adumbrated form the poss­
ibility of an overseas offensive campaign based on air power. He 
declared that a nation conducting an offensive war and having 
control of the air should throw Its whole air force "across the 
sea to attack the enemy air service In the hostile country and, 
the ascendancy having been gained, . . .  attack his formations 
on the g r o u n d . I n  the same year he thought he had solved the 
problem of logistics for such a campaign by means of an airship 
shuttle. The answer lay In the use of large rigid airships of 
the Zeppelin type, each carrying 10 tons of supplies— an amount 
he believed sufficient to keep many airplanes In operation for 
one day.53 Mitchell therefore believed It to be "perfectly 
practicable to keep up the train for the heavier-than-air units 
by means of dirigibles," and thought that In this way the air
5^Typescrlpt, "Notes on General Policy of Air Service,"
1, Mitchell Papers, Box 32, 1919-1920 Organization Folder; see 
also "Notes on Development of an Aeronautical Policy for the 
United States," loc. clt., for a similar statement.
^^Typescrlpt, WD, ODAS, "Notes on the Functions of the 
Air Service," Feb. 10, 1920, In NA, RG 18, CDF 321.9. Though 
not signed by Mitchell, these notes were undoubtedly prepared 
by him owing to the exact or Identical wording. In many places, 
of this paper and his lecture, "Tactical Application of Mili­
tary Aeronautics."
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service would be independent of communications, either on the
land or on the water, "making it possible to carry on an extended
54campaign through the air alone." (No such offensive mission 
for air power was prescribed by the Joint Board in its statement 
of tasks for army aircraft, as approved by the Secretaries of 
War and Navy December 29 and 27, 1919, respectively.) Even in 
his book. Our Air Force, in which he carefully noted the unique, 
self-sustaining nature of the American economy and developed a 
predominantly isolationist plan of national defense, Mitchell 
observed:
In case an offensive war is necessary, the air organiza­
tions will fly across the water to their destinations.
. . .  They will be able to force a landing in a hostile 
country through their own power, protect it, and trans­
port enough personnel there to defend the position, and 
maintain their own aircraft. 5̂
This prediction occupied less than one page of the book; such 
overseas operations were obviously highly fanciful when related 
to the technological possibilities of aircraft at that time. 
Nonetheless, it was indicative of a line of thought that he was 
to develop much further in later years.
Whether for defense of the continent or for the conduct 
of offensive operations overseas, Mitchell was already con­
vinced that air forces were the very keystone in the arch of 
national security, and that the national defense would there­
fore have to be reorganized around air power,
S^Tbid., 4.
55pur Air Force, 221.
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During the same year, 1921, similar proposals for re­
organization of national defense based upon the primacy of the 
air arm were being advanced by Mitchell’s contemporary, the 
Italian soldier and air theorist, General Giulio Douhet, 
Strikingly different, however, were his conceptions of how 
that power should be used.
CHAPTER III
GIULIO DOUHET AM) HIS AIR POWER DOCTRINE
1921
In 1909 an Italian field artillery officer wrote:
To those of us who have only armies and navies, it must seem 
strange that the sky is about to become another battlefield 
no less important than the battlefields on land and sea.
But from now on we had better get accustomed to this idea 
and prepare ourselves for the new conflict to come. . . .
The struggle for the command of the air will be bitter.
. . . The army and navy should not then see in the air­
plane merely an auxiliary arm of limited usefulness. They 
should rather see in the plane a third brother, younger of 
course, of the powerful family of War.l [italics added]
Who was this remarkable army officer who even at the dawn 
of the age of flight could perceive so clearly the implications 
of warfare in the air and the necessity of commanding that realm?
Giulio Douhet was born in 1869 in Caserta, Italy, though 
his people were from the Piedmont.^ Like Mitchell, he entered 
the army as a youth. Significantly, however, Douhet intended 
from the first to become a professional soldier and received his
Maj. G. Douhet, "II problemi del’ ario navigazione," La 
Preparazione, Rome, 1910, cited.in G. Douhet, The Command of the 
Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 194-2) , 27-28.
Ĝen. Celso Ranieri, "Biographical Notes," in G. Douhet, 
The Command of the Air, trans. Sheila Fischer (Rome: Revista
Aeronautica, 1958), xi. Unless otherwise noted, all biographical 
references are to this source.
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second lieutenant’s commission upon graduation from the artillery 
academy, where he ranked first in his class. Showing such marked 
intellectual ability, Douhet was soon assigned to attend an ad­
vanced course in electrotechnics at the Turin Polytechnic. There 
his study, "Calculations of Rotating Field Engines," was later 
adopted for use as a textbook. His subsequent work at the School 
of Warfare was likewise brilliant. As an officer representing the 
General Staff, Douhet was next assigned to various army units and 
headquarters. His continued keen interest in technical develop­
ments led him in 1904 to write a pamphlet, "Military Heavy Auto- 
mobilism," and a study, "Outlines of Electrotechnics." Not long 
afterwards he read a paper at the Sorbonnc dealing with the 
separation of oxygen and hydrogen from air. Displaying a keen 
interest in technical matters and motorized transport, Douhet, 
now a major, was made commander of the first motorcycle battalion 
formed in Italy.
Meanwhile, Douhet’s unique faculty of conceptualization 
of the future became evident. As early as 1909, upon the 
occasion of Wilbur Wright’s visit to Rome^ to start an Italian 
pilot training program, Douhet anticipated the formation of a 
military air force and an air ministry as well as the need to 
command the air. Two years later, he formally proposed to the 
Army Chief of Staff the establishment of "a competent organ" to 
deal with all matters concerning the application of air power.
In recognition of his remarkable aptitude for aeronautics,
3AFP 210-1-1, 61.
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Douhet was appointed in 1912 to be commander of the air battalion 
in Turin. There the already middle-aged officer threw himself 
into his new task with such fervor and dedication that "he soon 
came into conflict with the cautious and conventional mentality 
of his environment." During the next two years, despite the Gen­
eral Staff’s repeated rebuffs of his proposals for aircraft con­
struction, he assumed personal and financial responsibility for 
ordering the battalion workshop to proceed with the construction 
of Italy’s first three-engined plane, the Caproni 300. Though 
this aircraft was the prototype of the famous Caproni bombers of 
World War I— technically adjudged the best available in the 
opinion of the Bolling mission of 1917,^ Lieutenant Colonel 
Douhet was removed by his superiors from the field of aviation 
and reassigned to the ground forces just before the outbreak of 
war because of his "dynamic tendencies" and "strange initia­
tives.
With Italy’s entry into the war in late May 1915 against 
Austria-Hungary, Douhet was assigned as Chief of Staff of an 
important unit in the mountainous Carnatic zone on the frontier. 
As early as July 1915 he recognized the enormous difficulties 
of a successful ground offensive in this area and officially 
proposed the creation of a force of 500 Caproni bombers of 9-50 




vulnerable and least protected" points in Austria.^ This was 
probably the earliest enunciation of the strategic air bombard­
ment idea. However, almost all of Italy*s combat effort during 
the first tivo years of the war was devoted to the fighting of 
eleven successive battles on the Isonzo, a river near the north­
eastern border. The first Italian attempt to force the 60-mile 
wide front on the Isonzo lasted from June 29 to July 7, 1915.
At the end of the eleventh battle of the Isonzo in September 
1917, the Italians were not even half-way to Trieste— only 30 
miles inside the Austrian border— and had lost nearly a million 
men. These events forced one cabinet out of power and led to 
the court-martial and imprisonment of Colonel Douhet for ventur­
ing to criticize so sharply the employment of Italian forces.
For while he was Chief of Staff in Carnia in 1916 he wrote a 
memorandum to a cabinet member who had previously asked him for 
advice on military matters. In it Douhet severely criticized 
the conduct of military operations and the misuse of aviation.
When the matter came to the attention of high military authorities, 
the latter deemed it a violation of security regulations and in­
sisted upon a court-martial. Sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, 
Douhet bore the bitter burden with fortitude. In 1917 he composed 
and dispatched from his prison cell in Forte di Fenestrelle a 
memorandum to the minister of war in which he proposed that an 
inter-allied air force be formed with the object of gaining
^Quoted in Ranieri, xii, xiii.
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command of the air and executing decisive mass attacks against 
Austria. Though his conception of employment was not realized, 
it is only fair to point out that by 1917 Italy alone of all the 
Allied powers was carrying out large-scale strategic air opera­
tions of any consequence, using up to 250 Capronis in a single 
raid,7 and that, in the opinion of a respected military historian, 
"air power had been spectacularly successful” on the relatively 
short, deadlocked Italian front. Both sides were very active in 
the air; the Austrians, for example, dropped 80 tons of bombs on 
and nearly destroyed the small Italian city of Treviso— more than 
the Germans dropped on London, while the Italians repeatedly 
bombed the Austrian naval base at Pola. These were among the 
conditions which served to evoke the air power doctrine of 
Douhet, whom Theodore Ropp calls "the greatest military writer 
of the Long Armistice" (1919-1939).^
After the Italian disaster at Caporetto in 1917 the en­
tire question of the 1916 memorandum which had led to his down­
fall was re-examined, and Douhet, released from prison just be­
fore that time, was exonerated. It was found that he had not 
only aeeurately predicted the disaster but had also proposed a 
counter-strategy which might have prevented it.^ Early in 1918 
he became Director of Technical Services in the /,Aeronautical
^Holley, 55.
^Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Chapel Hill:
Duke University Press, 1959), 230, 272.
^Smith, U. S. Military Doctrine, 139.
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Bureau. In only a few months conflict broke out between the 
ideas which sprang like sparks from his keen intelligence and 
fertile imagination, and bureaucratic resistance to the in­
trusion of innovations dealing with the new air weapon. As a 
result, he resigned from the bureau,giving as his reason:
I believe that the nation has the right to demand that its 
resources be exploited in the best possible manner and 
therefore I cannot pretend to remain indifferent when I 
am convinced that such is not the case.^^
Clearly Douhet was, in the words of his biographer, "an excep­
tional personality, with unshakable convictions, . . .  and 
a dauntless conscience struggling, above all, for the affirma­
tion of a truth— which did not yet appear as such— but which he 
considered as the very pivot of his country’s defense: air
power."12
In 1921 Douhet was given a post-service promotion to the 
rank of general. Not long after the Fascist coup, he was 
appointed commissioner of aviation.1̂  Again the familiar 
pattern appeared, and Douhet retired once more— this time 
permanently— to devote the remainder of his life to the de­
velopment and refinement of his military theories.
l^Ranieri, xiii-xiv. Ranieri is not clear on this point, 
but one can infer from the absence of subsequent army assign­
ments that Douhet had resigned from or had left the service 
either in June or upon the conclusion of the Armistice; Ropp, 
273, asserts that Douhet retired in 1921.




His first major work. The Command of the Air, was published
by the Air Ministry in 1921. It aroused so much controversy that
Douhet prepared further studies: in 1923, "Difesa Nazionale,” and
in 1926, a revision of The Command of the Air, published, however,
in 1927, In the former work he outlined a unified organization
of national defense, which later was established and included a
separate air arm. In 1928 he published a monograph. The Probable
Aspects of the War of the Future; in 1929, Recapitulation or
Summing Up; and in 19 30, "The War of 19— ," which appeared in
its entirety in Revista Aeronautica, in March 1930, one month
after his death. Thus Douhet's major publications occurred in
the last decade of his life.
Like Mahan and Clausewitz, Douhet formulated ideas which 
were already in the air. That was one reason for his in­
fluence, though his works, like those of Clausewitz and 
Du Picq, were to become more famous after their author's 
death than during his lifetime.
Mitchell and Douhet Compared
From the foregoing account, it is clear that there were 
striking parallels between the largely contemporary lives of 
Mitchell and Douhet: both came from well-to-do, established
families; both entered upon a military career early in life 
and rose rapidly, largely through sheer ability and intensive 
effort; both displayed keen interest in scientific and technical 
matters, and sought with lively imagination to apply the new 
technology to military uses, first in motorized transport and
l^Ropp, 275.
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and communications, later in air transport and air weapon systems; 
both were acutely nationalistic, accustomed to the tradition of 
public service, and dedicated to modernizing the country’s national 
defenses; both saw air power as the key to national defense; and 
both were willing to pay any price, including court-martial, in 
maintaining their radical conceptions of the truth as they saw 
it.
Nonetheless, important differences between Mitchell and 
Douhet were also clearly discernible, some of which affected the 
course, direction, and outcome of their respective battles for 
the recognition of air power and its proper employment. Prob­
ably the most significant difference was that in temperament.
Where Mitchell was inclined to be direct, positive, active, out­
spoken, impetuous, insubordinate, and increasing resentful of 
what he considered to be the undue conservatism of the military 
hierarchy, Douhet was characteristically thoughtful, reflective, 
detached, deliberate, logical, and systematic in his thinking, 
and convinced of the superiority of reason over argumentation.
Thus, while Mitchell remained constantly in the arena, fighting 
to win recognition for the cause of air power, finally going so 
far as to take the fight to the people and the Congress, Douhet, 
while clearly seeing and facing the issues, stated his case in 
incontrovertible prose; once the war was over, he chose to re­
sign and pursue the battle on a purely intellectual and literary 
plane. But Mitchell continued in active service, for flying was 
his very life’s blood, and activity, restlessness, and boundless
81
energy characterized his physical being; but the combination of 
the obligations of the military service, on the one hand, and 
those of popular appeals to the public on the other— which 
appeared at times seriously to question and undermine the 
hierarchy in Washington— proved impossible of successful recon­
ciliation. Time and again Mitchell, stridently critical, cast 
caution to the winds, only to be saved by his friends and gotten 
out of Washington in time, first in 1921, and again in 1923-214-,
For reasons which are not entirely clear, Mitchell’s recrimina­
tions in 192M- became more intense, and in 192W—25 he waged an 
all-out, no-holds-barred contest against the military departments 
in Washington. Never, apparently, did he face squarely, cooly, 
and logically the inevitable consequences of the dual and contra­
dictory course that he attempted to pursue, whereas Douhet clear­
ly perceived the impossibility of continuing to serve his country 
in a given official capacity once a fundamental clash of prin­
ciples was involved in the serious matter of national defense. 
Truly Douhet came to believe more in the power of the pen than 
the sword. While Mitchell’s writings were often polemical in 
nature, Douhet’s were characterized by the presence of reason 
and logic. "It is not for me," he wrote, "nor for General Bastico 
nor for anyone else, to assign the predominant role in war to a 
particular arm. Indeed, if any one arm has an overshadowing im­
portance, it is not by any human desire, but because the dis­
coverable facts so indicate. If the aerochemical-arm is to be 
decisive in future war, it will be not my doing, and I shall
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deserve neither praise nor blame
Douhet's Concept of War: The Character of War
Douhet insisted that any doctrine of war, to be valid, must
adhere to certain criteria: the realities of war obtaining at
the time and the peculiar characteristics of the nation it re- 
1 fifers to. Accordingly, in his first major treatise, which pre­
sented for the first time a complete theory of air power, he
probed into the question of war in modern society. War Douhet
defined as "a conflict between two wills basically opposed, oneOn
to the other,” and saw the object of war, (then, as a nation's
rimposition of its will on another thrcugît̂ means of force. Modern 
conflict was between nations, not military^forces. In the past 
force was expressed through organized surface units, war being 
necessarily restricted to the surface of the earth. Thus one had 
to break through the fortified defenses of the other country or 
overcome the army defending the homeland behind it. Normally, 
then, the battlefield was strictly delimited and the status of 
the military and civilian elements sharply defined on a functional 
basis. People could go about their work undisturbed and safe 
behind the strong shield of the nation's surface forces and
fortifications. Under such conditions the army or navy came to
be seen as the true objective. These conditions prevailed as 
long as it was impossible to invade the enemy's territory without
l^Quoted in Warner, 1+9 8; cf. Command of the Air (Coward- 
McCann ed.), 251-53.
^^Command of the Air (Coward-McCann ed.), 263.
83
first breaking through his defensive line. Now, however, air 
power made it possible to go far behind the fortified lines of 
defense without first breaking through them. In future wars, 
therefore, neither army nor navy could assure the nation of 
victory, for they were no longer capable of guaranteeing the 
security of the homeland. As the air arm waxed in strength, 
the relative effectiveness of surface weapons in national de­
fense waned. Douhet did not, however, minimize the absolute 
power of surface arms, particularly on the defensive.
Resistance on the Ground.--Primarily because revolution­
ary developments in rapid fire weapons strongly favored the 
defensive over the offensive, the World War had been unduly 
prolonged. Future technological advance would, Douhet believed, 
continue to favor the defensive on the ground, "since the nature 
of development is dynamic, not static." Hence, on land, future 
conflicts would display the same general characteristics as the 
First World War. In this mistaken conviction was rooted one of 
Douhet’s chief strategic maxims, defense or resistance on land. 
Here the military model he held up for emulation was that of the 
Germans, who long used the defensive to advantage, thinning out 
their extended lines on several fronts, in order to mass for the 
offensive at single, critical points.
Concepts Governing Employment of Air Weapon Systems
Offensive Air Operations.— Since the key to victory lay
Command of the Air (Faber ed.), 13-14. Subsequent cita­
tions are to this edition, unless otherwise noted.
ISibid., 15-18.
in the offensive, the problem in an age which favored the defense
in conventional warfare was how to obtain and apply the necessary
preponderance of force entailed. To win it was necessary to gain
and to hold the initiative, to be able to plan and execute blows
at points of one’s own choosing, while the enemy, thrown upon the
defensive, had to spread his forces thin in order everywhere to
be prepared for the main blow. Ready to hand lay an instrument
almost perfectly suited to this need— the airplane— a weapon
independent of surface operations, operating at incomparable
speed, and capable of dealing sudden and "mortal blows at the
heart of the enemy." Truly air power was the offensive weapon
par excellance, for it constituted
a threat to all points within its radius of action, its 
units operating from their separate bases and converging 
in mass for the attack on the designated target faster 
than any other means so far k n o w n .  19
Thus Douhet was led to conclude that a nation’s ideal military
strategy was to concentrate its strength for offensives in the
air while its ground force assumed the defensive, resisting the
enemy on land. From these two cardinal tenets he never departed.
n nThey constituted the very basis of his strategic thought.
The Airplane as a Defensive Weapon. —  Superlatively 
adapted as the air weapon was to offensive purposes, Douhet-- 
like Trenchard— thought it a serious misconception to believe
Ibid., 18-19.
20lbid., 19; Recapitulation (1929) in Command of the Air 
(Coward-McCann ed.), 283.
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that it could be used effectively as a protective shield. To 
use air power defensively was most uneconomical and utterly im­
practicable, For example, to defend successfully twenty bases 
against attack from a given enemy force in the air, he judged
that it would be necessary to station at each of the twenty bases
21a force equal or superior to the size of the attacking force. 
Lamenting the prodigal waste of energy, material, and resources 
entailed by the basically defensive methods of air warfare 
characteristic of the First World War, Douhet insisted that the 
only practical way to prevent the enemy from attacking one with 
his air force was to destroy his air power before he had a chance 
to strike. Experience had demonstrated that all the means of 
defense— antiaircraft guns and pursuit planes— were inadequate, 
and that "every time an aerial offensive was carried out resolute­
ly, it accomplished its purpose,Instead he placed his chief 
reliance upon the bombers.
Principles of Aerial Bombardment,— The basis of Douhet’s 
new model air force was the bomber, which coupled a delivery 
system, the air vehicle, with one or more agents, incendiaries, 
gas, and explosives. These would be apportioned as the situa­
tion required. In general, Douhet suggested the use of explosives 
to prevent fire-fighters from extinguishing the flames. Attacks 
of this kind would include the use of gas to permeate the target 




be obtained either by applying a particular type of gas or by 
alternating standard gas bombs with delayed-action fuses. He 
concluded that it was "easy to see how the use of this method, 
even with limited supplies of explosives and incendiary bombs, 
could completely wreck large areas of population and their transit 
lines during crucial periods of time when such action might prove 
strategicEilly invaluable," Hence proper objectives for bombing 
were always large in size. Small targets he expressly eliminated 
from consideration. Though Douhet never thought aerial bombard­
ment would attain a high degree of accuracy, he considered this 
"unimportant because such accuracy is unnecessary." The truly 
important principle which must guide all bombing operations was 
the necessity for complete destruction: "The objective must be
destroyed completely in one attack, making further attacks on 
the same target unnecessary." Through complete destruction great 
morale and physical effects could be achieved, the repercussions
of which might be tremendous.23
To achieve such destruction, Douhet calculated that, based 
on contemporary practice, to destroy a surface 500 meters in 
diameter, ten tons of material would be required; that this 
amount in turn required an equal weight of metal casing or shell, 
hence 20 tons; that, figuring two tons of bombs per airplane, ten 
such aircraft could accomplish the necessary destruction. Thus 
he arrived at his concept of what he called "the basic unir of
23lbid., 11-12; 22; 39.
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power needed for effective bombing operations.If one accepted 
the magnitude of destructiveness posited for the aerial weapon by 
Douhet through the employment of his 10-plane units of bombard­
ment, it followed that this system was indeed a most efficient 
way to achieve a preponderance of power for the offensive.
With 1,000 bombers of the type described— a type he claimed 
to be in actual use— 100 operating units or squadrons could be 
established, and, if only half of these were operational, an air 
force could, with proper employment, destroy daily fifty centers 
of 500 meters diameter. Such offensive power was incomparably 
greater than any other offensive means known. Having identified 
a weapon with overwhelmingly potent offensive qualities, Douhet’s 
next problem involved questions of its proper employment.
Command of the Air.— Douhet strongly recommended— as a
general rule, though not an invariable one— that the enemy air
? ̂force be singled out as the first objective for attack. Success 
required correct employment of the "Independent Air Force," as 
he chose to call the air force constituted along his doctrinal 
lines. However, he argued, this did not mean aerial battle pri­
marily or even necessarily:
But . . . it is not enough to shoot down all birds in 
flight if you want to wipe out the species; there remain 
the eggs and the nests. The most effective method, would 
be to destroy the eggs and the nests systematically. . . . 
Similarly, destroying an enemy’s aeroplanes by seeking them 
out in the air is, while not entirely useless, the least
Z^Tbid., 23.
^^Ibid., 34-, 46; Coward-McCann ed. 50-51, 246.
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effective method. A much better way is to destroy his air­
ports, supply bases, and centers of production. In the air 
his planes may escape; but, like the birds whose nests and 
eggs have been destroyed those planes which were still out 
would have no bases at which to alight when they return. 
Therefore, the best means of destroying such objectives is 
by aerial bombardment.^^
Bombardment would always succeed; nothing could stop a deter­
mined, massed bomber attack. For its protection it would de­
pend in part upon its defensive firepower, but primarily upon a 
powerfully constituted combat escort. Its combat planes would 
be entirely différant from any pursuit aviation known. Unlike 
contemporary pursuit craft, his combat planes would not be 
designed to attain faster and ever faster speeds, but would be 
slow; they would be armored and extremely heavily armed— they 
would in short have superior firepower— .the factor he deemed 
most critical in any combat. There was no theoretical maximum 
to the over-all size and strength of the bombing units in an 
air force; the more bombers, the greater the destructive offensive 
capacity of the Independent Air Force, On the other hand the 
number of combat planes protecting the bombers need be "only 
proportionately greater” than the enemy*s combat strength.
Target Selection.— Once command of the air was gained, 
Douhet recommended, probably as a sop to antagonists, that the 
Independent Air Force cut off the enemy army and navy from their 
bases or sources of operation. Only then was it to undertake 




spreading terror and havoc in the interior and breaking down the 
resistance of the people. However, he took care to qualify his 
statement on the ordering of these tasks and asserted that "as a 
matter of fact, the selection of objectives, the grouping of 
zones, and determining the order in which they are to be destroyed 
is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare, consti­
tuting what may be defined as aerial strategy." Though objectives 
varied considerably in war, their priority would have to be deter­
mined by one’s aim: "whether the command of the air, paralyzing
the enemy’s army and navy, or shattering the morale of the 
civilians behind the lines." Making this choice, commanders 
would of course be guided by many considerations of a military, 
political, social, and psychological nature. His own preference 
he clearly indicated: "I have always maintained that the essential
purpose of an Air Force is to win command of the air by first 
wiping out the enemy’s air forces." Quickly he added that such 
was not always the case and concluded by saying that "on this 
aspect of aerial warfare I do not believe it possible to lay down 
any specific rules. It will be enough to keep in mind the 
following basic principle . . .  : inflict the greatest damage
in the shortest possible time.
Principles of War.— If one were to compress the greatest 
damage within the shortest span of time it was imperative that 
the Independent Air Force operate in mass. This was "the first 
principle governing its operation." The greatest effects, moral
28ibid., 46-117.
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and physical, could be obtained only if such aerial offensives 
were compressed in time and space. By adhering to the classical 
principle of mass in its operations, by cohering into compact 
formations, the Independent Air Force would be "able to force
n qits way through aerial opposition successfully."
Its chances of success would be further enhanced by em­
ploying the traditional principle of surprise, a principle made 
almost mandatory by the maxim to inflict the greatest damage in 
the shortest amount of time. Surprise required the attack to be 
prepared "in complete secrecy and launched without forewarning 
the enemy«" He thought that in this way "a really strong Inde­
pendent Air Force . . .  could inflict upon an unprepared enemy 
such grave damage as to bring about a complete collapse of his 
forces in a few days.
But even if a country were concerned only with self- 
defense, Douhet recommended that it build an Independent Air 
Force "capable of launching powerful offensives on land and 
sea," for the only possible defense was that of the offensive. 
Inevitably, then, "the fundamental concept governing aerial war­
fare is to be resigned to the damage the enemy may inflict upon 
us while utilizing every means at our disposal to inflict even 





Organization of Air Forces.—-Deriding the conventional 
division of air power into military and naval components, Douhet 
insisted upon a more rational division of functions as the basis 
for allocation of air units. Any aerial means used by the army 
and navy to carry out or further their own actions in their 
specific fields of competence should be regarded as an integral 
part of their forces. Such auxiliaries, as he termed them, were 
to be budgeted for and directed by the surface forees. All other 
military air power was to enjoy separate and independent status.
By definition, the Independent Air Force was designed to exeeute 
tasks in which land and naval units could not take part and which 
lay beyond their radius of action. Lastly, non-military or civil 
aviation merited support and encouragement from the state, par­
ticularly in all activities bearing directly upon national de­
fense.
Whereas Mitchell conceived war between two countries to 
be essentially a tactical conflict between their armed forces-- 
with the latter constituting therefore the primary objectives of 
aerial attack, Douhet viewed modern war as a clash of opposing 
peoples. He was sure that future conflicts would see air forces—  
properly organized and employed— gain command of the air and 
launch tremendous offensives against the people, wrecking their 
social and economic structure and thus disintegrating the 
national will to fight. Meanwhile, anticipating the use of a
32lbid., 52-63.
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similar strategy by the enemy, patriots would be enjoined, not 
to rely on a vast but futile array of pursuit planes and anti­
aircraft artillery, but to accept the offensive blows of the 
enemy, consoled by the thought that their Independent Air Force 
was dealing immensely more effective, telling, and decisive 
blows on the enemy. Mercifully, the end to this tragedy would 
not be long in coming. Victory would go to that side which had 
first anticipated the future form of war and had acted accord­
ingly. Such a doctrine could not fail to appeal to all who 
sought an alternative to a protracted, grueling trench war.
It appealed especially to American airmen who inwardly rebelled 
at the subservient, lackey-like figure that the United States 
Air Service cut in official military circles.
CHAPTER IV
THE AIR SERVICE TACTICAL SCHOOL 
AND ITS DOCTRINE, 1921-22
In recent times (1953) even so noted a scholar as Irving B. 
Holley, Jr., has maintained that the Air Service showed an "al­
most complete lack of interest" in doctrine during the 1920’s.̂
In point of fact, almost the opposite was true, for an avid 
interest in doetrine characterized the more vocal elements of 
the air arm during the first postwar decade, particularly those 
officers assigned to instruct at the Air Service Tactical School 
(ASTS) at Langley Field, Virginia. It was primarily due to the 
efforts of those instructors that the institution gained a repu­
tation in the 1930’s as the leading center of military aviation
2doctrine in the United States. What is not generally reeognized 
is that the foundations of the doctrinal edifice were already 
securely laid during the preceding decade. That accomplishment 
was made possible largely but by no means entirely through ex­
tensive borrowing and adaptation of European ideas during the 
twenties.
^Holley, Ideas and Weapons, 198.
ÛSAF Historical Studies, No. 89, 14-2.
93
91+
The Question of the Relative Influence of Mitchell and Douhet
Mitchell rather than Douhet is generally credited with hav­
ing exercised the greatest influence on the development of air 
doctrine in the Air Service (later Air Corps) Tactical School in 
the twenties and thirties, largely on the grounds that he was not 
only the leading exponent of air power in America but also the 
champion of the bomber and strategic air warfare. With all due 
respect to Mitchell, his sincerity, and his actual accomplish­
ments, it is believed that this view cannot be successfully up­
held any longer on the basis of all the objective evidence avail­
able. Samplings of the Mitchellian school of thought include the 
following:
If one person were to be singled out as having the most 
decided influence on the school, it would probably be 
Brigadier General William Mitchell. One of the first 
Americans to champion an independent air mission, Mitchell 
was also among the first to recognize bombardment as the 
basic arm of the air force,3
By 1926, ’Billy’ Mitchell . . .  planted the seeds of 
a new doctrine of war and air power. That doctrine in gen­
eral terms was to become the American air doctrine for 
World War 11.^
It is impossible to determine how much of Mitchell’s
thought is original and how much he owed to external
influences.3
Douhet’s book. The Command of the Air, might have pro­
vided some help to Mitchell, but it was not translated 
until 1933, and then it was produced only in manuscript 
form without publicity. Brigadier General Oscar We stover
^USAF Historical Studies, No. 100, 27.
*̂USAF Historical Studies, No. 89, 17.
Sibid., 1+9-50.
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and Captain George Kenney, both Air Corps officers, sponsored 
the translation by Miss Dorothy Benedict. This manuscript 
was studied in a somewhat clandestine way at the Air Corps 
Tactical School. The first public translation by Louis A. 
Sigaud did not appear before 194-1, too late to have an 
effect on the strategy of the Second World War.̂
In a similar but more positive vein Brigadier General Lawrence
Kuter, formerly an instructor at the School, in 1942 inequivocally
described Mitchell’s influence there in these words:
Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group . . .  by 
Brigadier General William Mitchell . . . , 1922 . . . 
was the basis of instruction in the . . . School from its 
inception. . . .  In 1932, the then Lieutenant K. N. Walker, 
who was one of General Mitchell’s several very capable aides, 
became instructor in bombardment aviation at the . . .
School. . . . Captain Robert Olds became responsible for ex­
tensive courses of bomber instruction. Between the two 
Mitchell’s work has continued, expanded, augmented, and 
separated into its several components, including tactics 
and techniques of attack aviation, tactics and techniques 
of bombardment aviation, and the employment of air forces.?
An Air Force historian compared the relative influence of
the two air leaders at the Air Corps Tactical School thusly:
Another person who could have had an influence on the 
Tactical School was the great Italian exponent of air 
power, Giulio Douhet. But it is doubtful that he had 
any profound influence on the thought at the school.
. . .  At ACTS only an imperfect translation was available 
and this not until 1933. By that time School concept had 
begun to take shape. . . . But Douhet was never really in 
vogue at the Tactical School. . , . General Lawrence F.
Kuter and Major General S. Hansell, Jr., USAF retired, both 
have stated that Douhet had little influence at ACTS.
Major General Donald Wilson, USAF retired, one of the lead­
ing theorists at Maxwell during the thirties, has said that
B̂rig. Gen. D. 0. Smith, United States Military Doctrine, 
(New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955), 144. General Smith
is mistaken on a minor point: Sigaud did not translate Douhet’s
work but rather offered a convenient popular condensation.
^Quoted in USAF Historical Studies, No. 100, 27.
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he had never read all of Douhet, and, in any case, disagreed 
with his idea of mass bombing. Actually, foreign influences 
seemed to have had little effect on the evolution of American 
air thought from the close of World War I until its final 
crystallization in the late thirties.&
The proponents of this school of thought, despite some 
shadings in opinion, maintain that Mitchell’s influence pre­
dominated, and argue that whatever formative influence was exer­
cised at the Air Tactical School must have been that of Mitchell, 
not Douiiet, largely by virtue of the fact that since there was so 
much resemblance between the concepts of the two air prophets, 
Douhet’s works could not have had a determining influence because 
they were not translated into English until 1933, by which time 
modern Air Corps doctrine had already assumed its familiar modern 
form.
However, it is submitted that careful comparison and 
analysis of doctrinal data available in the written materials 
prepared by Mitchell, Douhet, and ACTS show beyond any reason­
able doubt that Douhet’s influence, not Mitchell’s, was paramount 
in the development of doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School
^Ibid.; cf. Edward Warner, "Mitchell, Douhet, and De 
Seversky," in Makers of Modern Strategy. General H. H. Arnold 
goes further in giving credit to Douhet, but even he never 
realized the extent of Douhet’s influence. He thought that 
"Douhet’s theory came out in 1933." He also thought that "it 
came very close to conforming to the theory we had worked out 
from our bombing and our operations and maneuvers." (Italics 
added.) Global Mission, 131. Joe G. Taylor ("The Contribution 
of the Air Corps Tactical School to the Development of Aviation 
Tactics before World War II," a paper delivered at meeting. 
Southern Historical Assoc., Little Rock, Ark., Nov. 12, 1969) 
concurs in the standard appraisal.
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as early as the mid-twenties and continued to dominate that de­
velopment during the thirties, and that as a consequence American 
air doctrine was predicated upon and shaped by essentially 
Douhetian principles. It is believed, moreover, that the findings 
of this study shed much light on the related vexing question of 
the interpersonal influence of Mitchell and Douhet and demonstrate 
the letter’s overwhelming dominance of thought.
Organization and Early Academic Status
Organized at Langley Field in the summer of 1920 by Major 
Thomas DeWitt Milling, former Chief of Air Service, First Army, 
AEF, the Air Service Tactical School opened inauspiciously enough 
late in the autumn of that year. There were but eight students. 
Among them were in fact several officers assigned to operate the 
school, including Milling, the Officer-in-Charge, and two of his 
instructors.^ The staff taught courses in combined aerial tactics 
and staff duties.
However, classes were suspended in the spring of 1921 in 
order to participate in the planning, preparation, and conduct 
of the bombing tests of July and September 1921.^  Major Milling, 
who had won Mitchell’s confidence in France, served as his chief
^USAF Historical Studies, No. 100, 6-7.
^^Semiannual Report, Field Officers Service School, Jan. 1,
1921-June 30, 1921, in USAF Historical Archives, 245.111. The 
report was submitted by a Major Hensley, who as Commanding Offi­
cer of the field was ipso facto Commandant of the school. This 
practice continued throughout the history of the school.
llAnnual Report, ASTS, 1922-23, 2.
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of staff in the First Provisional Air Brigade, organized by General 
Mitchell at Langley Field expressly for the bombing exercises. The 
school’s first spring and summer were therefore almost entirely 
devoted to the task set by Mitchell— bringing to Langley from all 
over the country the most skilled men in the Air Service, organiz­
ing them, and training them intensively for the tests of July and 
September.This experience was not to be repeated until the 
test exercises of 1923.
During these early years the school’s academic caliber 
was adversely affected by rapid turnover of instructor personnel—  
in the second year only three were left of the original contingent; 
varying lengths of assignment for instructors; an excessively in­
flated curriculum which soon included technical as well as tactical 
and administrative subjects; and the lack of a firm doctrinal base. 
The administrative deficiencies were noted by the Chief of Air 
Service, who, in a letter to the Commandant on August 27, 1924, 
approved in principle recommendations which had earlier been made 
by the school, including the following: (1) instructors were to
be drawn from graduates of the Air Tactical School or the Army’s 
General Services School; (2) officers when assigned were to report 
sometime prior to the departure of their predecessors; (3) offi­
cers so assigned were to be allowed to remain for extended tours
12Levine, 224-25; Report of the First Provisional Air 
Brigade, Langley Field, Va., Administrative Order No, 1, 21 
Sept. 1921 (accompanying Operation Circulars 3 & 4, 1st Prov.
Air Brigade), by command of Brig. Gen. Mitchell, signed T. D. 
Milling, Chief of Staff, in USAFHA 248.222-70 (1921).
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of duty; (M-) classes were to be held to a maximum of 25 including 
foreign students;and (5) the Commandant was to make every effort 
to prevent outside duties interfering with the scheduled conduct 
of the school.The most demanding and pressing of its problems 
was to be less easily solved— the interrelated one of doctrine, 
instruction, and textbook preparation.
Though the original instructional program had been approved 
by the War Department as laid down in 1 9 2 0 , Major Milling made 
the interesting observation in his report for the 1922-23 year 
that the new school was originating "most of its doctrines and 
theory.Yet,  at the same time, he inexplicably referred to 
the need for disseminating, through a mailing list from the school, 
the "doctrine of the Air Service, prescribed by Washington and as 
taught in this school, which is the senior Air Service school."
In the same ambiguous vein he promised that the forthcoming 
revision of courses would not deviate from the schedule laid down 
by the Chief of Air Service.In any event the school made 
sufficient doctrinal progress during its first years to permit
^^Foreign students could continue to attend provided that 
they were selected by the State Department on a basis which in­
cluded thorough qualification in the English language.
"̂̂ Letter, OCAS to Commandant ASTS, Annual Report, 1923-
24.
l^USAF Historical Studies, No. 100, 6.




Milling later to report that texts had been written which had 
"stood the test of a year’s use in the school and . . .  become
18recognized authority for the tactical work for the Air Service."
Doctrinal Development, 1921-22: The Concept of War
The Air Tactical School’s doctrine of air power in its
early years, so far as written evidence is available, was very
much ground-oriented in its view of war and the employment of
air power. The major work produced by Air Service Tactical School
during this period was Air Tactics, written by Major W. C.
1 qSherman in 1921 and published early in 1922. This text also 
served tentatively as the first training regulation (TR) ?n the 
4-4-0-15 series for the Air Service, though this particular one was 
soon to prove unacceptable to the War Department, apparently be­
cause of its differentiation between "air force" and "air service."
p nSherman had not only had considerable air experience but was a 
good scholar and writer as well. An outstanding member of the 
faculty at ASTS in its early years, he later lectured at the 
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
and in 1926 published an important, authoritative book. Air 
Warfare. His earlier study. Air Tactics, was prepared under the 
direction of Major Thomas DeWitt Milling, Officer-in-Charge at
Annual Report, Ass’t Commandant to Commandant, 1923-24, 
dated 30 June 1924. In that year the title of Officer-in-Charge 
was changed to Assistant Commandant and was never again used.




The true objective in war, wrote Sherman in Air Tactics, 
was the destruction of the armed forces or military power of the 
enemy. Hence the objectives were the same in wars on land and 
sea, that is, they were tactical, not strategic, in nature. With­
in this context, he attached fundamental importance to the human 
element and hence to considerations of morale, both in air and 
ground warfare.
Nevertheless, he asserted that the use of ground troops 
should not be the basis for determining the principles of employ­
ment of the air force— as maintained dogmatically in the War 
Department manuals. Rather, he declared, each service should 
seek its doctrinal principles "in the element in which it 
operates." On this basis Sherman, much like Mitchell and Douhet, 
divided the Air Service into two functional categories, an 
auxiliary "air service" and an "air force." Whereas observation 
was clearly subordinate or auxiliary to the infantry, pursuit, 
attack, and bombardment aviation constituted a true arm, an air 
force. Their missions were offensive and destructive in nature—  
bombardment and attack aiming at the destruction of materiel and 
personnel, while pursuit aviation existed to destroy hostile 
aircraft.
Employment: Concepts and Tactics
Pursuit Role.— The air force’s first and most difficult 
problem, Sherman asserted, was that of protection against hostile 
aircraft. Without it observation units worked under a severe
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handicap, while attack and bombardment units were prevented from 
operating effectively against "the hostile foot troops" and 
friendly ground forces were meanwhile completely exposed to the 
enemy air force.This view was typical of that of many air­
men in the early and mid-twenties. But Sherman, who realized the 
importance of the offensive, immediately declared that, though 
the idea of shielding our own ground and air forces from hostile 
air activity was an essentially defensive idea, it did not mean 
that pursuit ought to adopt a passive posture. Such a course 
would be ruinous. Therefore he deeried the methods of close 
protection— that is, continuous escort of a given unit, which 
he declared deprived pursuit not only of its offensive spirit 
but the advantages of surprise and initiative. In like manner, 
he dispelled the notion of resort to defensive techniques such 
as the aerial barrage or line patrol. Any attempt to employ the 
barrage technique over any eonsiderable length of the fighting 
line "would require a number of planes that no nation [would]
. . .  ever be able to furnish in war, even were she so faultily
PPindoctrinated as to employ them in this manner."
At best control of the air would be partial, Sherman 
thought it impossible for an air force to approach "the almost 
complete control that at sea the British navy; exercised before 
the day of the submarine," Nevertheless, some degree of control
^̂ Air Tactics, Sect. II, 9-10.
22lbid., 11.
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of the sky was indispensable to successful air operations. Ac­
cordingly, "the doctrine of the air force— and of pursuit in par­
ticular—  [could] . . .  be therefore but one thing: to gain and
hold control of the air, by seeking out and destroying the hostile 
air force, wherever it may be found." Here Sherman not only 
followed Mitchell but went beyond him, touching a point in 
doctrinal development where it seemed he would be impelled 
logically to follow through and seize upon its implications as 
Douhet did. Failing to do this, however, he assigned primacy in 
the air force not to bombardment but rather to pursuit, which he 
likened to the infantry, queen of battles.
It is the branch of aviation whose success or failure will 
very largely determine the success or failure of all air­
craft. . . .  The backbone of the air force on which the 
whole plane of employment must be hung is pursuit.
[italics added.]
Role of Attack Aviation.— Next in order of importance 
Sherman ranked attack aviation, not bombardment, for by defini­
tion it "intervened on the field of battle itself, making direct 
attacks with light bombs and machine gun fire upon the hostile 
ground element." Reflecting the importance he attached to the 
human element in war, Sherman saw the role of the attack plane 
as essentially that of shattering the morale of ground troops.
The threat it posed was considerable, for its radius of action 
was wider than that of any other combat arm of the air force—
150 miles from the airdrome as of January 1922, Commanders were
^^Ibid., Sect. II, 13. Cf. Tentative Manual for Employ­
ment of Air Service, 1919, 80.
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enjoined to exploit fully attack aviation’s great innate capability 
to reorganize rapidly after an attack, refuel, rearm, and reattack, 
Sherman predicted that those who made proper use of this arm in 
the future would open up great opportunities for an army.̂ ^
Role of Bombardment. In land warfare Sherman considered 
it absolutely imperative that all bombardment objectives be 
established and determined in accordance with the over-all plan 
of ground campaign. Again, predictably, the type of employment 
he envisaged was primarily tactical in nature. Railways and 
other lines of communication ranked highest on his list of ob­
jectives. Together with depots and headquarters, they would be 
attacked in the rear areas of the opposing army. Sherman pointed 
out too that the air force must not overlook "possibilities of 
. . .  destroying hostile airdromes." Once more he seemed to be 
approaching a critical part of the Douhet theory of counter air
? c:force action, but again he failed to develop it systematically.
Against industrial centers strategic bombing should not
be undertaken, Sherman declared, without "a definite objective
2 fiin some war industry." This was an early indication of the 
need for identifying and linking a given target with a larger 
war objective and as such constituted a forerunner of modern 
strategic air warfare concepts. In this respect he was more
Z^Air Tactics, Sect. IV, 1, 9, 15, 29-33.
ZSibid., Sect. V, 7.
ZGlbid., 9.
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advanced in his thinking on bombardment than either Mitchell or
Douhet, if one aecepts as a criterion scientific bombing of
specific military objectives rather than mass area bombings.
(This thought he was to develop further in 1926 in his book,
27Air Warfare, where he clearly outlined the doctrine of strategic, 
precision attacks.) He predicted that the future would see 
bombardment directed largely toward physical destruction of 
"hostile works of varied kind,"28 as opposed to mass morale 
bombing of cities and towns.
Strategic bombing of civilian population centers, which 
Sherman treated separately, would undoubtedly adversely affect 
morale, but he warned that its importance should not be over­
rated. Having in mind the example of London, he thought that 
for its part the government whose territory was thus attacked 
ought not permit its judgment to be swayed by the popular clamor 
for ever greater local defense. Nor should it seek to retaliate 
in kind. Rather it should constantly keep uppermost in mind 
that the enemy’s armed forces, not his cities, were the true 
objectives.28 He concluded that a decision as to the use of 
bombers against cities involved political questions and ought 
to be decided on a political, not a military, basis. As for 
Trenchard’s estimate of 1919 that the morale effect of bombing
2 Âir Warfare, 217-18,
28Air Tactics, Sect, V, 3.
28lbid., 10,
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compared with the physical in a ratio of 20 to 1,^^ he thought 
this statement applied in actuality not to bombardment per se 
but rather to attack aviation, especially after showing that most 
of the British independent air force's operations were primarily 
of a light bombardment nature.Bombardment’s role, whether of 
physical or morale destruction, could be executed successfully 
by provision of adequate pursuit escort for bombers and defen­
sive formation tactics.
Role of Bombardment at Sea.— Air fighting on land and sea 
would present essentially similar features. The chief disadvantage 
for air operations at sea would be that of the floating aerodrome. 
The fundamental doctrine of the Air Service would be the same: 
its first duty would be to seek out and destroy the hostile air 
force and thereafter to destroy the most important enemy surface 
forces. 3̂
Commenting on Mitchell’s bombing tests of 1921, the author 
observed that the army, charged by law with coastal defense, 
possessed in the airplane a mighty offensive arm capable not 
only of the coastal defense function but also of intervening 
in battles at sea. Though Sherman— unlike Mitchell~-believed 
in the permanency of sea power, he noted that the airplane had
30usaF Historical Studies, No. 89, citing Trenchard in The 
London Gazette, Supplement No. 10, Jan. 1, 1919.
3^Air Tactics, Sect, V, 1-2, 18.
32lbid., Sect. V, 5.
33lbid., Sect. II, 22.
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certainly "altered the means by which that power [was^ obtained." 
There was no longer any doubt as to the ability of aircraft to 
sink seacraft within range of shore bases. Although the tests 
were conducted about 100 miles from shore, he was not satisfied 
as to their conclusiveness. He saw that if bombing planes could 
be prevented from making their attack or interfered with suffi­
ciently as to greatly decrease their accuracy, "the ships 
ĵ mightj be saved." Of the three possible methods by which 
this might be done— antiaircraft fire, changing of the vessels' 
course, and pursuit aviation attacks on the hostile bombers—  
only the latter could be regarded as practicable. "Were bombard­
ment airplanes to attempt to attack seacraft amply defended by 
pursuit, the attack would be broken up before it could prove 
effective.This led Sherman to conclude that not only was 
the question of. air control as important over the sea as over 
the land, but that there was every reason to believe that "con­
trol of the air, while it may in land warfare— to use the phrase
of Marshal Foch— only 'incline' victory to the side holding it,
3 Sit will in sea warfare insure victory." Oddly enough, however, 
Sherman in his later sections on bombardment at sea endorsed a 
view predicated on the assumption that bombardment aviation could 
successfully engage and sink a hostile fleet regardless of its 
counter-action.Which of the two views, inconsistent as they
3^Ibid., 15-21.
35ibid., Sect. II, 22. 
36ibid., Sect. V, 11-13,
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were with one another, the school actually followed is not known. 
Evaluation
In its concepts of war and the role of the aerial weapon, 
the Air Tactical School in the early twenties largely followed a 
tactical rather than strategic orientation. In this respect, it 
adhered to the basic pattern derived from the experience of the 
World War and the quite similar doctrine of air power put forward 
by General Mitchell. The objectives in Mitchell’s doctrine and 
in ASTS’s teachings on air power were in each case the same— the 
armed forces of the enemy and associated geographical positions.
To carry out such tactical employment in conjunction with the 
ground forces, both insisted that the doctrine of the air force, 
and of pursuit aviation in particular, was to seek out and 
destroy the enemy air force wherever it was found. In practice 
this meant sky battle. Though ASTS made reference to the need 
of bombing airdromes, this was done in an incidental manner and 
did not constitute, as in the Douhet system, a part of an 
integral well-thought-out scheme of air force employment directed 
at gaining command of the air. With bombing at sea, employment 
was necessarily tactical— directed at surface forces once more. 
Here, however, ASTS followed Mitchell only part of the way. It 
recognized the superiority of shore-based aircraft but reserved 
judgment as to the absolute primacy of air power over sea power, 
a point on which Mitchell would not yield. It saw that a role 
for naval aviation existed which if developed could protect naval 
vessels at sea. As for strategic bombardment, that controversial
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role of air power was treated circumspectly by ASTS, but in one 
respect ASTS nevertheless advanced a step forward in bombardment 
theory; it did call for adherence to the principle that all bomb­
ing be coordinated with the larger plan of campaign and insisted 
that bombing directed at industrial centers have a specific 
objective in view in some war industry. The bombing of cities, 
a hotly debated contemporary issue, was expressly treated with 
great caution; this was an area in which the decision would have 
to be made only at the highest echelon, the political. Thus it 
was clear that Douhet’s influence had not yet penetrated ASTS.
If anything the tendency was in an opposed direction, tactical 
rather than strategical, pursuit-oriented rather than bomber- 
oriented, and, if one may stretch the point, precision-oriented 
rather than area-oriented. So marked was the school’s tactical 
orientation that it ranked attack aviation ahead of bombardment 
per se. In this respect it was in closer accord with the War 
Department General Staff than with Mitchell, whose position on 
air power was now beginning to shift perceptibly away from the 
tactical.
PART III
THE FORMATIVE PERIOD IN AMERICAN 
AIR THOUGHT, 1922-1926
CHAPTER V
EVOLUTION OF MITCHELL’S CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER;
ATLANTIC INFLUENCES, 1921-1923
The five years after 1921 were years of flux and growth in 
American air thought. Though characterized by sharp controversy 
as to the value and role of the air weapon, that period saw 
American air power doctrine begin to take on its modern contours 
and hues at the Air Tactical School, largely under the influence 
of the foremost air thinkers. Mitchell’s thought, stimulated by 
Douhet, not only broke out of the narrow confines of tactical 
employment in which it had been almost entirely absorbed and 
concentrated since 1918, but also departed from its essentially 
isolationist orientation in favor of a dynamic, intercontinental 
one. Moreover, the surface forces at this time found it advan­
tageous to devise ways and means of employing the increasingly 
potent air vehicle to meet their respective needs. The period 
saw too the real beginnings of the growth of both civil aviation 
and the aircraft industry, both of which gained increasing recog­
nition as indispensable supports for the nation’s defense. But 
of all the events of this remarkable formative period in American 
military history, perhaps the most significant was the revolution
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in air power thought at the Air Corps Tactical School in 1926 which 
inverted the pyramid of American military air power, with bombard­
ment displacing pursuit as the principal element. The dominant 
element at the school thereby set the institution upon a new 
doctrinal path that was not to be departed from in later years 
except for minor deviations. Throughout the latter twenties and 
the early thirties the revolution in ideas continued until fully 
consolidated at the school and accepted within the Air Corps as 
a whole. Thus the history of air doctrine during the formative 
years of the twenties unfolds a panorama of swirling currents of 
thought; ideas and concepts with, at times, the power of tidal 
forces; and an intermingling of certain ideas and concepts, 
emanating from abroad for the most part and adopted and adapted 
by leading individuals or schools within the United States. In 
that process the evolution of Mitchell’s thought was to play an 
important part, with him primarily as a transmitter of foreign 
thought conjoined to his own and evolved into an American product.
As early as 1920 a close observer. Major H. H. Arnold, 
had detected "a change in Billy Mitchell,” noting that the ex­
periences encountered in his crusade for air power "had given 
him an under-current of angry impatience.Though it could 
fairly be said that the stature of air power had been enhanced 
by the long sought bombing tests of 1921, it may be recalled 
that following those tests there had been such a furore in the
^Arnold, 96.
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press (which had been instrumental in creating pressure for the 
tests in the first place)^ over the radically differing interpre­
tations of the results achieved that it led to a shake-up xn the 
Air Service, with Major General Patrick coming in once more to 
handle the apparently intractable Mitchell. A somewhat similar 
series of events transpired in 1923, following the September air 
bombing tests against the New Jersey and the Virginia off Cape 
Hatteras. After both sets of tests— September 1921 and 1923—  
the new Chief of Air Service and other friends arranged assign­
ments for the fiery but obviously overwrought aviator that would 
constitute useful duty while giving him a needed rest and change 
of scene. The first led to Mitchell’s trip to Europe in the 
winter of 1921-22; the second to a prolonged sojourn in the 
Pacific, covering a period of nine months of 1923-24. So far 
as the evolution of air doctrine was concerned, both journeys 
proved eventful, particularly the latter. Also doctrinally 
significant was the intervening contest of air power versus sea 
power in 1923.
A note of caution may perhaps be in order at this point. 
Mitchell’s thought, unlike Douhet’s, was often expressed not 
only in generally unsystematic fashion but sometimes in ambivalent 
if not seemingly contradictory terms. Hence it should not be 
entirely surprising to find that Mitchell’s thought during the 
period under review has been represented by some as primarily
^Lincoln, Military Affairs, XV (Fall, 1951), 151-152.
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strategic and by others as essentially tactical, or again, as 
essentially defensive and isolationist, or, offense-minded and 
applicable to a world theater. The tendency has been to ascribe 
to Mitchell a consistency of strategic air thought he did not 
possess.3 An opposite view has also been presented showing 
Mitchell relying chiefly upon tactical air power— the pursuit 
plane in particular— for the nation’s defense in the context of 
a narrow, isolationist-oriented strategy.^ Both views appear to 
be lacking in discrimination; ignoring nuances, changes, and 
trends of thought; and failing to probe questions of origins and 
influences. Closer to the mark but still insufficiently dis­
criminating in the evolution of Mitchell’s thought is the view 
showing him espousing strategic air bombardment concepts of an 
offensive nature while couching them in an isolationist setting.^
Based upon the available evidence, there is no doubt that 
Mitchell’s own views of war and the role of air power in war 
underwent considerable change during this period. It has already 
been established that Mitchell was no doctrinaire. While the 
most significant change appeared in late 1923 and 1924 and can 
be dated with reasonable approximation, it is believed that the 
beginnings of this process date from Mitchell’s visit to Italy
ÛSAF Historical Studies, No. 89, 17-18.
^hester H. Brune, Foundations of American Air Power Doctrine, 
1917-1933 (Ph. D. dissertation). University of Rochester: 1958.
Sjames L. Cate, "Development of Air Doctrine, 1917-1941," 
AUQR I (Winter, 1947), 11-22.
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in the winter of 1921-22, though here the evidence is indirect and 
vague.
The stated purpose of Mitchell's mission to the leading 
air powers of Europe was to ascertain in each case, as he put 
it, the military "policy of the country and the way in which it 
was applied from an aeronautical standpoint, how the aeronautical 
activities were related to the military and naval activities, and 
the manner in which the problems were solved."® The mission also 
was interested in the administration, tactical establishment, and 
the technical organization of the air forces and air services. 
Mitchell in his report made a particular point of establishing 
that "in each country visited great care was taken to visit all 
officers and officials and to deal with them with the utmost 
frankness." Mitchell added that, fortunately, "in every country 
the officers in charge of aviation were either old friends of 
mine with whom I had served . . .  or whom I knew of and who knew 
me," The net result was that "in every case everything practicable 
was done for us, and the trip resulted in the gaining of a great 
deal of knowledge about the rearranged conditions as they obtain 
today in Europe and the application of aviation to those condi­
t i o n s . I n  light of this fact, it is interesting to observe
^Mitchell, Report of Inspection Trip to France, Italy, 
Germany, Holland, and Britain, 1921-1922 (Washington: 1923),
1-2. Hereafter cited as Report of Inspection, 1921-1922. In 
USAF Archives 167.*4-04-13. Mitchell was accompanied by his aide,
1st Lt. Clayton Bissell, and Aeronautical Engineer Alfred 
Verville. Ibid.
^Report of Inspection, 1921-1922, 2.
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that Mitchell, while mentioning n.’mes of people in almost every 
other country, studiously avoided mentioning anybody by name or 
professional position in Italy. The only person singled out in 
that country was identified by virtue of his status— the King.
With a different doctrine of aviation which he carefully noted 
and a technically advanced aircraft industry, it is indeed strange 
that Mitchell made no reference whatever to Douhet or Caproni in 
Italy, On the other hand, the names of Junkers and Dornier 
appear in his report on Germany, and references to personalities 
are interspersed throughout his account of the inspections made 
during the visits to France and England.® Yet, oddly enough, 
Mitchell asserted that "we met more men of exceptional ability 
in Italy than we did in any other country;”® but he mentions no 
names.
Concept of War and the Role of Air Power— 1922 : European 
Influences
His European trip appeared to confirm Mitchell in his 
conviction that war would continue to be largely a tactical 
affair, and that air power’s role in the next conflict would 
be directed initially toward control of the air. Certain 
applications and methods now emerge in his views, and they 
were later adopted by ASTS and incorporated in school texts:
OThe distribution of weight by pages in the report is 
also interesting: France, 34 pages; Italy, 13 pages; Germany
(no air force and no military aviation industry), 18 pages; 
Holland, 7 pages; England, 25 pages.
®Ibid., 40.
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(1) Regardless of the type of air force or army in Europe, 
all must mobilize;
(2) Whoever was quickest to do so in the air gained a 
great advantage in time;
(3) Air power should be directed initially against mobiliza­
tion, assembly, and concentration points with the aim 
of disrupting or preventing effective mobilization of 
surface forces;
(M-) Realization of this goal was likely for that side which 
first gained control of the air;
(5) With the air controlled and the enemy army immobilized,
the war could be won virtually by air power alone.
Thus a premium was put on offensive operations. From the
French Mitchell incorporated in his recommendations, that, inas­
much as there would exist no functional need for observation avia­
tion during the first two weeks of the war, observation aircraft—  
the mass of most air forces— should be prepared to assume a dual 
role and act offensively in a pursuit capacity from the outset.
This proposal entailed the recall of observation planes from 
army units and their placement under command of the air force 
during the early stages of a campaign. The planned augmentation 
of offensive uses of the air weapon is notable as a harbinger of 
the future; the function however remained tactical.
Mitchell also concurred with the French commanders (with
lOlbid., 5, 14-15, 104-; infra, chap. 8.
lllbid., 8, IS.
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whom he sat in conference in December 1921) in taking away 
tactical control of the central or GHQ air force from the supreme 
command, which had been the practice during the war, and de­
centralizing it by giving it to that commander in the field who
12was charged with the execution of a mission or operation.
The GHQ air force itself would however still be handled through 
its senior commander, to whom would be transmitted orders from 
the field commander in charge of the operation, (Despite 
Mitchell^s recommendation, American practice continued to favor 
retention of centralized control at the GHQ level.)
Mitchell was influenced not only by French aviation con­
cepts but also by certain aspeets of British and Italian aviation 
policy. Owing to facts of geographical location, Britain dis­
covered herself at a comparative disadvantage in the new era of 
air power. Lacking continental bases, her air force found itself 
a long distance from most European strategic targets, while at 
the same time British centers, especially London and the Channel 
ports lay within much closer reach of potential enemies on the 
mainland. Hence during Mitchell’s investigation, it became clear 
that British concepts of national defense had undergone commen­
surate change since the war. The greatest importance was now 
attached to air defense, with pursuit aviation organized for the 
"protection of localities." Air attack from the continent was 
the only thing of which Britain was "deathly a f r a i d . A t  the
l^Ibid., 9, 10, 13.
13lbid., 82.
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opposite extreme strategic bombardment was now de-emphasized in
view of the navigational difficulties of reaching the vital
centers of a continental foe with existing equipment. Because
of the distances involved and the limited radius of action by
existing aircraft, any attacks which might be undertaken would
have to be night-time bombing ventures which did not require
pursuit protection.Thus Britain viewed air warfare no longer
1 Rin offensive but rather in defensive terms. Mitchell was also 
interested in the British practice of assigning air force units 
to duty at sea on aircraft carriers and attempted, unsuccessfully, 
to make it American practice too in subsequent years. From 
studying Britain’s strategic position and problems of defense 
vis-a-vis the continent, Mitchell developed a keener apprecia­
tion of the intricacies of geographic location, noting how 
relatively easy it was for a continental enemy to strike the 
United Kingdom from nearby bases but how much more difficult it 
was for the British air force to attack the heart of a continental 
military power,
The strategic situation confronting Italy was generally
l^Tbid.; General Arnold in his memoirs. Global Mission,
160, makes the interesting observation that it was not until 1936 
that the RAF, despite its separate and independent organization, 
developed large 9-engined bombers again, and that they were not 
ready until about the outbreak of World War II. However, it 
would appear that weakening of the strategic concept was also 




quite similar to that of Britain, but the Italian response was 
markedly different. To an even greater extent than the British, 
the Italians faced the age-old problem of defending their most 
important region under highly disadvantageous conditions. Indus­
trially and agriculturally. North Italy was the heart of the 
country, but it lay within easy reach of potential enemies by 
both land and sea. Yet the important centers of her larger 
neighbors were comparatively distant from the Italian border. 
Moreover, Italy’s entire coast was highly vulnerable to naval 
attack. The advent of the air age seemed to accentuate rather 
than relieve the defense problem.
Instead of finding within the context of this problem a 
solution similar to the one evolved by the British under roughly 
comparable but more advantageous circumstances, Mitchell learned 
that a new national defense policy had been recently determined 
on: resistance on the surface and attack in the air.^^ This
policy echoed Douhet’s cardinal strategic maxims for Italy; 
of capitalizing upon the inherent offensive power of the air 
weapon and the supposed superiority of the defense on the ground, 
as well as favorable Alpine terrain. Mitchell noted that "the 
greatest stress is being laid on aviation, and it is regarded as 
their first line of d e f e n s e . H e  observed that both bombardment
I b i d . . 1+2.
l%ouhet. Command of the Air, Part I (Faber edit.), 15-19, 
48. See also Command of the Air (Rome edit.: 1958), xv.
l^Report of Inspection, 1921-1922, 42.
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and pursuit aviation were being organized for taking the offensive 
and that the Italians were experimenting with delayed action fuses 
covering a time span of several hours with the object of dropping 
bombs so fused in "an area which is to be put out of business."
He expressed the opinion that "the effect of this sort of bombard­
ment on an industrial district can be easily realized, because 
bombardment of an industrial area not only destroys materiel but 
also has a tremendous morale e f f e c t . I t  is notable that the 
example of delayed action bombs is given in Douhet’s Command of 
the Air, 1921 edition, and that the morale effect of bombing is 
stressed throughout. Mitchell was also impressed with the 
Italians’ technical performance, all their work "being of the 
highest order." As to the priority accorded aviation, Mitchell 
reported that its development was to take "precedence over any 
other national defense organization."^^
Nevertheless, in his recommendations Mitchell continued
to accord pursuit aviation top place in the air force triumvirate,
thus following the British and French example rather than the
Italian— the tactical rather than the strategic. His general
conclusion was that the European consensus held the mission of
an air force to be the destruction of the hostile air force
to a sufficient extent to allow free operation of one’s own 
air force and then to attack and destroy the most dangerous 
of the enemy’s elements either on the ground or on the water; 
that to bring this about all available air power should be




thrown into the offensive immediately upon the outbreak of 
the war, and that the nation inferior in air power at the 
beginning of the war will either lose the campaign at once 
or be placed in a very embarrassing military position.
As for the national defense structure in the United States— .which 
should of course be based upon air power in the first instance,—  
he concluded that pursuit aviation should be given first considera­
tion as the air arm's primary mission remained the destruction of 
the hostile air force.
Thus his national defense scheme of 1921 was retained
virtually intact in his report, based upon 600 planes on the
East Coast, 600 on the West Coast, and 1200 planes in the central
part of the country, though now one-fifth rather than one-sixth
were to be on an aetive basis. The general proportions, as to
types, were also to remain the same. However, he thought the
United States needed to "more intimately associate [its^ pursuit
with bombardment and attack aviation." Hence two kinds of wings
should be organized, bombardment and attack, in each of which
the proportions would be two groups of pursuit to one group of
the other component. Putting more emphasis on offensive
flexibility in 1922, he also felt it desirable to combine the
bombardment wing and the attack wing into a 600-plane brigade,
thus enhancing the unit's ability to strike both at a distance
2 ̂from shore and nearby, in defense of localities.




of observation aviation for offensive employment during the initial 
period of mobilization and concentration of ground forces, Mitchell 
thought that future observation aircraft ought to be "designed as 
two-seater pursuit planes with superchargers so as to act at the 
highest altitudes, and should be trained to accompany the bombard­
ment aviation on its raids at the beginning of a campaign.
Like his European contemporaries, he regarded observation aviation,
p Cwhich still constituted the bulk of most air forces, as an 
auxiliary service within the United States’ defense structure 
and recommended that it be "cut down to the lowest point possible 
commensurate with efficiency." Sdnprisingly enough, however, 
Mitchell, in specifying the types of airplane the country should 
adopt and develop, failed to include a two-place pursuit ship.
In addition to three single seater pursuit types and a two-place 
armored attack type he listed among the three bombardment types 
a combination single engine bomber and surveillance airplane.
This was the only reference to an observation craft in his air­
craft requirements list.
All these ships were to be constructed of metal in 
their entirety as soon as possible— a feat already achieved in
2^Ibid., 114-115.
2^For the United States see table of aircraft acceptances 
by type of aircraft, 1920-1930, in Ch. II, AAF Historical Studies, 
No. 4-4-: Evolution of the Liaison-type Airplane, 1917-194-4-
(Maxwell Field, Ala. : 194-6). More aircraft of the observation
type were accepted annually than any other.
26Report of Inspection, 1921-1922, 115, 119.
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n *7Europe. He was convinced that this country should develop air­
ships "as airplane carriers for use over the high seas and over
the land, as a means of combating other airships, for bombing,
2 Rreconnaissance, and transport purposes." However, he had 
little regard for the ordinary observation balloon, which had 
been used so widely in Europe during the late war, noting that 
it would "have very little application in a war of movement," 
presumably a reference to the initial phase. Since it was void 
of offensive power, the balloon could not be modified for offensive 
purposes as could the observation plane. Thus he advised that the 
balloon organization be reduced to a point where only instructional 
work would be continued.
The keynote of the entire report, then, is an insistence 
upon greater and more efficient offensive use of the entire air 
organization, but for tactical purposes as hitherto. For the 
time being at least, the Italian plan of strategic bombardment 
was muted. That the Continental nations in general were think­
ing in terms of air offensives and were adapting their air forces 
and national defense systems accordingly caused Mitchell to 
reiterate his plea for a national defense reorganization in the 
United States.
^^Ibid. But the first "all-metal, all-American-made" plane 
was not produced in the United States until the late twenties and 





Pointing out that "the organization along our coasts is 
so complicated. . . . that we would he terribly handicapped and 
our hands almost tied in case we were attacked by a first-class 
p o w e r , t h e  Assistant Chief of Air Service called for a 
congressional investigation to look into the entire question 
of national defense and to enact additional statutes to re­
define, reallocate, and fix the duties and responsibilities for 
defense in the air, on the land, and over the water.Though 
this somewhat presumptuous and sweeping recommendation was 
hardly calculated to restore him to a position of favor within 
the War Department, it was couched in generally moderate language, 
quite unlike the report he was to issue two years later upon his 
return from the Pacific, During that latter interval Mitchell 
was not content simply to wait for the Congress, already deeply 
engaged in a spate of postwar investigations of the executive 
branch, to renew its earlier defense inquiries; rather, he 
threw himself into a number of projects which he hoped would 
enhance the stature of aviation and give the air arm a larger 
place in the national defense system.
While the most important of those projects was no doubt 
the preparation for and the conduct of the bombing maneuvers off 
Cape Hatteras in 1923, other notable ones included stimulation
30lbid., 122.
^̂ Ibid.; see R. Earl McClendon, The Question of the 
Autonomy of the United States Air Arm, 1917-199-S (Montgomery:
Air University, 1954-) , for documentary treatment of the 
organizational aspect of air power development.
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of progress on airways throughout the country, in which Lieutenant 
Bissell, one of his aides, took a notable part; Mitchell^s estab­
lishment of a world’s speed record in October 1922; and staff 
planning and preparations for the first round-the-world Air 
Service tour scheduled for 192I+. In the meantime the navy
3 2launched its first aircraft carrier, the USS Langley, and took 
other steps to incorporate air power within the traditional 
establishment. This sharpened competition for control of the 
air weapon in national defense served to intensify Mitchell’s 
efforts to assure the primacy of air power in its own right. It 
was during this period that the Assistant Chief of Air Service, 
in addition to more highly publicized measures, found time to 
write an important and revealing manual of instructions for 
bombardment operations on land and on sea, entitled Notes on the 
Multi-motored Bombardment Group. C o m p o s e d  sometime in 1922 
or early 1923 following the European trip, Mitchell’s manual long 
served as a major reference and guide for air officers.Its 
special importance for this study lies in its revelation of the 
evolution of Mitchell’s thinking.
Concept of War and the Role of Air Power— 1923: Consolidation
and Advance
Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group.— The title
^^ATP 210-1-1, 79-81.
^^Mitchell, Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group, 
Day and Night (Washington: n.d.). In USAFHA 248.222-57. Copy
used bears ASTS’s catalog date of Oct. 3, 1923.
^^USAF Historical Studies; No. 100, 27
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in itself is significant in denoting increasing emphasis on the 
offensive power of the aerial weapon. The air leader still 
insisted, however, that "the defeat of the enemy forces is the 
purpose of the conduct of war, and the destruction of enemy 
objectives is the function of bombardment." And even within this 
context bombardment aviation was no more than "a component part 
of the air force," constituting but part of the offensive air 
force of the nation." j^talics added%] Except in the rarest 
cases, operations of the bombardment force could not even be 
contemplated during daytime without the use of pursuit; hence 
the bombardment group commander was adjured to maintain the 
closest liaison with the pursuit forces.
Moreover, his discussion of targets to be attacked by 
bombardment reflected in part European influence and the experi­
ence gained during the 1921 bombing tests against vessels at sea. 
Speaking of targets on land, Mitchell used words strongly 
reminiscent of Douhet in the latter’s discussion of the complex­
ities of target selection: "With such a diversity of targets,
each one requiring by its very nature the special consideration 
of the best method of attack, it is impossible to formulate 
general rules which may be universal in application. In a large 
measure each mission must be left to the discretion of the Group 
Commander.
^^Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group, Introduc­
tion, 4, 18, 108.
36Ibid., 85. Cf. Douhet, The Command of the Air, Part I 
(Coward-McCann edit.), 59-60.
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Mitchell’s adherence to taetical thinking and his mounting 
concern with counterforee problems were evident in the order in 
which he preferred to list possible targets for the bombardment 
group eommander: "enemy airdromes, coneentration centers, train­
ing camps, personnel pools, transportation centers, whether rail, 
road, sea, river, or canal, ammunition and supply dumps, head­
quarters of staff commands, forts and heavily fortified positions, 
trains, eonvoys, columns of troops, bridges, dams, locks, power 
plants, tunnels, telegraph and telephone centers, manufaeturing 
areas, water supplies and growing grain." [italics addedfj 
Especially significant were the initial position he now accorded 
enemy airdromes in this carefully prepared categorization of
3 7targets and the placing of strategic targets at the very last.
In the ensuing diseussion Mitchell therefore took up first the 
question of attacking enemy airdromes per se:
Attaeks against enemy airdromes may be launched night or 
day and may be carried out by Bombardment alone or in 
conjunction with Pursuit or Attack. At all events, the 
mission of Bombardment is the same, to render the aircraft 
on the airdrome and its equipment useless for further attack 
against our forces.38
Whereas in World War I such,attacks were generally directed 
against pursuit dromes and occurred more or less haphazardly, 
this statement marked the first systematic identification of 
this type of target in Mitchell’s thinking, together with the 




is almost certainly indicative of Douhet’s influence. Bombers 
(as well as other types) were to be stopped on the ground. After 
extended discussion of employing bombardment aviation against a 
great variety of other tactical targets, mainly in the battle­
field area, Mitchell took up the question of strategic attack 
against cities— a matter which he had largely ignored since 1918 
in his major concern with the tactical aspects of aerial warfare.
As in the preceding instance, Mitchell’s thought was here 
quite likely influenced by the growing European interest in 
offensive employment of air weapons in future land warfare.
And certainly not the least of his reawakened interest in the 
possible strategic uses of the air weapon derived from the bomb­
ing tests of 1921 which, though tactical of course, had neverthe­
less themselves served to do "more than anything else since the 
war to emphasize the importance of aircraft as an offensive , , , 
weapon,Hence Mitchell probably felt strongly impelled to 
take issue with contemporary questioning of aerial bombing and 
proceeded to justify its use against industrial areas.
The ethics of attack on manufacturing areas in the rear is 
one which is engaging the attention of an International 
Tribunal convened at The Hague, The result , , , will 
probably be the formulation of a set of rules limiting 
attacks of this nature. Manufacturing centers produce 
munitions of war. Munitions of war are imperative to the 
continuation of the struggle. The destruction of manu­
facturing centers and material brings the conflict to a 
quicker termination. These facts cannot be controverted. 
Thus, manufacturing centers become military objects, even 
though they house non-combatant personnel,^
39Lincoln, 153,
'̂^Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group, 93,
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He suggested that residents be given sufficient warning of impend­
ing destruction, thus removing any justification for their remain­
ing in the danger zone. It would be the height of folly, he said, 
to neglect the development of the long-range air weapon and be 
unprepared to use it in a future conflict. Thus, paradoxically, 
the airman who had done probably more than any other single person 
to demonstrate the feasibility of precision bombing seemed unable 
or unwilling to transfer that concept and practice from tactical 
operations at sea to strategic bombardment against war-making, 
industrial targets on land. Once more, however, Mitchell was 
corning to espouse strategic bombardment, but this time more 
gradually than in 1917-18. He suggested application of gases 
that might be developed to poison the water supply in arid lands 
for both man and beast; he proposed a similar use of gas against 
wheat in agricultural areas.Thus Mitchell, though continuing 
to emphasize the tactical, was moving perceptibly toward a 
doctrinal posture that would include strategic bombardment. 
However, the most efficacious use of the bombing arm Mitchell 
still saw in its employment at sea.
Experience in 1921 had proved that in comparable bombing 
of objectives at sea and on land, the former was more destructive 
because "any large bomb exploded at the proper depth within a 
reasonable distance of the vessel caused as much, if not greater, 
damage than a direct h i t . T h r o u g h  application of this
"+llbid., 94.
42Ibid., 61; Lincoln, 152-153.
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"water-hammer" effect, the most powerful battleship afloat could 
be sunk by aerial demolition bombs alone. To counter the threat 
of air power against battleships there had been much talk about 
using aircraft carriers with the fleet, but Mitchell asserted 
that the floating airdrome represented by the aircraft carrier 
"would be one of the easiest ships in the fleet to put out of 
commission because even very light bombs would tear the landing 
deck to pieces and make it impossible to land or take off." In 
the event that hostile carrier pursuit proved troublesome, 
carriers would be singled out as the first target for attack.
But in his listing of principles for attacking seacraft, Mitchell 
as a general rule urged (1) concentration on battleships; (2) 
designation of each individual battleship for attack by a 
separate flight of bombers, with twelve flights per bombard­
ment group; and (3) adherence to specific detailed tactics which 
he had worked out. Most of these tactics were adopted by the Air 
Tactical School in its manuals and texts.Moreover, such 
tactics were further refined as a result of the important 1923 
bombing tests off Cape Hatteras, in the course of which two 
condemned vessels, the Virginia and the New Jersey, were sunk 
on the fifth of September from the remarkable, required altitude 
of 10,000 feet^^— a further, astounding early instance of precision
Ibid., 63, 67.
^^Infra, Ch. 8.
^5AFP 210-1-1, 80; Arnold, 111; Lt. Clayton Bissell, Brief 
History of the Air Corps and Its Late Developments (n.p.: 1927),
91, says hits were scored against the New Jersey from 11,000 feet.
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bombing which ranked with the sinking of the Ostfriesland.
The Bombing Tests off Cape Hatteras.— His report of the 
bombing tests of 1923 clearly reveals that Mitchell was strongly 
influenced by those events and that he remoulded his air doctrine 
accordingly:
1. Air Forces, with the type of aircraft now in existence 
or in development, acting from shore bases, can find 
and destroy all classes of seacraft under war conditions 
with a negligible loss to the aircraft.
2. Conditions of weather . . .  do not alter the statement
above.....  There are no conditions in which seacraft
can operate efficiently in which aircraft cannot operate 
efficiently. Aircraft therefore form an absolutely 
positive system of defense against seacraft within their 
radius of action.
Although the problem of air destruction of ships at sea had in
Mitchell’s view been "solved and . . .  finished," there remained
the necessity of providing "an Air organization and a method of
defending not only our coast cities, but our interior cities,
against the attack of hostile air forces." Mitchell was now
convinced that an enemy in control of the air— which automatically
gave it control of the sea— .could establish its air forces on
off-shore islands, using carriers to transport them thither,
Consequently it was imperative that America’s "scheme of national
defense . . .  be revised at once."
But a final solution of the national defense problem could
^SReport of Bombing Maneuvers Conducted off Cape Hatteras, 
Sep. 5, 1923 (n.p.), 22. In USAFHA 248.222-71.
^^Ibid., 23-24. This theme was to recur throughout the 
years at ACTS in discussions of coastal defense problems.
^^Ibid., 24.
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not be obtained until a Department of National Defense was 
established and organized with sub-secretaries for the army, 
navy, and air; only thus could aviation develop to its fullest 
extent, that is, under its own direction and control. Such a 
national defense structure would concentrate all air strength 
within the jurisdiction of the air force, though air units would 
be allotted to the navy for fighting operations on the high 
seas. However, all naval control would cease two hundred miles 
from the shoreline, and in that zone complete control and 
responsibility for defense against both ships and aircraft 
would reside in the air force. The army would be completely 
responsible for defense of the l a n d . T h u s  Mitchell believed 
that the great striking power of the air weapon— demonstrated 
anew by the bombing tests of 1923 and already acknowledged by 
Europeans in their defense policies--should be functionally 
recognized in a thorough-going, logical reorganization of the 
entire American defense system. Such a clear-cut demarcation 
of functions would of course deprive the navy of its shore 
establishments and bases for coastal defense, limiting it to 
a combat and patrol role on the high seas where it would operate 
under the protection of air detachments. Mitchell’s doctrine on 
the superior place and function of air power in national defense 
was soon expanded in the course of his inspection of United 
States possessions in the Pacific.
^9Ibid.
CHAPTER VI
EVOLUTION OF MITCHELL’S CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER:
PACIFIC INFLUENCES, 1923-1925
Concept of War and the Role of Air Power, 1923-2
Even before he left the shores of the United States on 
October 23, 1923, Mitchell unwittingly revealed in a communica­
tion to the Chief of Air Service that he had taken a further 
significant step in the evolution of his air doctrine. On 
October 19 he wired General Patrick from the west coast, where 
he was inspecting air bases, that his impending study of the 
Pacific defense problem would not be approached simply in terms 
of defeating the enemy’s armed forces but would encompass as 
well the destruction of the hostile nation’s "power to make war, 
including production and supply of war material, transportation, 
etc., and . . .  destruction of their morale."^
Such objectives unmistakably connoted a Douhetian concept 
of war; with their acceptance, Mitchell clearly crossed the 
threshold from the tactical to the strategic realm. They repre­
sented no passing fancy but rather became integral to the future 




the results of his inspection he reiterated three cardinal points 
as essential to the successful conclusion of a war: "1. the
destruction of the hostile armed forces; (2) the destruction of 
the hostile power to make war; and (3) the destruction of the 
morale at an early d a t e . B y  the power to make war Mitchell 
clearly meant the ability to produce, supply, and transport war 
material. Destruction of morale signified the ending of the 
people’s will to continue the struggle, as opposed to that of 
the armed forces.
These statements marked the first time in years that Mitchell 
systematically added anything to his concept that the objectives 
in war extended beyond the tactical element, the destruction of 
the armed forces. Even here, the idea of complete or unqualified 
destruction was new in his thought. Formerly he had called only 
for the defeat, not the utter destruction of the surface force; 
only the hostile air force was to be sought out and destroyed— in 
the air, and beginning in 1922, on the ground. The new position 
first indicated in October 1923 represented, then, not only a 
significant and substantial— though not total— shift from tactical 
to strategic air warfare but also the acceptance of a philosophy 
of annihilation. In so doing, Mitchell committed the same error 
which Douhet had made earlier when in his discussion of war he 
deemed inevitable the destruction of the entire social and economic
^Report of Inspection of United States Possessions in the 
Pacific and Java, Singapore, India, Siam, China, and Japan 
(Washington: Oct. 24, 1924), 30. Hereafter cited as Report of
Inspection in the Pacific. In NA, Air Corps Library.
136
fabric— a theme the Italian theorist continued to reiterate in 
more or less explicit fashion.3 Mitchell’s new emphasis on 
destruetion, therefore, was typically Douhetian. It was completely 
divorced from the Clausewitzian concept of graduated application 
of a state’s force aimed at attaining a national object which 
could not be realized by peaceful means; certainly destruction 
was not an object of that kind.Thus did the American air 
leader apparently succumb to Douhet’s admonition that "in this 
period of rapid transition from one form of war to another, 
those who daringly take to the new road first will enjoy the 
incalculable advantages of the new means of war over the old. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in his new concept of 
war the military objectives which Mitchell posed for a belligerent 
were ones whose realization was dependent in large part, in every 
case, upon the employment of air power; only the air weapon could 
exercise a significant and perhaps commanding role in the pursuit 
of the trinity of objectives— strategic as well as tactical- 
established as requisites to victory in the new Mitchellian 
doctrine.
Strategic Employment of the Air Weapon: Principles
As in his previous enehantment with stratégie air warfare 
in 1917-1918, Mitchell now once more in 1929 recognized explicitly-.
^Douhet, The Command of the Air, Part I.
^Hoffman Nickerson, "War," Encyclopedia Britannica (1996),
V. 23.
^The Command of the Air, Part I, 30.
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as if it were a new thing— that the advent of the air weapon had 
changed the old patterns of war. He used the standard Douhetian 
arguments that aircraft could strike anywhere behind the enemy’s 
army and navy, and that air forces could carry operations to all 
parts of the hostile country, being restricted only by the air­
plane’s radius of action.® Nothing was immune to the striking 
power of the air arm.
Such exposure, Mitchell continued, would be the fate of 
any country that had lost the initiative and was forced on to 
the defensive.^ Once in that posture, defeat in modern war became 
inevitable. To avoid such a catastrophe, it was imperative for a 
country to assume the offensive and maintain it until the issue 
had been successfully resolved. Agreeing tacitly with Douhet’s 
conclusion as to the necessity for command of the air, Mitchell 
expressly stated that under the changed conditions of warfare it 
was now "necessary to gain the ascendancy first with air power 
before a decision can be obtained over an enemy.
Such predominance could be achieved by adherence to correct 
doctrinal principles in the organization and employment of air 
power. Like Douhet he placed the greatest stress upon mass, but 
in applying the principle Mitchell emphasized the pursuit role.
®Report of Inspection in the Pacific, 31; cf. Douhet, 
Command of the Air, Part I (Faber edit.), especially 14.
^Ibid.; cf. Douhet, Command of the Air, Part I, 18-19,
45.
®Ibid., 31, 311-12; cf. Douhet, The Command of the Air,
Part I (Coward-McCann edit.), 25.
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Though his objectives entailed attack by bombardment, such 
destruction could not be achieved without the skilful assistance 
of pursuit aviation, even as Douhet’s bombers remained largely 
dependent upon their combat escorts. To be successful in the 
new warfare, one had to mass pursuit aviation at "the decisive 
points at the inception of the operation." If an air force did 
not act in "concentrated compact bodies," it could be defeated 
in detail regardless of the size of the opposing force.^ 
Comparative lack of mass was the main reason that aircraft 
stationed on a floating airdrome could not normally operate 
successfully against an opposing land-based force. For this 
reason he thought that any invading air force from overseas 
would attempt first to seize or establish land airdromes on our 
off-shore islands and thence launch fresh attacks against the 
mainland of this country. Hence in his choice of primary 
targets for attack, the hostile air force complex loomed large, 
on the ground as well as in the air; due attention was to be 
paid to the "hostile air power, its airdromes, shops, supply 
points, and communication systems." Here then was an explicit 
reiteration of Douhetian thought on counter air force strategy.
While defeat of the rival air force insured command of 
the air, it still could not be equated with victory; only if 
one’s air power was deliberately planned, organized, and used
^Ibid., H6-H7, 313, 
^°Ibid., 4-7, 311.
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to exploit the opportunity afforded by one’s control of the skies, 
could an air force decide an armed contest. Here Mitchell 
insisted— like Douhet— that the basic principle underlying the 
organization of a nation’s total air power must be an offensive 
one; this entailed the building of an air force "capable of the 
greatest radius of action practicable," Conveniently ignoring 
Britain’s postwar switch to a defensive posture in the air, 
Mitchell justified this policy on the ground that "all of the 
great countries . , . are now organizing their air power for 
striking their adversary as far away . , . as possible." While 
this policy of course accorded fully with Trenchard’s war-time 
precept of keeping the fighting at a distance from the frontier, 
the American was now clearly thinking of offensive striking power 
in terms of inter-continental warfare. "Aircraft of certain 
classes," he asserted, were already "able to traverse the air, 
all over the w o r l d . T h e  enemy he had in mind lay across the 
Pacific,
The Threat in the Pacific,.— The policy of the United 
States, Mitchell believed, was "to keep its soil, institutions, 
and manner of living free from the ownership, the dominion, and 
the customs of the Orientals who peopled the shores of this 
greatest of all oceans," He saw this as a common policy among 
all the "white" powers of the Pacific, Sooner or later, the 
white and yellow races would clash in an inevitable conflict.
Ibid,, 311, 313, 323,
m o
Japan was the best organized and the most aggressive of the 
nations of the "Mongolian race" which Mitchell described as a 
"capable, strong, and virile people . . . perfectly able to 
defeat economically, possess and eventually absorb any other 
races crossing their paths." The Japanese, now a great power, 
wanted equality of position and freedom to live, move, and labor 
where they wished on a basis of full equality with the whites. 
Already they were beginning to organize the continent of Asia; 
this attempt might, through their powers of organization,
"easily lead to a recreation \̂ siĉ  of the greatest military 
machine the world ever saw." Hence the problem facing the 
United States was not simply one of political supremacy but 
involved the "very existence of the white race." Mitchell, 
accustomed since the days of the Spanish-American War to seeing 
America take a leading role in the affairs of the world, thought 
it "quite evident that the struggle must be taken up by the 
white inhabitants of the New World, and . , , by the inhabitants 
of North America primarily." He predicted that eventually the 
diplomatic means of handling these questions would fail, and 
that war would be our only recourse.And in war the aerial 
weapon would be supreme.
Strategy in the Pacific.— Although air power would prove 
the most effective weapon in the American arsenal for war against 
the Eastern power, hostile, land-based air forces would conversely
l^Ibid., 26-30.
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make it impossible for our surface vessels to transport in time 
of war very many men or much equipment across the southern line 
of advance over the Pacific. The surface navy would be inhibited 
from operating offensively because carriers simply could not 
compete for control of the air against land-based aircraft, owing 
to the limitations of their decks. These he described as "so 
small, contracted, unstable, and exposed to hostile air attack 
that neither sufficient nor suitable air craft ][[could[] be launched 
from them, to cope with air forces acting from shore bases."
Hence he reasoned that the navy could not control the air over 
the fleet. Other possible measures were inadequate to sustain 
the fleet: concealment was impossible, and antiaircraft batteries,
balloon barrages, and evasive action were ineffective. Yet the 
arsenal of land-based aerial weapons— bombs, mines, chemical 
weapons, air and water topedoes, and gunfire— could destroy or 
completely inactivate any surface vessel that "has been built 
or that can be built." In the face of such superior land-based 
power, overseas surface expeditions were no longer in the realm 
of strategic possibility. With Japan dominating the central and 
southern lines of advance across the Pacific, a conventional 
naval offensive against her was therefore completely out of the 
question. Navy operations, as far as offense was concerned, 
would be limited in the future to submarine warfare. Inability 
to maintain water communications with the Western Pacific caused 
Mitchell to recommend writing off the Philippines as indefensible.^^
13Ibid., 23-24, 323.
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Alternatively, Mitchell proposed that "all plans for 
offensive operations against Japan . . .  be based on an advance 
through Alaska, the north Pacific, Kamchatka, . . .  the Kuriles." 
In this way air power could be projected along a line of land 
bases from which direct operations against the main islands of 
Japan could be launched. Such an air offensive against Japan 
would be decisive, because all Japanese cities and centers of 
population were highly constricted, congested, easily located, 
and highly inflammable. Other arms might contribute, but clearly 
strategic air bombardment would play the paramount and decisive 
role.l^
To permit effective joint operations, the American command 
structure in the Pacific would have to be greatly strengthened, 
particularly by instituting unified direction and control. 
Mitchell observed that in sharp contradistinction to other 
countries in the Far East we had no single command in "Hawaii 
or the Philippine Islands. . . .  Our present system will be 
provocative of a greater amount of friction in time of war than 
. . .  in time of peace. There should be a single commander 
charged with the complete defense of these possessions." A 
similar type of unified control was recommended for the defense 
of the continental United States embodying all operating units—  
land, sea, and air. If the air factor in the national defense 
equation was to be developed to its full potential, it was 
incumbent upon the nation’s leaders to recognize the imperative
l^Ibid., 24, 324.
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need for drastic reorganization,^^
Asserting, in terms reminiscent of Douhet, that "air forces 
must be designed primarily to attain victory in the air,” Mitchell 
once more recommended that air forces be separated from surface 
establishments since they had no necessary relation to ground 
forces and warranted an entirely separate budget. Through autono­
mous budgetary control, the air arm could maximize prospects for 
the fullest development of aviation. Moreover, the functions and 
responsibilities of the air, ground, and water forces required re­
definition and clarification; it was especially necessary that the 
air force be assigned a definite mission in its particular sphere 
of responsibility, Mitchell believed it should be charged with 
"responsibility for the complete air defense of the nation,"
Such a mission would give the proposed air department centralized 
control over all functions of air power, and terminate the 
contemporary dissipation of aerial operations among the several 
services which so reduced defense efficiency,^®
As for the protection of the coasts and interior, Mitchell 
reiterated that the navy’s mission in coastal defense had "ceased 
to exist"; while admitting that the mission of the army remained 
much as usual, he asserted that fixed coastal artillery, except 
at those few points where important centers could conceivably be 
threatened by submarine fire power, had become superfluous, and
l^lbid,, 311, 323-324,
16lbid,, 313, 321, 325,
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recommended that appropriations for unnecessary coastal gunnery 
be devoted to air power instead. The nucleus of the Mitchellian 
defense system remained air power, built as before around an 
offensive air force comprised of two-thirds pursuit and one third 
bombardment, but the tactical element of greatest importance on 
the battlefield, attack aviation, was subsumed under bombardment, 
provided the former continued to be an element in the American 
Air Service.
Thoughts on Air Power in Future War, circa 1924
Not long after his return from the Pacific in July, Mitchell
amplified, in the preparation of manuscripts and printed matter,
some of his thoughts on war and the influence of air power in
future wars. The more important ones are summarized or excerpted
below. Especially significant is the stress upon the Douhetian
concepts of the offensive nature of the air weapon, the necessity
of attacking first, and the decisiveness of air power.
Putting an opponent on the defensive in the air is much more 
valuable comparatively than putting him on the defensive on 
the ground. Armies may dig trenches. . . . This cannot be 
done in the air . , .for if. . . they [̂ airplanes] are not 
in the air when the hostile air force appears, they will 
have no effect An it. . . .  In the future, the country that 
is ready with its air force and jumps on its opponent at once 
will bring about a speedy and lasting victory.1°
To know what to jump on was certainly important too. More
and more Mitchell seemed to see destruction of the air force on
l^ibid., 312-313, 316-317.
^^Typescript, "The Influence of Air Power in Future Armed 
Contests," n.d., _ca. 1924, 6-7. Mitchell Papers, Box 24.
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the ground as the key to the speedy victory he prophesied:
Once an air force has been destroyed it is almost impossible 
to build it up . . , because all the places capable of build­
ing aircraft will be bombed, all the big air stations that 
train pilots and flyers will be destroyed.19
Logically this led him once more to the concept of strategic 
bombardment, for the factories supplying the engines and aircraft 
frames constituted parts of the nexus of war industry. Therefore 
air power would normally have to strike at a considerable distance. 
Aircraft plants would be among the targets Mitchell categorized for 
strategic attack, once opposing air forces were vanquished:
"centers of production, means of transportation, agricultural 
areas, and shipping, not so much the people themselves.
^Italics addedT) In an age of popular pacifism, the latter qual­
ification was no doubt deemed appropriate.
Moreover, air power employed on such an extensive basis 
would "make the contest much sharper, more decisive, and more 
quickly over with, which, in all cases, will result in much less 
loss of life and treasure." Thus Mitchell, like Douhet, saw 
strategic air warfare as short, decisive, and cheap. Consequently 
a war so waged would be, he believed, a "benefit to civilization."^^
In terms remarkably similar to the later arguments of the 
nuclear age, Mitchell declared that air power, in fact, offered
19lbid., 7.
20lbid., 13. Cf. 1922 listing in Notes on the Multi­
motored Bombardment Group, 84-.
Zllbid., 13-16.
"the one great hope" of eliminating war through its ability to
make war "so terrible that nations will hesitate to engage in
it." This property, together with other unique characteristics,
had already given air power "complete mastery over sea power,
within the radius of its operation," and had made it for the
future "the deciding factor in military operations." Truly our
first line of defense would be in the air, whether against
? Phostile air or transwater attack. Until these fundamental 
principles were recognized, however, the air power of the United 
States would "continue to flounder in the slough of aeronautical 
despond.
Concept of War and the Role of Air Power— 192S
1925 marked the climax of Mitchell’s intensive efforts in 
the arena of national defense and in the realm of air doctrine. 
He refined the intertwined themes of continental defense built 
around air power, and offensive overseas war based on the air 
element. Though Mitchell in Winged Defense placed the greater 
emphasis on continental defense and couched much of his language 
in appealing isolationist terms and concepts, the note he struck 
on offensive overseas warfare was nevertheless clear and un­
mistakable.
Seemingly heeding Douhet’s admonition on formulation of 
doctrine, he advised that "underlying thought and reason must
^^Typescript, no title, Sep. 20, 192<+, 2-3, Mitchell 
Papers, Box 2<+.
^^Report of Inspection in the Pacific, 324-25.
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govern, and then the organization must be built up to meet it."
Recognizing that "to follow blindly what another nation does is
merely to invite disaster," he saw that every state must solve
the problem of security within the particular context of its
24geographical, military, political, and other circumstances.
In hostilities between major powers, however, Mitchell remained 
convinced of his new view as to the role and decisiveness of air 
power. Air power would prove decisive because war was now 
primarily a strategical— rather than tactical--struggle:
The destruction of individuals and property beyond the 
fighting zone becomes a function of air force which is, or 
should be, unaffected by the swaying of the battle line.
This work of destruction by bombing and other methods should 
be continued from the outbreak of hostilities until the war 
is finished, and should be waged primarily . . . [against] 
those industries and equipment that form part of or are 
auxiliary to, the enemy’s military establishments.
[italics addedj
As future war would therefore involve the entire nation in
combat, like Douhet he thought that the old ideas, treaties,
and conventions inspired by humanitarian impulses to mitigate
the cruelties of war would necessarily be altered, changed, or,
he implied, rejected. 6̂
The Mitchellian Synthesis..—  By 1925 Mitchell had clearly 
adopted the main outlines of the strategic bombardment thesis
'̂̂ Winged Defense (New York: Putnam, 1925), 19, 181.
^^Typescript, Reports, "Internal Operation," n.d., ca. 
1925, 6 (Folder— 1925: Organization of Air Service), Mitchell 
Papers, Box 32.
Z^Ibid., 4; Winged Defense, 214.
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propounded by Douhet. Yet, while observing that advances in
27bombardment aviation had been ’’phenomenal" since the World War, 
in response to a question in November 1924 as to the relative 
value of pursuit planes against bombardment planes flying in 
formation, he maintained that "the bombardment planes haven't 
any chance,
But he did not accept the contemporary Douhetian solution 
to the problem of bomber protection— a screening formation of 
slow, heavily armed combat planes. Instead, Mitchell continued 
to place chief reliance upon specialized fast pursuit aviation 
which in the aggregate stood in the forefront of his ideal air 
force, in the ratio of two to one.
Recognizing clearly that the effectiveness of air power 
on an opponent varied inversely with distance,Mitchell sought 
to make the radius of action the same for bombers and pursuit 
escorts.30 His proposed solution (an actual operative one, accord­
ing to his testimony) was the one ultimately adopted in 1943 when 
fighter protection became imperative after unescorted Eighth Air 
Force bombers proved unable to make deep daylight penetrations
^^Winged Defense, 164.
^OMitchell Testimony, Nov. 10, 1924, pp. 1324-25 in 
Proceedings of the Board, Enclosure to Report of Special Board 
to Secretary of the Navy . . ., Jan. 17, 1925. In U. S. Naval 
History Div. (General Board File). Hereafter cited as Eberle 
Board Proceedings (after Admiral Eberle, Chairman).
^^Winged Defense, 182.
^^Eberle Board Proceedings, 1324-25.
1L|9
against such targets as Schwinfurt without excessive losses. It
was a notable observation when he explained in late 1924- that "we
are attaining this greater radius of action for pursuit planes by
31means of auxiliary tanks which can be dropped." While varying 
rates of speed between the two types remained a problem,such 
planes could attack at a distance calculated to "keep all air­
craft away from our borders.These long range, heavily armed 
fighters would make use of the closely-spaced land masses and 
islands in the Northern Hemisphere. "With a pursuit aviation 
of this kind, our bombardment aviation could be accompanied and 
protected on its missions whenever necessary.
In addition to the long-range fighter escort, Mitchell 
called for another category of pursuit aviation to defend large
population centers of critical importance. Planes of this kind
were to be capable of "very great and rapid climb, of great
maneuverability and ammunition capacity." He also foresaw the
need for an extremely high altitude fighter to combat hostile 
aircraft "trying to break through . . .  from 25,000 to 30,000 
feet." These interceptors were to have an effective ceiling of 
35,000 to 4-0,000 feet,^^ a capability hardly attained two decades
31lbid.
32ibid.
^^Winged Defense, 182. Range in 1924- was about 550 miles, 





later. Besides insisting upon the development of several function­
ally specialized types of pursuit craft, Mitchell also differed 
from Douhet with respect to techniques of employment for obtain­
ing control of the air.
Mitchell’s own concepts for gaining command of the air 
evolved into a unique synthesis during the years 1924—1925.
Though he had recognized since about 1922 the full implications 
of destroying the enemy air force on the ground,the American 
airman was no doubt acutely conscious of the fact that the geo­
graphical location of the United States made it unlikely that 
surprise could be achieved against a hostile force approaching 
the United States. Similarly, in the event of an offensive air 
campaign, his composite strike forces^? could hardly count upon 
surprising a transoceanic enemy air force on the ground. The 
problem, then, was how to defeat the enemy air force if it could 
not be surprised on the ground, Mitchell’s doctrine was to press 
attacks on critical targets using long range fighter escort for 
the b o m b e r s ; 38 by attacking an indispensable installation, he 
expected not only to demolish the target but to force into the 
air even an unwilling enemy air force, whereupon the fighters 
would undertake air battle while bombardment proceeded apace.
3^Notes on the Multi-motored Bombardment Group, 84—85.
37Winged Defense, xviii,
^^Eberle Board Proceedings, 1524-25.
38Typescript, "The Influence of Air Power in Future Armed 
Contests," n.d., ca. 1924, 6, Mitchell Papers, Box 24-.
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Hence Mitchell repeatedly pointed out the need to combine
bombardment attacks with fighter offense forces for the control
of the air. As late as 1925 he harked back to his tactical
experience in the war, though he exaggerated it, and combined
that lesson with the new concept of counter force strategy of
attack on the ground:
It was proved in the European War that the only [italics] 
added effective defense against aerial attack is to whip 
the enemy’s air forces in air battles. In other words, 
seizing the initiative, forcing the enemy to the defensive 
in his own territory, attacking his most important ground 
positions,menacing his airplanes on the ground, in the 
hangars, on the airdromes, and in the factory so that he 
will be forced to take to the air and defend them,
Once the potential for command of the air had been attained, he
foresaw, like Douhet, that nothing could impede the operation of
the air arm in a future conflict, For the present, however,
the most important requirement was to obtain the right kind of
national defense structure; one that would arrive at the correct
decisions on tasks, force structure, and employment.
The most immediate and pressing need was to determine the 
necessary types of aircraft and to get them into production. For 
example, Mitchell at that time questioned the need for ground 
attack airplanes. Since American aviation should be designed 
rather to strike at great distances, heavy bombers and pursuit
*̂QWinged Defense, 199,
^llbid., 203,
^̂ Cf. Douhet, The Command of the Air, Part I (Coward- 
McCann edit.), 76.
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escorts were most needed. Therefore, it was vitally important to 
resolve the national defense wrangle, and to get authoritative 
decisions on what kinds of aircraft to build for both coastal 
defense and overseas warfare. Decisions were especially necessary 
because of the lead time required for development and production. 
Mitchell felt than the program of aircraft development should be 
planned at least seven years ahead. Under the existing service 
arrangement, with the army and navy controlling the defense 
establishment, he considered it impossible for the Air Service 
to obtain the required decisions which would permit it to build 
up its offensive aviation sufficiently to ensure command of the 
air against an enemy.
His basic plan for national defense continued to center 
around air power, but it had to be an independent air force. 
Greater strategic mobility was to be promoted through improved 
airway communications from coast to coast, permitting more 
rapid shifting of forces. Airways and communications were 
also to be developed to and from Alaska and along the Aleutian 
chain to Attu. His recommended deployment of aircraft with­
in continental United States remained the same as in previous 
years, but notable additions were made for outlying territories—  
300 planes for Alaska and 400 for Hawaii, including a special 
complement of 100 for defense of the Pearl Harbor area. How­
ever, no airplanes were to be stationed in the Philippines, as
*̂3Winged Defense, 134-35, 188-89, 198, 216, 218, 221-22.
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Mitchell regarded them not only as indefensible but also useless 
for offensive operations in the Western Pacific. This deploy­
ment, featuring a preponderance of pursuit craft, together with 
Mitchell's references to the relative economic self-sufficiency 
of the United States, constitute the basis for the view that he 
advocated at that time a passive, isolationist policy for American 
air p o w e r . Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only 
did he in his preface repudiate isolationism per se, but in 
various places throughout the book considered the question of 
overseas invasion in explicit language.Mitchell saw national 
defense as consisting of four phases: (1) maintenance of internal
security, (2) protection of the country's borders; (3) control of 
sea communications; and (4-) prosecution of offensive wars over­
seas. In the first two phases air power and land power would 
work together; in the third phase aircraft and submarines would 
divide the tasks, the line of demarcation being the aircraft's 
effective radius of action; in the fourth air power would be the 
primary agent, assisted by submarines and ground forces. A string 
of land bases would have to be seized for air bases and held by 
ground troops; aircraft carriers could not possibly compare with 
air forces based on land. Mitchell clearly and prophetically 
envisaged a war of invasion across the seas based upon establishment
ŷ Ibid., 218-19.
*̂^Supra, chap V, n. M-.
Winged Defense, 101-102, 126, 134-.
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of the necessary control of the air. Thus air power in his 
doctrine included both continental defense and overseas campaigns. 
Only air power could carry the war directly to the heart of the 
enemy country, ignoring its surface forces and striking directly 
at its power to make warj It was perhaps inevitable that the 
staking of such a large claim for air power would fan further 
the glowing flames of controversy over service roles in the 
War and Navy Departments.
y^Ibid., 101-102,
CHAPTER VII 
EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER
The return of the stormy petrel of the Air Service from 
the Pacific in the summer of 192M- and his report in the fall 
signalled the beginning of a series of events which, within 
little more than a year, stirred and heated to white-hot 
intensity the struggle between him and the War and Navy Depart­
ments. From the tenor of his writings in the fall of 1921+ it 
would appear that he was confident of achieving favorable 
changes in the national defense structure. It is surmised 
that his optimism derived in part from the efforts of the 
Lamport Committee, a select committee of inquiry into aviation 
matters. One of numerous Congressional investigations of the 
executive branch during the early twenties, it had begun by 
looking for an "air trust” and ended by probing into the entire 
relationship between air power and national defense. Two steps 
which Mitchell took did much to dramatize the issue of air 
power which had apparently slumbered during his absence. One 
was his appearances and pronouncements before the Lampert 
Committee in December 1924. The other was a series of articles 
which he prepared after receiving special, required permission
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from President Coolidge—-who conditioned it upon approval by 
Mitchell’s superiors— and, consequentially General Patrick. 
Mitchell’s intent of course was to stir up the public to pressure 
Congress into enacting new defense legislation. But in his 
testimony of February 6, 1925 he overplayed his hand. That 
proved to be the beginning of his undoing, as it led directly 
in March to his transfer to the Port Sam Houston Air Station at 
San Antonio, Texas.^ Mitchell’s "sin" lay, apparently, in 
attacking as "confusing" or misleading to Congress and country 
certain testimony and statements made by some departmental 
officials, including General Patrick— who had endorsed the 
concept of a separate air force as the ultimate, but not im­
mediate, solution of the defense problem. Mitchell soon re­
canted, but apparently this maneuver did not impress the War 
Department sufficiently to spare him severe consequences for 
his rashness.^ Yet, even at a farewell luncheon attended by 
Patrick and other ranking colleagues in April 1925, Mitchell 
kept up the attack on the two "old executive departments," 
blaming them directly for holding up the prewar and postwar 
development of aviation in the United States. He remained 
firmly convinced that a change would come about "only through
^Levine, 302-318. Mitchell, upon receiving a lower assign­
ment, reverted to his permanent rank of colonel.
^Typescript, "Memorandum of Recommendations Submitted by 
General Mitchell and Not Acted Upon," p. 27 in Folder, Army and 
Navy Air Services, Recommendations, Mitchell Papers, Box 32.
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the pressure of public opinion or war.During his subsequent 
sojourn in Texas Mitchell completed his book. Winged Defense, 
which came out for publication in August. At that point, fate 
seemingly intervened.
The reported loss of a navy seaplane on September 1, en 
route from San Francisco to Honolulu, and the crash of the naval 
airship Shenandoah on September 3— the flights of which were 
launched under questionable, debatable circumstances— provided an 
opening for another attack. Within forty-eight hours after the 
Shenandoah disaster, Mitchell launched a sharp, telling, and delib­
erate broadside against the Navy and War Departments. He charged 
nothing less than that these accidents were "the direct result of 
the incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable ad­
ministration of the national defense by the Navy and War Depart­
ments. Mitchell’s insubordination of course led to his court- 
martial, in November and December 1925, but the immediate and 
significant effect of his denunciation was to precipitate on 
September 12 a full-scale presidential inquiry into the role of 
the air weapon in national defense. The air power views of the 
Navy, the War Department General Staff, and the Office of the 
Chief of Air Service are described and compared in this chapter.
War and Navy Departments: Defense Policy and Organization
Throughout the entire inter-war period persistent and 
strong efforts were made to establish a separate air force and a
^"General Mitchell’s Parting Address," National Aeronautic 
Assoc. Rev., Ill (June, 1925), 84, 87.
‘̂Quoted in Levine, 327.
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unified department of defense. Between 1919 and 1937 there were 
no less than 19 investigations into these two problems. The two 
questions were closely related and by 1991 were "indissolubly 
married." The major impetus for change emanated from the Air 
Service and evoked a generally sympathetic response from Congress. 
As might be anticipated, the existing major services consistently 
opposed both these proposals.^
From 1920 to 1935 for the first time in American history 
pacifism as well as peace was popular. War, militarism, armaments, 
alliances— all fell under the ban of popular disapproval if not 
outright indictment. The retreat from the League, the Washington 
treaties, and the Kellogg Pact were part and parcel of this 
expression of the nation's sentiment during the 1920's. Never­
theless, the widespread hunger for peace had only the most limited 
and indirect effects upon American military policy. Neither the 
popular vogue of isolationism nor the naive faith of a mesmerized 
public in the possibility of everlasting peace struck a responsive 
chord in either the military departments or the State Department. 
"The citizen's desires were something that had to be catered to 
and, at the same time, evaded."®
Likewise, the military successfully resisted heretieal 
attempts at self-assertion and independence on the part of their
®Louis Morton, "Political-Military Collaborarion," in 
Harry L. Coles (ed.). Total War and Cold War (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1962), 139-190.
®Arthur A. Ekirch, "The Popular Desire for Peace as a 
Factor in Military Policy," in ibid., 161-62.
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"semi-services," the Air Corps and the Marine Corps. Though in 
general the two services rarely went out of their way to help one 
another, they seldom fought each other politically and achieved 
much inter-service success in a few areas such as strategic 
planning.?
Despite drastic postwar demobilization and budgetary 
retrenchment in the twenties, the peacetime army, already larger 
than its ante helium predecessor, looked to rapid expansion from 
its professional nucleus in the event of full scale aggressive 
war. Not only did it have a carefully planned reserve training 
program and a good public relations staff, but its leadership, 
expressed through a strong general staff, was more influential 
than before the war. As for the navy. Senator Claude Swanson 
declared in 1924- that its power made the United States the 
strongest and the most threatening of nations.8 This situation 
obtained largely because of the figure which the navy cut in 
world affairs. It was not merely larger than the prewar navy; 
by the early 1920’s it was second in the world and in process 
of implementing its 1916 building program of 10 battleships and 
six battle cruisers which, when completed, would give it wquàlity 
with Britain by 1924.^ Largely as a consequence, the Washington
^Samuel P. Huntington, "Inter-Service Competition and the 
Political Roles of the Armed Services," in ibid., 180; Wheeler, 
Air Power Historian, VIII (Apr. 1961), 79.
^Ekirch in Coles, Total War and Cold War, 154-156, 164-.
^Ropp, War in the Modern World, 259.
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Naval Disarmament Conference of 1922 formalized American naval 
parity with Great Britain. As for relations between the armed 
forces, inter-service cooperation was institutionalized through 
the Joint Army-Navy Board.
The Joint Board had lapsed into desuetude under the later 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt and the subsequent ones of 
Taft and Wilson, and was practically defunct by the end of the 
World War. As it was the only official body established to 
coordinate the planning activities of the army and the navy, it 
was decided to revive and strengthen it in 1919. A measure of 
its effectiveness was provided in 1924- by Secretary of War Weeks 
who told a joint committee of Congress that, with the exception 
of one case which had to be referred to the President for final 
and prompt decision, the board had since 1919 treated over 300 
cases involving joint action with unanimity. During the next 
decade and a half, another 300 cases were disposed of, with 
generally satisfactory results to both services. Nevertheless, 
there were some thorny matters which proved highly resistant to 
ready solution, notably the role of air power, joint operations, 
and Far Eastern strategy.And even here the two services were 
usually able to work out a compromise arrangement.
Concepts of Employment of Air Power: The Navy View.— The
missions officially prescribed for the navy by the Joint Board 
were as follows: (a) "Battle-fleet: to gain and maintain
lOiyiorton, in Coles, Total War and Cold War, 135-39.
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command of vital lines of communication by sea, thus insuring 
freedom of movement on the sea in one’s own vessels and denying 
such freedom of movement to enemy vessels. . . , (b) Naval
Coast Defense: . . . control the sea communications within the
area to which assigned. (c) If the navy is inadequate to the 
task indicated above, it must be used to prevent the enemy from 
obtaining control of vital lines of communication.”^^ Airplanes 
had not affected these traditional functions of the American navy 
during the World War nearly as much as the submarine. Certainly 
"they did not exercise any serious influence upon the conduct of 
the war at sea.
It took Mitchell’s demonstrations of air power against 
heavily armored sea v e s s e ià iin'July 1921 to jar the Joint Board 
into admission soon thereafter that aircraft in adequate numbers 
might prove the decisive factor in coastal defense operations. 
Following the September 1921 air tests, in which the Alabama went 
down in 30 seconds after being hit by a 2,000-pound bomb, the 
Naval Board of Observers decided, in their report to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, that aircraft constituted the best defense 
against air attack and that therefore aircraft carriers were
l^War Department Statement, by Brig. Gen. H. A. Drum,
Asst, Chief of Staff, Opr. and Trng. Div., W. D. General Staff, 
before the President’s Aircraft Board, Sep. 21, 1925, 22. Here­
after cited as War Department Statement.
12Navy Department, Report of Special Board, "Result of 
Development of Aviation on the Development of the Navy," Jan. 17, 
1925, 28. Hereafter cited as Navy Aviation Report.
^^Quoted in War Department Statement, Sep. 21, 1925, 22.
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"absolutely necessary. Though the air service was assured a
role in coastal defense, it had to share it with the navy. But 
the navy’s view was that coastal defense was something which 
involved all branches of the army and navy and that there was 
"no sound reason why such army or navy air forces as happened 
to be available should not cooperate . . .  to repel an attack.
Air power thus accentuated an already existing problem. Although 
Congress in 1920 had assigned control of all land based bombard­
ment aircraft to the army and given control of all fleet air 
operations to the navy, "the dispute over coastal air defenses 
remained unsettled until well into World War I I . T h i s  chronic, 
running dispute over coastal defenses of the continent had its 
parallel in the overseas possessions, notably in Hawaii. There 
it was exacerbated by the problem of joint operations, another 
sensitive area for the army and navy, and one in which air power 
was to play an increasingly significant role.
Both military services, but particularly the navy, viewed 
with serious concern the American strategic position in the 
Western Pacific following the World War. Committed politically 
to the defense of the Philippine Islands, the United States 
government nevertheless refused to provide the military forces
1^Lincoln, Military Affairs, XV (Fall, 1951), 155.
^^Navy Aviation Report, 10.
^^AAF Historical Studies, No. 6: The Development of the 
Heavy Bomber, 1918-199-1+ (Maxwell Field, Ala. : revised ed.,
1951), 131, 136.
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and installations necessary to hold them.^^ The problem was 
compounded by the islands mandated to Japan in the Caroline and 
Mariana groups. Lying athwart the United States’ lines of 
communication to its possessions in the Western Pacific, they 
threatened the security of fleet communications with the 
Philippines and Guam. Moreover, the Washington Naval Disarmament 
Treaty limited American strength in the Western Pacific vis-a-vis 
Japan and served more or less to equalize naval strength in that 
area. Furthermore, the United States fleet was not well balanced 
for Pacific type operations, being deficient in fast cruisers. 
Nevertheless, the naval treaty did allow fairly high limits for 
aircraft carriers, Britain and the United States each being 
permitted 135,000 tons and Japan 81,000 tons. With such relative­
ly high carrier ceilings out of a total naval tonnage of 525,000 
for the United States and 315,000 for Japan, both countries
1 Orapidly developed the carrier as a striking weapon. In this 
context, the strategic plan adopted by the Joint Board of the 
Army and Navy— War Plan Orange— posed a highly ambitious mission 
which the two services could fulfill only with extreme difficulty, 
if at all.
l^Morton, in Coles, Total War and Cold War, 14-2.
l^Ropp, War in the Modern World, 260-61.
l^Morton (Coles, Total War and Cold War, 14-2) believes 
that the Orange Plan, "the product of the best minds of a whole 
generation of planners, . . . set a task that was clearly 
incapable of achievement."
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Faced with a virtually insoluble problem of war-time opera­
tions in the Western Pacific, a number of bigb naval officers were 
not entirely averse to utilizing the air weapon to assist the 
fleet. The general strategy enunciated in Orange, finalized in 
August and September 1924 (just after Mitchell’s return from the 
Pacific but before bis report was rendered) proposed to resolve 
the Pacific problem by carrying the war to Japan with both sea 
and air power. Following the imposition of a blockade, a 
strategic offensive by sea and air was to be mounted. Air 
attacks on Japan were to be launched initially from carriers, 
but were gradually to be superseded by army aircraft as bases 
were established. Japan’s naval forces were to be the first object 
of attack; next, her economic life. Landings were to be made only 
if necessary. The basis for this strategy had been established
during the preceding year when the General Board of the Navy, 
comparable to the Army’s General Staff, came out in favor of the 
use of naval air power in a war with Japan, aiming at the conduct
PIof an intensive air campaign over Japanese territory.
So important had military aviation become, not only for 
reconnaissance at sea and control of the air above the fleet 
but for tactical air strikes against enemy territory, that the 
Navy’s Eberle Board in 1924 concluded that aviation was an
ZOReport, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—  Orange, JB 
File No. 325, Serial No. 228, Aug. IS, 1924, pp. 1-2.
^^General Board to Secretary of Navy, JBR File 425,
Serial No. 1136, Apr. 26, 1923, quoted in Brune, 186-187.
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integral element of the fleet and should not be separated from it. 
If, notwithstanding, separation were to be effected and an 
independent air establishment created, the navy’s considered 
opinion was that such a development "would be most injurious 
to the continued efficiency of the fleet in performance of its 
mission."22
In this connection, the navy rejected as unsound Mitchell’s 
proposed offensive strategy against Japan— to be applied primarily 
though not solely by land based air power— even though it had 
just secretly endorsed a generally similar strategic concept 
utilizing air power as an integral part of the fleet. Neverthe­
less, it did recommend further development of both military and 
naval aviation. It called for a thorough-going, progressive, and 
long term aviation program in the navy involving aircraft con­
struction up to the full limit permitted under the 5:5:3 ratio 
in naval air strength.
Despite some disarray within its ranks as to the relative 
importance and place of the air weapon in the surface fleet, 
the navy remained on record as unalterably opposed to losing 
control over an arm which promised to augment its offensive
Z^Navy Aviation Report, Jan. 17, 1925, 75-75.
Z^Ibid., 10, 79-80.
^^Naval air enthusiasts and pioneers such as Admirals 
Sims, Fullam, Moffett, and Fiske thought naval air the most 
vital aspect of air power. See, e. g., Rear Admiral W. F.
Fullam, "Aeronautics in the Navy," National Aeronautic 
Association Review III (Jan., 1925), 9-10.
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? C,power in a critical, potential theater of operations. Thus the 
navy, despite its lack of a body of war experience in naval avia­
tion, nevertheless proved flexible and realistic enough to benefit 
materially from the new air technology in general and from the 
aerial bomb tests of 1921 and 1923 in particular.
Concept of Employment of Air Power: War Department View.—
The army, comparatively familiar with the capabilities of the air 
weapon, proved even less willing than the navy to dispense with 
control over a military air organization whose maximum contribu­
tion to national defense, it felt, could be effected on the battle­
field as an integral part of the army team. The tasks of the army 
as prescribed by the Joint Board comprised (a) the coastal defense 
of continental United States and its possessions; (b) the conduct 
of offensive operations against enemy possessions or homeland, 
once the navy had established control over lines of communication 
thereto; and (c) the relief of marine garrisons at temporary 
bases taken and secured by the fleet. In carrying out these 
missions, all components were expected to be guided by the army’s 
doctrine on employment of forces. Training Regulation 10-5 
identified the infantry as the basic arm of the army and stated 
unequivocally that its role was the crucial, decisive one for the 
army, all other arms or branches functioning only to support the
Z^By 1930, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Pratt, 
could proclaim that "the primary purpose of naval aircraft is 
the development of the offensive powers of the fleet and of 




War Department policy, premised on the inseparability of 
air and land operations, asserted the virtual impossibility of 
defining a separate, coordinate defense role for an air establish­
ment. To buttress this contention during the fierce intra-service 
fight of 1925, it drew upon the findings of both the Dickman 
Board of 1919 and, especially, the Lassiter Board of 1923. As 
to the former, it is sufficient to note that the so-called branch 
board of the Air Service itself, headed by Brigadier General 
Foulois, had not recommended the Air Service be made a separate 
and independent organization; the War Department board, which 
reviewed all the subordinate branch board reports, concurred 
emphatically.
However, the War Department's Lassiter Board, convened in 
March 1923 by Secretary of War Weeks to consider reorganizational 
proposals by Major General Patrick, agreed in several, respects 
with the Chief of Air Service.This favorable attitude toward 
air power bore no immediate fruit, owing to protracted failure of 
the two military departments to agree upon proposed legislation 
required to put the recommended changes into effect.29 Consequent­
ly the War Department had not formulated a program for congress­
ional consideration by the time Mitchell’s verbal bombshell
2^War Department Statement, Sep. 21, 1925, H5.
27lbid., Sep. 21, 1925, H5-H7.
P QMcClendon, Autonomy for the Air Arm, 1907-1995, 63.
29War Department Statement, Sep. 21, 1925, 10.
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precipitated the presidential investigation of national aviation 
in September 1925. As the Morrow Board was to resurrect and adopt 
some of the principles of air organization urged by the Lassiter 
Board two years earlier, a review of the letter's findings is in 
order.
The Lassiter Board called for a progressive development of 
military aviation extending over a ten-year period, based upon a 
minimum peacetime establishment, a maximum of reserve officers on 
active duty, and a long term program of military aircraft procure­
ment. The ten-year expansion program was aimed at bolstering the 
sagging aircraft industry and restoring the vigor of the air arm—  
so sapped by reductions in men and planes as to be declared in 
critical condition. Equally important was its modified endorse­
ment of General Patrick's recommendation to reorganize the air 
component into two groupings, one consisting of observation and 
balloon units which would function strictly with ground combat 
arms; the other comprising pursuit, bombardment, and attack 
units— to be called the Air Force--which would operate more or 
less independently.^*^ The Lassiter Board believed that the latter
ÔjyicClendon, 63. The parallel to Douhet' s Independent Air 
Force is arresting. Whether such a connection existed has not 
been established; it is surmised that the Assistant Chief of Air 
Service may have had a hand in inspiring or formulating this 
particular recommendation made in early 1923, a time when Mitchell 
was in the country and displaying other evidence of Douhetian 
leaitihg§;. It is interesting to note McClendon's further comment 
on the GHQ air force idea: "Two decades later an Army Air Force 
historian pronounced it as the concept of the strategic air force 
which was hailed as a new type of aerial combat unit when intro­
duced in the North African campaign during the spring of 1913." 
(Italics added) Ibid., 61.
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object could be achieved through establishment of an air force 
under General Headquarters (GHQ) control comprising bombardment 
and pursuit forces, but rejected the proposal to take control of 
attack aviation and protective pursuit from the field armies.
The GHQ air force would operate under General Headquarters for 
assignment to "special and strategical mission^," which might be 
executed "either in connection with the operation of ground 
troops or entirely independently of them." It was therefore to 
be organized into "large units, insuring great mobility and 
independence of a c t i o n . I n  his final report in 1929, just 
prior to his retirement as Chief of Staff, General Pershing also 
acknowledged that the air service should remain available "for 
independent use in mass or otherwise wherever necessary, but 
always under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies.
While thus making some accommodation to the demands of 
the Air Service, at least on paper, the War Department neverthe­
less remained fixed in its conviction that war was essentially a 
matter of coming to grips with a foe on the ground. In 1925, 
contending that in future wars aviation would not be the 
deciding factor. Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, then Assistant 
Chief of Staff and destined to serve into the 1930’s as one of 
the War Department’s chief authorities on aviation matters, set
Slfbid.
Department Statement, Sep. 21, 1925, 11.
33lbid., 12.
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forth the official view of the department on the role of the air 
weapon: "Military aviation is primarily an important and new means
of transporting weapons and securing information. As such it has 
been and will be an auxiliary to the decisive element of the ground 
battle.^Italics added]
Countering the demand for a separate air organization, the 
War Department further argued that the GHQ air force (under its 
Lassiter plan), if directed by an air officer, could "function as 
an independent air force and execute all air missions which might 
be assigned to the proposed independent air force." The army 
needed air units of all types, and they were either to be integrated 
with its ground units or come directly under control of its General 
Headquarters. It expressly rejected as "unsound tactically and 
strategically" the associated argument of the separatists that 
autonomy might alternatively be achieved by dividing military 
aviation into "service" and "combat" functions, with the army 
retaining control only of the former. On the contrary, air opera­
tions could not be divorced from land and sea operations, and 
there could be therefore no place whatsoever for any separate air 
command independent of the army and navy.
As events transpired, these arguments of the War Depart­
ment, together with similar ones of the Navy Department, before 
the Morrow Board (as the President’s investigating board was
^^Ibid., 60.
^^Ibid., 61; War Department Statement (also presented by 
Gen. Drum), Oct. 13, 1925, 2, 21, 38, 93, 99.
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called, after its chairman, Dwight Morrow) in the fall of 1925 
impressed the members much more deeply than did those of "the 
principal exponent" of an independent air establishment whose 
testimony, to the disappointment of sympathetic observers, con­
sisted almost entirely of reading his book. Winged Defense,
published August 29, 1925 and described by The New York Times
5 7as an attack on the nation’s air policies.
National Aviation Policy: Morrow Board
After a thorough series of hearings during September and 
October, the Morrow Board prepared its report, issuing it in 
early December before the Lampert study was finalized. Through 
this tour de force the executive branch’s board of inquiry scored 
a distinct psychological advantage over the Lampert Committee 
whose legislative hearings had revolved largely around the 
testimony of General Mitchell.This bold stroke added much 
to the impact of the report itself, largely nullifying the effect 
of the subsequent congressional report.Initially directed by 
President Coolidge to determine the "best means of developing and 
applying aircraft in national defense" and to supplement the 
studies already made thereon by the military departments, the 
board in its report reflected generally the policy of the Coolidge 




39lbid., 68; Arnold, 119; Levine, 332.
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Committee— which submitted its report about a week or so later 
(though it had concluded its hearings nine months earlier)-- 
sharply differed with the administration on defense matters, 
expressly calling for a unified department of defense containing 
an independent air establishment.^^ But it was the presidential 
board which set the tone and determined the direction of national 
aviation and defense policies for the coming decades.
While the President’s Board of Aviation Inquiry in its
report recommended a moderate, constructive governmental policy
to put the civil aviation industry on firm foundations for future
growth, it viewed national defense as a whole in conservative,
narrowly defensive terms. It found no evidence to support the
conclusion that there was any threat to the United States of
invasion from overseas directly by way of air either at that
*
time or in the foreseeable future. It regarded the fleet as 
the first line of defense. Naval aviation was to be maintained 
"in due relation to the fleet.” The army’s aviation requirements 
were to be determined in light of its function as an agency of 
defense. To bring air strength of the services up to an accept­
able level the board recommended the adoption of a systematic 
five-year aircraft procurement program. Effective prosecution 
of modern military and navy operations made it mandatory for the 
army and navy to operate and control directly their own auxiliary
"̂ M̂cClendon, 67-70. Air units would be provided the Army 
and Navy to meet their tactical requirements, but the air force 
would have its own separate establishment and independent mission. 
See also AAF Historical Studies,No. 25, 12-13.
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aviation. As to whether we had need of a separate air force over 
and above the air components required for use by the army and navy, 
the board concluded that aviation had not "yet demonstrated its 
value— certainly not in a country situated as ours for independent 
operations of such a character as to justify the organization of 
a separate department." However, board members deemed it important 
to distinguish functionally between the efforts of air troops act­
ing in an auxiliary capacity and those of an air force acting 
alone on a separate mission. It therefore recommended that the 
designation. Air Service, be changed to Air Corps.
Air Service-General Staff Consensus: TR M-M-O-IS
At the same time that Morrow’s investigation was launched, 
the War Department hierarchy took rapid steps to put its aviation 
affairs in order. Protracted discussions between the General 
Staff, particularly the War Plans Division, and the Air Service 
as to the role of the air component within the army structure 
were quickly terminated.These focused around the proposed 
Training Regulation 440-15, "Fundamental Principles for the 
Employment of the Air Service." Because of the nature of this 
document as well as its bearing upon the relationship between
Study, no title, attached to letter. War Dept., AGO to 
Secretary, Federal Aviation Commission, Aug. 14, 1934, 15-17, 
in Air Corps Library. For details consult Report of the 
President’s Aircraft Board (Washington: 1925).
y^Letter, War Dept. Gen. Staff, Op. and Tr. Div., Brig.
Gen. H. A. Drum, Asst. Chief of Staff, to Chief of Staff,
Training Regulations No. 440-15, Fundamental Principles for 
the Employment of the Air Service, Oct. 27, 1925. In NA, AGO,
CDF 321.9.
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the Air Tactical School, the Office of the Chief of Air Service, 
and the War Department General Staff, it is instructive to trace 
the history of its formulation before examining the regulation 
itself.
The original paper was prepared at the Air Service Tactical 
School under the title Air Tactics and was submitted by the Chief 
of Air Service informally to the General Staff in May 1 9 2 2 .
When subsequently circulated for comment to the Army’s General 
Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, it was sharply 
criticized by the Commandant, General Ely, who deprecated the 
proposed regulation as "largely an argument for the recognition 
of the aviation service as an independent force, on a parity with 
the land and naval f o r c e s . I n  April 1923 the Chief of Air 
Service submitted a redraft to the War Department under the 
title, "The Air Service— Fundamental Conceptions,"^^ but it too 
was rejected by General Smith, the new General Service Schools’ 
Commandant, who asserted that the anticipated functional division 
of the air arm into air force and air service was "not only un­
sound but . . . extremely dangerous." He was concerned lest such 
a doctrine serve to remove the bulk of the îr arm from its 
primary role as an auxiliary to a new mission of waging warfare
^^ibid., Enclosure No. 2.
^^Quoted in ibid.
^^OCAS to Commandant, Army General Service Schools, through 
AGO, Apr. 26, 1923 (signed fMajor^ W. H. Frank, Executive), In 
NARG 94, AGO 062.12 (1923).
175
independently of either army or navy. A subsequently revised 
manuscript submitted by the Air Service in early 1924 presumably 
also met with disfavor and was "returned at the request of the 
Chief of Air Service on May 2 4 . In June the Office of the 
Chief of Air Service (OCAS) again changed the title and submitted 
the "first tentative draft" of . Fundamental Principles for
the Employment of the Air Service," adding that it "was prepared 
by Major Milling at Langley Field.General Patrick desired 
General Drum to read the rough draft so that he might criticize 
anything he considered "fundamentally wrong," after which the 
training regulation would be rewritten,After repeated 
shuffling between the General Staff and OCAS,^^ this draft was 
suddenly expedited in September 1925. The War Department 
accepted all the 74 changes made by the Chief of Air Service 
when he returned the manuscript on September 21. After minor 
alterations. General Drum on October 27 informed General Hines,
^^ibid. 5 Second Ind., General Service Schools to AGO,
Nov. 6, 1923, 2-3, 5.
'̂ D̂rum to Chief of Staff, Oct. 27, 1925, Enclosure No. 2,
P. 3.
^^OCAS, Trng and War Plans Div., Maj. B. K. Young to Lt. 
Col. W. C. Johnson, Gen. Staff, June 19, 1924. In NARG 94, AGO 
062.12 (1924). Persistent efforts to locate the Milling or 
ASTS draft have not been successful, either at N.A. or USAP 
Archives.
^^Ibid.
SOsee also criticism by Army War College. The Army War 
College, Washington, D. C., to AGO, First Ind., Jan. 20, 1925, 
Trng. Reg. 440-15, 2.
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the new Army Chief of Staff, that the manuscript of TR M-!|0~.1S was 
ready for publication, both "the Air Service and the Operations 
and Training Division being in accord.
In view of the persistent opposition within leading army 
circles to any autonomous mission for the air arm, the final 
version of TR •+■4-0-15 was comparatively progressive for its time. 
Such, however, is not the prevalent opinion among air historians. 
Certainly the regulation went well beyond the restrictive defensive 
thinking which pervaded the report of the Morrow Board. TR 
■+•+0-15, finally printed on January 26, 1926, was a composite 
based largely on the Lassiter Board findings, the priority of 
the army ground mission, and a skilful blend of Douhetian doctrine 
then being developed at the Air Tactical School.
Concepts of Employment of Air Power: The Air Service
View. —  In TR ■+•+0-15 the Air Service declared its mission to be 
twofold: (a) "to assist the ground forces to gain strategical
and tactical successes" by destroying enemy aviation, attacking 
enemy ground forces and associated objectives, and protecting 
friendly forces from hostile observation and attack; and (b) to 
furnish aerial observation for information, adjustment of 
artillery fire, messenger service, and special transportation.
All air units were to be organized and trained on the fundamental 
principle of helping the ground forces to achieve a decision.
^^Drum to Chief of Staff, Tr. Reg. ■+■+0-15, Oct. 27, 19 25.
52cate, Air Univ. Qrtly. Rev. I (Winter 19•+7) , 1<+; USAF 
Hist. Studies No. 89, ■+0.
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The nature of air support varied from close tactical coordination 
on the battlefield to more remote strategic cooperation against 
distant enemy targets.
Very much as in the Lassiter formula, "Air Service troops” 
were assigned to functional units comprising:
(a) observation aviation as an integral part of divisions, 
corps, and armies;
(b) an army air force of attack and pursuit aviation, also 
organized as an integral part of each field army; and
(c) a General Headquarters (GHQ) air force of bombardment, 
pursuit aviation, and airships forming a part of General 
Headquarters.
Pursuit aviators, in the army air force, acting under direct army 
command, were to protect "ground forces from aerial attacks" as 
well as furnish cover for aerial observation and attack forces.
They were to do this primarily by seeking out, destroying, or 
driving off enemy air forces. Attack planes were to direct their 
fire against troops and enemy establishments. A noteworthy innova­
tion in official American attack doctrine appeared here with the 
Douhetian injunction to neutralize or destroy antiaircraft defenses 
when they seriously interfered with air operations.
An over-all GHQ "air service" comprised a general reserve 
of air units for the field army as well as a GHQ air force 
organized into "large units capable of effective action within
S^War Dept., Air Service, TR M-M-O-IS: Fundamental
Principles for the Employment of the Air Service, Jan. 26, 1926,
1. This regulation was not superseded until Oct. 1935.
^‘̂Ibid. , 5-7, 9. Pursuit forces were to act in an attack 
capacity when necessary.
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the theater or against distant strategic objectives." This air 
force was supposed to be a '’self-contained" entity, highly mobile 
and flexible in operations, able to shift the focus of its action 
from one theater to another and to transport all necessary asso­
ciated personnel and equipment. Organized into air divisions, 
its objectives were (1) to obtain "command of the air" by defeat­
ing, destroying, or neutralizing enemy aircraft in the air and by 
the "destruction of enemy air bases on the ground"; jjitalics 
added] (2) to attack enemy ground forces and establishments 
Within the theater of operation; (3) "to carry the war into the 
enemy interior by attacking his important strategical centers"; 
and, (M-) when necessary, to attack enemy naval forces operating 
against the coast. The enemy's strategical centers were listed 
in the following significant order: (1) military and industrial
centers, (2) mobilization and training centers, (3) military 
shipping and transportation centers, (<4) bridges, dams, locks, 
power plants, etc., (5) war material depots. Both in the 
description of the GHQ air force and in the listing of target 
systems, there appeared the first clear indication of Douhetian 
influence on official doctrine. Accepted as the key to winning 
"command of the air," destruction of the enemy air force now 
meant systematic destruction on the ground as well as in the air.^^
For its guiding concept of employment, the GHQ air force 
was enjoined in terms reminiscent of Douhet to have its offensive
55lbid., 8-11.
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power in readiness "for instant use" and to seize the "offensive 
in the air immediately" in order "primarily to secure control of 
the air, and secondarily, to disrupt and delay enemy communica­
tions and ground establishments" [̂ siĉ . Once the hostile air 
force was defeated or neutralized, "critical areas of the enemy’s 
country" might lie exposed, and aerial forces could then be 
employed "freely against the enemy’s lines of communications or 
other strategical objectives." Until that time arrived, however, 
targets would be selected in accordance with the general situa­
tion or plan of campaign.
Tactical bombing would be directed against objectives on 
and to the rear of the battlefield, but it is notable that air­
dromes ranked first among recommended immediate targets, followed
57by depots, transport, and troop columns. Strategic bombardment 
was to penetrate deeply into enemy territory "with the object of 
destroying sources of military supply, main lines of communica­
tions,- mobilization, concentration, and military industrial 
centers." ^Italics added] Such bombing was also intended both 
to weaken the enemy by causing discontent and alarm and to impel 
him to divert a significant portion of his fighter and anti­
aircraft forces from the combat zone. These long range air 
missions, derived from the "broad plan" of military operations, 




carefully prepared plans" for fighter protection had been arranged. 
It was anticipated that this would have the further advantage of 
forcing enemy fighters into the air to defend vital installations-- 
a key Mitchellian concept. This proviso in effect would limit 
large-scale operations to daylight hours, as fighters would operate 
only by day and for relatively limited distances.
In coastal operations, the GHQ air force was seen to be of 
special value, attacking such enemy vessels as might venture within 
its radius of action,The sections on air defense of the coast, 
written almost entirely at the Air Service Tactical School in the 
spring of 1 9 2 5 , were based upon the Mitchellian doctrine of 
aerial attack against surface vessels.
Evaluation
Mitchell’s influence, as well as War Department doctrine, 
was no doubt partially responsible for the offensive note struck 
throughout the Air Service manual— war was to be carried to the 
enemy and a decision sought over his territory. The influence of 
Douhet was also notable; for the first time in a manual systematic 
destruction of the enemy air force on the ground was recognized as 
an effective means of gaining "command of the air," To more varied 
influences may be attributed the strategic air warfare concepts
SBibid,, 8, 11,
59lbid., 8 (Par. 14. d. 4 and 5),
G^ASTS, Langley Field, Va., to OCAS, First Ind., May 18, 
1925, Comments on TR 440-15, 4. (Signed Maj, 0, Westover, 
Commandant).
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embodied in TR 4M-0-15; the emphasis on initial attacks against 
enemy concentration and communication centers reflected the 
European idea, elaborated by Mitchell in 1922, regarding pre­
vention of contact between rival ground forces through disruption 
of mobilization. Insofar as the object of such attacks was to 
cause discontent and alarm, they probably derived in part from 
Trenchard’s high estimate of the morale effect of strategic 
bombing in the World War. But Douhetian influence might well 
have played a part, especially since other elements of his theory 
were accepted. The air experience of the British and their 
erection of the elaborate London defense system doubtless con­
tributed in large measure to the belief that strategic attacks 
on the home front might well force the enemy to divert a sig­
nificant portion of his pursuit and AAA forces from the combat 
zone. The special role accorded the GHQ strategic striking 
force was probably varied in origin, dating to the war-time 
experience of the British independent air force and revived 
through the Douhetian emphasis upon the Independent Air Force. 
Certainly among the most immediate and significant reasons for 
War Department acceptance of the idea of an independent air 
striking force were Mitchell’s crusade for a separate air force 
and Sherman’s functional division of the air arm into "air 
force" and "air service" in Air Tactics in 1922. In furnishing 
the section on coastal defense and in presumably supplying the 
basis for a new counter-air force strategy, the Air Service 
Tactical School played an important part in the formulation of
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official doctrine in areas pioneered by Mitchell and Douhet, 
respectively. More important still was its formulation of a 
comprehensive 5 new theory of air power employment during 1925 
and 19 26.
CHAPTER VIII
EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER DOCTRINE AT THE 
AIR TACTICAL SCHOOL, 1923-1926
The 1929-25 school year saw the departure of Major Milling, 
It may be recalled that at the end of the 1923-29- school year 
Milling, probably alluding to Air Tactics (1922), had spoken of 
school texts which had become authority for the work of the Air 
Service. Subsequently a major textbook-writing program was 
undertaken under the direction of Captain Naiden, Director of 
Instruction, with the aim of putting textual preparation on a 
systematic basis.
The first fruit of that program was the text. Employment 
of Combined Air Force, 1925-26. According to the annual report 
for 1926, it was 90 per cent completed as of June 30. It was 
published later in the year, though still dated 1925-26. There­
fore this text chronologically follows TR 9-9-0-15, published in 
January 1926. Before discussing this new text, however, it may 
be well to examine briefly the status of doctrinal thought at 
the school during the years 1923-26, as reflected in the texts 
of that period.
Traditional concepts prevailed during those years, with
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the texts generally following Air Tactics (1922). In the only
extant bombardment text, objectives for tactical bombing in land
warfare comprised, in order, ground forces, pursuit airdromes,
and vital materiel.^ Strategic bombing was seen as distinctly
subordinate to tactical operations.
Its Ubombardment? si use on strictly strategical missions 
is held to be in the same category as any other act of 
strategy; it is a necessary adjunct to tactical employ­
ment; it will have an important bearing on the outcome of 
the war, but it must not take precedence over the support 
of ground operations by proper tactical employment.^
^Italics added]
On the other hand, attack aviation seemed to have lost some of
the impetus given it by the World War and Air Tactics. Instead
of carving out an independent tactical role and making it rely
increasingly upon its heavy armament for protection, school
authorities called for a pursuit umbrella:
The mission of pursuit aviation in protecting attack missions 
is to clear the air of enemy offensive aviation in the area 
of attack operations and to accompany these missions wherever 
possible.3
Pursuit aviation of course remained the backbone of the air force 
and the key to victory in the air. Much different from the texts 
of the early twenties in outlook, concept, and theoretical develop­
ment was Employment of Combined Air Force.̂
^ASTS, Bombardment, 1929-1925 (Fort Monroe, Va.: 1925),
59-65, 70, 74, 75-76, 84.
Zibid., 76-77.
ÂSTS, Attack Aviation (n.p.: 1923), 2.
"Nevertheless, it should be noted that coexisting with the 
new outlook in Air Tactical School concepts, different, if not 
contrary or opposed, views continued to be propounded simultaneously. 
See, for example. Bombardment, 1926-27.
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Concept of War: Objective— The Enemy Population
This text was the first to expound systematically the concept 
that the true objective in war was no longer the enemy force in 
the field but rather the enemy population and vital points in his 
homeland. Air forces, capable of operating in three dimensions, 
could now strike at any time the enemy’s front, flanks, or rear 
with equal facility. Thus the enemy’s will to resist could be 
reduced at the beginning of hostilities by using the air force to 
attack the very seat of his power. In a typically Douhetian 
passage, the anonymous authors described such strategic employ­
ment of air forces "as a method of imposing will by terrorizing 
the whole population of a belligerent country, while conserving 
life and property to the greatest extent." This method was 
greatly to be preferred to "gradually wearing down an enemy to 
exhaustion.Douhet’s concept of strategic air warfare thus 
struck a responsive chord at the Tactical School in the widespread 
postwar reaction to protracted military struggles.
Concept of Employment: General
The new doctrinal emphasis on bombing was shown to be a 
logical development, for the airplane lent itself naturally to 
offensive— rather than defensive— employment: "The extreme 
mobility of and extensive radius of action of the airplane leads 
to the conclusion that the bulk of the air force" should be 
massed as a striking unit and controlled "by one hand." They
^ASTS, Employment of Combined Air Force, 1925-1926 (Fort 
Monroe, Va.: 1926), 3, 22. Hereafter cited as Combined Air
Force.
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were pleased to observe that the current plan of organization (TR 
•44-0-15, January 26, 1926) conformed "to this principle in provid­
ing a large concentration in the G.H.Q. reserve." This air force 
was described as "a highly mobile force of tremendous power" which 
could quickly be thrown into action at widely separated points.®
It represented, on paper at least, the realization in embryonic 
form of the Independent Air Force idea extolled by Douhet.
The ordering and scale of tasks expected of the GHQ air 
force was provided in a statement of mission requirements. The 
large units within that force were to be "employed in vigorous 
offensive action from the beginning of hostilities to:
1) Obtain COMMAND OF THE AIR ------
2) Further the national aim in STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS ------
3) Support the operations of the ground forces in TACTICAL 
OPERATIONS ------
4) DEFEND THE COAST against attack ------
The general procedure in this chapter is to treat each of these 
four tasks in turn.
Command of the Air
Air power had to be employed offensively because the air 
force was essentially an offensive weapon and experience had 
proved it "impossible to defend absolutely an area against a 




examples were cited to show "the futility of employing an air
force defensively in major operations." The only defense was
the offense. Thus the reader was psychologically prepared for
the shocking thought that pursuit was essentially defensive in
nature and in fact incapable of executing the mission of sky
control traditionally associated with it:
Due to the innumerable avenues of approach and withdrawal 
in the air, it is futile, particularly at the beginning of 
hostilities, to attempt to stop hostile aerial activity 
through aerial combat activity alone, [italics added~3
Even with the most dedicated application of the principle of the 
offensive in the "almost limitless dimensions" of the sky, it 
was manifestly impossible "absolutely to prohibit an enemy from 
executing all missions of importance in the air." Hence command 
of the air, though impossible of complete attainment, "would have 
to be sought by different means from those employed in the past.
In other words, Douhet's positive, methodological approach to 
the problem was to be applied. Up to that time, control of the 
air was considered to be a task falling entirely within the 
province of pursuit aviation, for as Air Tactics in 1922 ex­
plained, the doctrine of pursuit was ipso facto the doctrine of 
the air force, to seek out and destroy enemy aviation in aerial
^Ibid., 9-5, 9, 23. This marked the first use of the term,
"command of the air," in the extant ASTS manuals and texts. 
Previously, terms such as "air supremacy" (temporary and local) 
and "control of the air" were used, and with a different connota­
tion. The meaning here was the meaning that Douhet gave the term. 
To make the meaning clearer, the authors drew an analogy between
sea and air forces— the same one used by Douhet to drive home
his point. Cf. Command of the Air (Faber edition), 21, 83.
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combat. Now, however, the faultiness of this method had been
detected; the source of error was to be exorcised, and the only
certain remedy applied— true offensive action! The school text
explained how command of the air was to be achieved:
The command of the air is gained only through positive 
action, i. e., the offensive, the form of combat best 
suited to the air force, the arm which can never reach 
maximum efficiency in any form of defensive operation, 
[italics added]9
Douhet used many of the same words in 1921, but fewer of them,
to describe this concept of gaining command of the air:
Achieving command of the air implies positive action—  
that is, offensive and not defensive action, the very 
action best suited to air power. ["italics added.
Identical words in both underlined."]
Again, describing the meaning of the command of the air, the Air
Tactical School text stated:
The belligerent which gains command of the air is in a 
position to conduct offensive operations on a scale which 
heretofore have been impossible. ["italics addedJTl
Douhet said:
To have command of the air means to be in a position to 
wield offensive power so great that it defies the imagina­
tion. [Italics addedll2
Continuing, the Air Tactical School text emphasized the "decisive
importance" of the new concept of command of the air.l^ Douhet
^Combined Air Force, 10.
Command of the Air (Faber ed.) , 21. Subsequent citations 
are to this edition unless otherwise noted.
TTCombined Air Force, 10.
Command of the Air, 2<+.
^^Combined Air Force, 10.
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had declared himself in ringing terms on this critical point:
Command of the air means . . . complete protection of one's 
own country, the efficient operation of one's army and navy, 
and peace of mind to live and work in safety. In short, it 
means to be in a position to win. To be defeated in the air, 
on the other hand, is finally to be defeated and to be at the 
mercy of the enemy.
The concept of air control would have to be expanded to involve
the effort of "every branch of the air force." Command of the
air must be understood in a new context as involving forces which
had "not been used to the greatest possible extent and with the
maximum efficiency.Here, clearly, the authors were alluding
to the radically different use of force which Douhet advocated
for attaining command of the air— both as to the composition of
the forces required and the means or methods of employing them
for that object.
The New Philosophy Verified by Theory and Empiricism.—
The authors of this radical doctrine of air warfare were at some
pains to assure their readers that it was well grounded and
sound— both in theory and fact. To furnish the necessary proofs,
they resorted to Douhet's carefully reasoned arguments. That they
made specific borrowings of phrases as well as supporting ideas
is evident from the following analysis of each of the underlined
words or phrases as used originally by Douhet.
Though conclusions may be reached, which are based on theory, 
as to the vital importance of command of the air in future 
warfare, they arc founded on data which are absolutely 
positive, i. e., the performance characteristics of aircraft,
"̂̂ Command of the Air, 24.
^^Combined Air Force, 9-10.
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their destructive powers, and their effectiveness, against all 
types of objectives on both land and sea.l^
First, it is to be noted that the ASTS writers struck a
new note by redirecting thought to what war in the future would 
be like. This was one of Douhet’s major concerns, upon which he 
predicated much of his argument: "The character assumed by the
war of the future [italics added] is the fundamental basis upon 
which depends what dispositions of the means of war will provide 
a really effective defense of the state.
Next, as to the school’s allusion to conclusions based on
theory, the authors were probably referring to the following or
a similar passage in Douhet:
All that is a present possibility . . .  and proclaims aloud 
for anyone to understand that to have command of the air is 
to have victory. . . . C Original italics] Reasoning from 
the facts along the lines of logic, this is the conclusion 
we have reached. . . .  When conclusions are reached by 
adherence to logic from actual verifiable facts, those con­
clusions ought to be accepted as valid, even if they seem 
strange and radical, in direct contradiction to conventional 
thought patterns or fixed habits of mind based upon other 
facts, equally positive and verifiable to be sure, but en­
tirely different in nature. To come to any other conclusion 
would be to deny reason itself.["italics added]
The passage cited in the Tactical School text also declared 
that conclusions regarding command of the air were based too on 
positive empirical data, including performance characteristics of 
aircraft. This would appear to be an unmistakable reference not 
only to the immediately preceding quotation but more particularly
IGlbid., 10.
Command of the Air, 11.
IBlbid., 26.
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to ones such as the following from Douhet’s dogmatic argumenta­
tion on properties of aircraft.
Now let us try to determine the general characteristics of 
planes suitable for bombing units, Tt is the functional 
characteristics— the performance— of a plane that we must 
determine here: . . .  these include speed, radius of action,
ceiling, armament, and useful-load capacity.[italics 
added]
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
Very different is my conception. . . .  Whether bombers or 
combat planes they need no more than a medium speed.^0 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
What determines victory in aerial warfare is firepower.
Speed serves only to come to grips with the foe or to flee 
from him, no more. A slower, heavily armed plane able to 
clear its way with its own armament can always get the best 
of the faster pursuit plane.
As to data on the destructive powers attributed to
bombardment against all types of objectives, the ASTS writers
followed in all probability Douhet’s extended and repeated
references to massive aerial devastation by various agents, of
which the following is typical:
It is easy to see how the use of this method . . .  bombing
by gas, incendiaries, and explosives could completely wreck
large areas of population and their transit lines during 
crucial periods of time.22
Having demonstrated the decisiveness of the command of the 
air in future warfare, the possibility of its attainment, and the 
proofs of the theory, the authors of Combined Air Force went on 
to make a significant departure from previous doctrine: "Before
^^Ibid. (Coward-McCann edit.), 38.
ZOfbid. (Coward-McCann edit.), 4-7.
21fbid. (Coward-McCann edit.), 44.
22lbid., 22-23.
192
attempting to strike the enemy a decisive blow on the ground . . .  
it is essential that the offensive power of the hostile air force 
be destroyed or neutralized." [̂ Italics added]] The special head­
quarters air fleet was to be "employed in vigorous offensive 
action from the very beginning of hostilities to obtain COMMAND 
OF THE AIR through the destruction or neutralization of aircraft 
in flight and by destroying the ground installations of the hostile 
air f o r c e . A l l  the latter— not simply pursuit fields, as was 
sometimes mentioned in the past— were blanketed under this sweep­
ing injunction.
After showing that it was futile for pursuit to attempt to
prevent enemy air activity. Combined Air Force concluded that "the
only sure method of effective retaliation against air forces is
to attack their bases or airdromes with other air forces.
]l[talics added]] This Douhet had set forth as follows:
The only really effective aerial defense cannot but be in­
direct; for it consists in reducing the offensive poten­
tiality of the opponent’s air force by destroying the source 
of aerial power at its point of origin. The surest and most 
effective way is to destroy the enemy air force at its bases, 
which are found at the surface. Italics added"3
This method of gaining mastery of the skies called for an
air force built around bombardment, not pursuit, with the latter
reduced to a subsidiary role:
Against the hostile air force pursuit aviation executes normal 
offensive missions in the course of supporting bombardment and 
attack operations. ^Italics added]]
Combined Air Force, 11, 16, 23; Cf. TR WO-15.
Z^Ibid., 23.
Command of the Air, 4-8.
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Bombers and attack planes would of course strike the major blow 
against the enemy air force on the ground, endeavoring to prevent 
the enemy from getting "into the air in force.” Further, asso­
ciated operations aimed at paralyzing the hostile air force followed 
other parts of Douhet’s formula for gaining command of the air: 
"Centers of concentration of the hostile air force are most im­
portant objectives. . . . The destruction of depots, assembly 
points for aircraft, and aircraft on permanent or temporary air­
dromes will have a very decisive effect."
Unless destroyed at the outset, the enemy air force would
of course remain a target system^^ for continued attack during
successive phases of operations. However, the major objective
of securing command of the air was to exploit it strategically,
as the following Douhet-tinged passage revealed:
The hostile air force is always an objective of great 
importance. Once it is neutralized or seriously crippled, 
both the Air Service and the ground troops can proceed 
with the accomplishment of their missions unhindered. And 
by throwing the full strength of the air force against the 
opposing air forces at the start of hostilities an advantage 
may be gained which should lead quickly to the defeat or 
annihilation of the enemy.
Strategic Air Warfare
With this text the Air Tactical School broke ground 
doctrinally not only in the area of counter-air force operations 
but E l l  so in that of strategic air bombardment, thus laying the
^^Combined Air Force, 29-25.
^^A system of targets each of which is functionally related 
either horizontally or vertically to every other target in the 
system. USAF Dictionary, 519.
^^Combined Air Force, 23-29.
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foundations for the school’s subsequent advocacy of bomber suprem­
acy. Taking as its starting point the commonly accepted objective 
of undermining the enemy’s morale and will to resist, which tra­
ditionally was assumed to apply to the armed forces, the text 
asserted, as aforementioned, that this objective might possibly 
be attained "at the beginning of hostilities" by using air power 
to terrorize the civil population and demolish vital targets in 
the enemy state itself. Douhet, it will be recalled, had declared 
that aerial offensives could bomb the interior of the enemy's 
country so devastatingly that the physical and moral resistance
nnof the people would collapse. Initial action of the air force, 
however, would have to be directed against pre-designated objec­
tives during so-called first phase operations. Such operations 
were confined to the time periods of enemy mobilization and 
concentration, preparatory to assumption of combat positions.
The enemy’s military and economic posture at that time were 
thought to present most favorable opportunities for using the 
long-range striking power of the air weapon, the object being 
"to interfere with or prevent" the completion of his preparations. 
All points of concentration for enemy forces were to be attacked 
"without interruption.
Industrial as well as military mobilization of the enemy 
was also to be "attacked with all the power of the air force."
Command of the Air (Coward-McCann edit.), 20-23, 35, 61.
Combined Air Force, 23-25.
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Both physical and morale objectives were identified in this rationale
for strategic bombardment:
The destruction of industrial centers which manufacture muni­
tions or which interfere with their production, will have a 
very detrimental effect on operations in the combat zone, 
since these points are responsible for supplying the ’sinews 
of war.’ . . .  Successful air force operations against
these sources . . . may so delay a campaign as to preclude 
its realization. In addition . . . they are a powerful means 
of undermining the morale of the civil population.
Though admittedly the consequences which might be expected to flow
from such strategic operations remained "a matter of conjecture,"
there was abundant reason to believe that such employment of air
forces would be both large in scale and by no means dictated by
requirements of the ground situation.
Seeking to gauge the possible effectiveness of such air 
operations, the authors pointed to the mobility and radius of 
action of air forces as conferring advantages of unquestionable 
importance. They permitted the air force to conduct strategic 
operations either independently of tactical operations or in 
conjunction therewith. The mere fact that ground forces might 
be engaged in important tactical operations did "not make nec­
essary the abandonment of strategical aerial operations." On 
the contrary, the air force "should be used extensively in 
strategical operations." And the GHQ air force represented 
"the only means at the disposal of a commander for striking 




of concentration,” Nor must he fail to realize that bombardment 
was, moreover, a weapon which might be used "to destroy sources 
of supply and to undermine national morale with the minimum ex­
penditure of effort and material.
The authors of the text asserted the Douhetian maxim that 
"in any scheme of strategical operation the object is to cause 
complete destruction or permanent, irreparable damage to the enemy 
which will have a decisive effect. [.Italics added^ It was at
this point that the Air Tactical School proceeded to integrate 
unavowed Douhetian doctrine with the already budding American 
practice of precision, pin-point attacks. The idea of sustained 
precision attacks according to a pre-determined plan which 
identified a selected portion of the enemy’s organism, already 
evident in Sherman’s Air Tactics of 1922 and in the school’s 
Bombardment text for 1924-25 as well, was now further amplified 
and illustrated in Sherman’s book. Air Warfare. Combined Air 
Force reiterated Sherman’s emphasis upon strict adherence to a 
well defined plan of action. Demonstrating less faith in the 
efficacy of single attacks than Douhet, the authors adjured 
commanders that, once a decision had been reached as to the 
precise elements of the enemy’s organization to be attacked,
33lbid., 12.
^^Ibid., 12. Cf. Command of the Air, 22-23, "The guiding 
principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must
be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attacks on 
the same target unnecessary."
217-18.
^^Sherman, Air Warfare (New York: Ronald Press, 1926),
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it would have to be followed consistently and undeviatingly until 
that phase was completed. In an admirable statement of eclectic 
synthesis, the authors declared: "In this way the air force will
cause complete destruction of vital parts of the enemy's sources 
of supply, eventually leading to the collapse of the whole system.
Against lines of communication too, strategic operations 
were to be "conducted with the same object in view, viz., dis­
integration of the whole scheme of movement and supplies to the 
troops in the combat zone." Key points for attack were to be 
selected by identifying those "sensitive points in the enemy's 
organization which, if destroyed, would seriously curtail or stop
3-7movement altogether in certain areas."
Here, then, were surely the foundations and specifications, 
if not the most precise elaboration, for a system of precision 
bombardment of the enemy's production and communication systems. 
This was the basis upon which the Tactical School was later, 
following a lapse of some years, to erect an impressive super­
structure. Its beginnings and early development clearly lay in 
the twenties, not in the thirties, as commonly asserted.Cer­
tainly the tactical feasibility of pin-point bombing Mitchell had 
demonstrated beyond question during the bombing tests of 1921
^^Combined Air Force, 12.
3?Ibid.
38usaF Hist. Studies No. 89, 57; USAF Hist. Studies No.
100, 32-33.
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which saw heavily armored naval vessels sunk quickly,and those 
of 1923 during which precision bombing was done from altitudes in 
excess of 10,000 feet.^^
Tactical Operations !̂
Although the GHQ air force itself might be employed in ground 
support operations from time to time, the major effort here would be 
conducted by tactical air organizations assigned directly to the 
field armies and supported by special units held within the GHQ re­
serve. The general concept of such operations was ground-force 
oriented; the elements of the enemy forces which constituted the 
most immediate threat to the success of friendly forces would be 
attacked in the order of their importance. Decisions would be made 
by the ground force commanders to whose units the army air force was 
assigned. Although it was envisaged that occasions might arise when 
the entire air force including the GHQ air force might be engaged 
in tactical operations, the authors were confident that such situa­
tions would be rare. There were no notable changes or innovations 
in the tactical sphere. Coastal defense— also a tactical task— was
SGfincoln, Militarv Affairs, XV (Fall, 1951), 152, 154.
Arnold, 111. As to the comparative accuracy of air and 
sea weapons, Levine cites Major H. H. Arnold's figures showing 
that aerial bombing of a moving target at Langley averaged about 
24 per cent hits compared with 4.1 per cent at Jutland (Pre­
sumably the latter referred to British gunnery, which was less 
accurate than the German). Levine, 263. On altitudes, supra 
chap. V, n. 45.
Introduction of the revolutionary tactical concept of 
counter-force operations for gaining command of the air has 
already been treated.
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considered one of the most important missions of the air force. 
Employment of bombardment, attack, and pursuit aviation against 
a hostile fleet was based of course upon tactics developed by 
Mitchell during the early tiventies.
Evaluation
Combined Air Force in 1926 showed clearly that Douhet^s 
influence had not only penetrated the School but that it had be­
come paramount. Gone was the earlier Mitchellian doctrine of 
tactical air warfare which focused its sights upon the enemy 
armed forces as the main objective in war and which relied en­
tirely upon pursuit aviators to wrest command of the skies from 
the foe. The only distinctly Mitchellian element of doctrine 
that remained was his concept of the preponderant role of land- 
based air power against sea power. However, it might be argued 
that simply by virtue of association the School’s espousal of 
strategic bombardment mirrored the views of Mitchell, not 
Douhet. It is true that, during the years intervening since 
Sherman wrote Air Tactics, Mitchell had shifted his doctrinal 
stance, renewing his former belief in the superior efficacy of 
strategic bombardment. But his iteration of that doctrine may 
be likened more to a declaration of faith than a systematic 
exposition, probably because it was itself a reflection of 
Douhetist influence. On the other hand. Combined Air Force 
specifically and unmistakably revealed the Douhetist touch in 
its exposition of strategic air warfare theory, and included
1̂ 2Combined Air Force, 13, 25.
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most of his arguments, among them his concept of objectives 
in war, his thought on the influence of the airplane on war, 
his reasoning as to the powers and characteristics of aircraft, 
the great potency of the new air weapon system, his general 
emphasis on the primacy to be accorded strategic attacks upon 
enemy population centers, and his insistence on the need for 
complete destruction of the target. Significantly, the last 
element was modified through conjoining the concept of complete 
destruction with that of paralysis of a given, critical segment 
of industry or communications, a synthesis made possible by 
Mitchell’s precision bombing achievements. That the counter-air 
force strategy embraced by the School derived from Douhet is 
equally clear, as is particularly evident from the terminology 
employed. The school also followed Douhet rather than Mitchell 
in setting forth its doctrine on pursuit aviation which appeared 
largely in a role supporting bombardment and attack operations.
In describing tactical air functions, the Air Tactical School 
went to greater lengths than did Douhet, but qualified this treat­
ment by remarking that situations would be rare in which the 
entire air force would be used in tactical operations.
The question as to how the Air Tactical School could have 
obtained, or derived, such apparently detailed knowledge of the 
Douhet theory so many years before 1933, the universally acknowl­
edged date, can now be answered quite simply. Contrary to general 
belief, Douhet’s Command of the Air, 1921 edition, was translated 
into English and was available at the Air Tactical School as early
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as 1923. A copy of it was examined by the writer. The utiliza­
tion of this valuable source of air thought probably accounted also 
for the school's ability to furnish the Office of the Chief of 
Air Service in June 192M- with the draft of what became the basis 
for TR 4-1+Q-15, published eighteen months later, which itself 
reflected a vital part of Douhet*s theory.
Meanwhile, the President's Board of Aviation Inquiry con­
firmed the views of the Navy and War Departments as to the nec­
essity for retention of auxiliary air arms and denied the need 
for a separate or independent air role except within the scope 
of the army or navy command structure. The findings of the Morrow 
Board became the basis for national air policy, and the inner hard 
core of the military departments, while still looking with a 
suspicious eye on the rapid rise of the air weapon system, was 
permitted to continue to develop and integrate aviation into 
their existing systems without further serious interference. For 
the former enfant terrible of the Army was after 1926 "little in 
evidence" so far as air matters were concerned.
Douhet, The Command of the Air (Rome: Printing
Office for the Use of the War Department, 1921). A translation 
of Guilio Douhet, II Dominio Del' Area (Roma, 1921) Translator 
unnamed . In USAFHA 24-9.501-64-C (1921), Four copies were avail­
able at the library of the Air Tactical School. The fourth copy 
bears the official incoming stamp of the School, "Received May 3, 
1923, Field Officer's School, Langley Field, Va." It is a good 
translation, if one uses the widely acknowledged Ferrari transla­
tion of 1942 as a criterion.
'̂ Patrick, The United States in the Air, 182.
PART IV
ASCENDANCY OF DOUHETIAN DOCTRINE, 1927-35
CHAPTER IX
FINAL EXPRESSION OF THE THEORIES 
OF DOUHET AND MITCHELL
By the time of his death in early 1930 Douhet had system­
atized and put into final form his theory of war and air power.
In the same year Mitchell gave concise expression to the essen­
tials of his later doctrine, only embellishing it during the 
years before his death in 1936. The late twenties and early 
thirties, then, denote the highwater mark in the doctrinal efforts 
of Douhet and Mitchell respectively.
Refinement of Douhet*s Doctrine: Concept of War
To the end of his life Douhet remained fascinated by the 
form in which the next war would manifest itself. In 1928 he 
asserted: "There is what may be called the mysterious aspect of
war which . . .  presses upon everyone and is shrouded by a heavy 
veil of mystery in that it bears within it vaguely descried an 
eventuality of the future.Intellectually absorbed in the prob­
lem of war and patriotically motivated, he continued to be profound­
ly concerned over the paucity of Italy’s economic and financial
^The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future (Apr., 1928) 
in The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 145.
Subsequent references are to this edition unless otherwise noted.
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resources and the weakness of its geographical position.^ To derive
any findings that would be of value to his country in a future war,
it was important to anticipate correctly the shape and contours of
the phenomenon of war which the future would unfold. The success
of his endeavor did much to endow his works with a character of
seeming universality, and this circumstance in turn helped spread
Douhet's appeal far beyond the borders of his native land, both
during his lifetime and afterwards.^ A future war, he thought,
would be an immense and varied national undertaking demanding the
greatest preparation and foresight before the crisis and the most
fervent but scientific prosecution if it were to "yield the maximum
results from the resources poured into it. There would be no
limit to the violence employed. During the year of the Kellogg
Pact, Douhet wrote:
It is useless to delude ourselves. All the restrictions, all 
the international agreements made during peacetime are fated 
to be swept away like dried leaves on the winds of war. . . .
War will always be inhuman, and the means which are used in 
it cannot be classified as acceptable or not acceptable accord­
ing to their efficacy, potentiality, or harmfulness to the 
enemy. The purpose of war is to harm the enemy as much as 
possible; and all means which contribute to this end will be 
employed no matter what they are.^
Although he was on strong ground in feeling that none of the nations
seemed to want "to get to the root of the problem and attack the
^Recapitulation (Nov. 1929) in ibid., 290.
R̂opp, War in the Modern World, 275 maintains that Douhet 
had little immediate influence.




causes of war,"® he was certainly in error, as Bernard Brodie has 
pointed out, in believing that the object of war was to harm the 
enemy as much as possible.^ Any war so conceived, then, would not 
be one waged in rational pursuit of national objectives. But 
rather it would be a cataclysmic, titanic struggle in which nations 
would forget "for a time that they all wear the aspect of human 
beings, that they belong to the same family of humanity striving 
toward the same goal of ideal perfection, to become wolves and 
throw themselves into torment and a bloody work of destruction, 
as though possessed by blind folly."® This portent of compulsive 
mass slaughter was of course utterly divorced from the traditional, 
Clausewitzian concept which saw war as the deliberate, continuing 
pursuit of vital national objectives when other means had failed.
But this portent is not far removed from the dread specter of 
thermo-nuclear warfare which haunts the world of the sixties. This 
similarity derives in large part from two major common factors, the 
inherently offensive nature of the air weapon and the vulnerability 
of the hiÿLy urbanized structure of modern life.
Future war being as he envisaged it, Douhet inevitably was 
led to place ever greater stress upon]popular morale as a significant 
variable in the equation of victory. This growing emphasis was
®VWar in the Air" (Jan. 5, 1930), reprinted in The Command 
of the Air (Rome: Revista Aeronautica, 1958), 193.
^Bernard Brodie, "The Heritage of Douhet," AUQR, V 
(Summer, 1953), 69.
®Probable Aspects of the War of the Future, 195.
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nourished by the fruits of his intensive reexamination of the 
World War— "the worst crime that humanity ever committed against 
itself." The issue in that war was not decided by the breakdown 
of the army and navy, both of which, he thought, remained organized, 
intact, and capable of protracted resistance; rather it was deter­
mined only by the cracking of the people’s morale after a long and 
excruciating process of attrition. A future conflict would there­
fore see the air weapon used to attack precisely those "entities 
less well organized and disciplined, less able to resist, and 
helpless to act or counteract." It would strike "chiefly . . .  
the civilian population, that is, the densely populated areas, 
industrial and commercial centers, lines of communication, etc."
By attacking "chiefly moral resistance" and sowing terror and 
destruction, the aero-chemical arm would quickly and surely bring 
about the "collapse of the enemy nation and the consequent dis­
ruption of its armed forces.
The New Air Force: The Battle Plane
Manifestly, then, the outcome of any major war in the 
future was predictable; it hinged upon conquest of the sky. To 
seize such control at the earliest possible moment was imperative, 
but to do so one had to have a properly constituted air force.
By 1927 Douhet had revised his conception of such a force and 
insisted that it be composed almost entirely of what he called 
"battle planes." This new air force differed sharply from his
^Ibid., 179-75, 188, 196; "War in the Air,” 193-195.
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earlier instrument comprised, of bombers and a protective escort 
of combat planes. Douhet reasoned that air battles, like sea 
battles, would be fought and decided by means of firepower, and 
that there was no reason why the bomber itself could not be made 
suitable for air combat. Though his earlier bomber was not with­
out armament, its guns were affixed mainly to bolster the morale 
of the crew. By increasing its armament sufficiently to fight 
off hostile pursuit, Douhet thought the need for a protective 
escort to the target cou“ be eüninated. By adding heavy armor, 
he sought at the same time to decrease the bomber’s vulnerability 
to hostile fire. Since, in his system of warfare, both the bomber 
and the combat plane had the same radius of action and neither 
depended upon spr̂ d, specifications for these factors were 
approximately the same for each. Therefore he concluded that 
it was perfectly feasible as well as highly advantageous to 
unite both combat and bombing functions in one type of aircraft—  
the "battle plane.” If these fighting and bombing functions 
became separated, Douhet pointed out, one would have either an 
air force capable of simply fighting in the air— and therefore 
rendered impotent unless it encountered the enemy— .and at best 
indecisive; or else an air force able to attack only the surface, 
and exposed therefore to the grave risk of destruction by enemy 
fighters. On the other hand, an air force equipped with "battle 
planes" gained vastly in efficiency, for it could concentrate 
all its tactical units for either bombing or air combat as 
occasion demanded. The battle plane, Douhet said, must "certainly
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be a heavy type, multimotored, . . .  of medium speed," so con­
structed as to permit ready removal of armor and guns, to fit it 
for normal transport uses. Thus, he concluded, "we have been 
able to determine through deduction the characteristics a battle 
plane should have— the only type of plane which should make up 
the operating mass of an Independent Air Force— the only 
organism necessary, because sufficient in itself, to wage aerial 
warfare." As late as 1929, Douhet^s verdict remained that the 
pursuit plane had "had its day" and would have to give way to a 
ship able to fight in the air and yet retain its radius of action 
as a bomber.Besides the battle plane, the on]_y other type of 
aircraft for which Douhet saw any need was the reconnaissance 
plane, a fast and wide-ranging craft designed to procure and 
transmit to the operating body of the air force the information 
required for intelligent operational decisions.
Specifications for Aircraft, Bases, and Logistics.—
Beyond the above generalizations which he believed were valid 
for any air force, Douhet recognized the need for identifying 
and incorporating in a country’s aircraft special features 
peculiar to its geographical location or military position 
vis-a-vis other powers. For example, if Italian bombers were 
to carry out offensives across the Alps and span the Mediterranean,
Command of the Air, Part II, 117-119, 123-125; "Battle 
Planes in Air Warfare," Dec. 15, 1929, reprinted in Command of 
the Air (Rome: Revista Aeronautica, 1958), 191.
llCommand of the Air, Part II, 119-120.
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they required both high altitude ceilings and long range. Moreover, 
he emphasized the need for a country to be well supplied with air 
bases and means of dispersing its aircraft. A wise air force, he 
prophesied, would "disappear from the surface immediately upon 
landing and . . . never be left exposed to enemy attack on the 
open field." Camouflage and use of alternate groups of bases 
facilitated dispersal. There was need also for creation of an 
aerial logistical organization to reduce an air force’s dependence 
upon ground force-supplied services. The new Independent Air 
Force was to be "a completely self-sufficient organization able 
to move in the air and to change its location on the surface
1 pautonomously." With such an air force, a nation could indeed 
gird itself formidably in the sky where the decision lay=
Concentration on Strategic Air Power.— But in order to 
mass in the air, it was essential to avoid breaking up one’s air 
power into fragments divided among the army, navy, and air force. 
Yet, in 1921 Douhet had admitted the need for a separate organiza­
tional establishment of auxiliary aviation attached to the army 
and navy. That position, he now declared in 1927, had been 
adopted without conviction, was aimed only at appeasing his 
opponents, and was in fact belied by his concomitant statement 
that national defense could be assured "only by an Independent 
Air Force of adequate power," in whose unique tasks of destruction 
neither the army nor the navy could in any way assist.Such
l^Ibid., 121-122; Recapitulation in ibid., 262.
Command of the Air, Part I (Faber edit.), 32,
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auxiliary aviation he now explicitly branded as worthless, super­
fluous, and harmful:
Worthless because incapable of taking action if it does not 
have command of the air. Superfluous because a part of the 
Independent Air Force can be used as an auxiliary if the 
command of the air has been conquered. Harmful because it 
diverts power from its essential purpose, thus making it 
more difficult to achieve that purpose.
To this fundamental statement there were no exceptions. It had
to be made "the basis for the formation and use . . .  of aerial
p o w e r . T h i s  principle of resource allocation Douhet carried
further still.
Passive Air Defense.— Any country which desired an Inde­
pendent Air Force capable of asserting command of the air should 
under no circumstances permit funds to be diverted to such 
secondary purposes as local air defense, balloon barrages, and 
antiaircraft guns.. Just as the coastline was historically 
defended by winning command of the sea, so now it and the surface 
of the land were to be defended from the air— not by scattering 
guns and balloons and attack planes— but by gaining command of 
the element concerned, the air. Underground shelters he also 
dismissed as an ineffective defense posture, since it was obviously 
impossible to move underground everything that could be destroyed 
by air attack. Nor was evacuation of large cities a tenable alter­
native, for a city abandoned was a city destroyed. Only in the 
sphere of morale, to which he attached the greatest significance, 
was it possible to accomplish much in air defense. It was
^^Command of the Air, Part II, 94-95, 100-101, 112.
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important that the people be informed of, and steeled in their 
resistance to, the atrocity of air warfare, if the country were 
to reduce the possibility of panic and catastrophies resulting 
from apprehended or surprise attacks. Toward this end Douhet 
advocated "truthfulness" concerning future war from the skies, 
and urged that every effort be made to strengthen the sense of 
discipline and national pride of the masses.Such indoctrina­
tion required little in the way of expenditures, it may be 
remarked, and also accorded well with Douhet's stoical injunction 
to resign oneself to the blows inflicted by the enemy. Certainly, 
as Ropp points out, Douhet, more than any other individual, was 
responsible for the concept of passive air defense.
Scientific Research. —  If national resources were to be 
concentrated on building up one’s offensive air power to the 
exclusion of all other means of air defense, it also followed 
that the country’s laboratories and factories should strive to 
increase the potency of "active materials" used by its air strike 
force. Provided nothing else was altered, doubling the power of 
destructive materials doubled the offensive power of the Independent 
Air Force.
^^"Danger from the Air," 1930 (mo. not given) reprinted in 
Command of the Air (Rome: Revista Aeronautica, 1958), 198-199,
209.
j-̂ Ropp, 279.
l^Command of the Air, Part II, 128; Probable Aspects of 
the War of the Future, 201-202.
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Chief Principles of Employment: Provided it adhered to
correct principles of employment, an Independent Air Force already 
in being, enjoying a monopoly of a nation’s air power resources, 
and composed primarily of heavily armed and carefully deployed 
bombers, would soon wrest command of the air from an enemy air 
force differently constituted and organized. Victory in a future 
war would therefore depend solely upon one’s success in offensive 
air action; hence, air force crews and commanders would have to 
act with the utmost aggressiveness, skill, and dispatch from the 
very outset and never let up until command of the air was won. 
"There is only one attitude to adopt in aerial warfare, namely,
1 Oan intense and violent offensive. ..." To win, Bouhet con­
tinued not only to insist upon the necessity for a mass, surprise 
attack but in fact underscored its tremendous importance:
Whatever its aims, the side that decides to go to war 
will unleash all its aerial forces in mass against the 
enemy nation the instant the decision is taken, without 
waiting to declare war formally, trying in this way to 
exploit to the utmost the factor of surprise by direct 
attack and the use of the aero-chemical arm. . . .
Some morning at dawn capital cities, large centers, and 
important aviation fields may be struck and shaken as 
though by an earthquake.
^^Command of the Air, Part II, 109-111.
Improbable Aspects of the War of the Future, 202. To 
insure national resistance of some kind in the event command of 
the air were lost, Douhet recommended that the army and navy 
reorganize their structure and change their methods of opera­
tion so as to permit continued functioning despite loss of 
their lines of transportation and communication. While 
emphasizing the importance of the air arm’s role, he never 
sought to minimize those of the sister services. Ibid., 20M-.
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In 1930 in his last major work, "The War of 19 he
employed the device of fiction to depict vividly the decisive 
importance and proper use of mass in offensive aerial operations 
by a modern air force. In it, the German Independent Air Force, 
constituted and organized like his new model, won its great 
victory by reliance upon relentless, determined, and disciplined 
adherence to offensive bombing conducted en masse. Deploying 
from numerous, well-scattered bases in the interior, it operated 
in eight long columns, each of which consisted of a series of 
carefully spaced formations of battle plane units. Each column 
was directed to follow a certain target route through France 
and/or Belgium, and each bomber unit within it was assigned a 
specific group of targets along that itinerary. The combined 
effect of the simultaneous action of all the columns was a 
steady, regulated pile-up of bomber "waves" which proved ir­
resistible. The continuous pounding of the bomber fleet, main­
tained despite heavy losses, proved too much for the valiant 
but diversified array of defending fighters which, forced from 
time to time to break off engagements in order to refuel and 
rearm, gradually were overwhelmed by sheer mass. In the mean­
time, Allied bombardment of German cities, though unopposed by 
any air units, had to be discontinued because of the threat of 
massive retaliation. After gaining command of the air, the 
commander of the German air force was compelled by the high 
command to cease the mass bombing of more cities— the course 
he favored— in order to help the German army resist the
21M-
numerically superior enemy ground forees by interdieting the latter 
along their lines of deployment. Thus, by massing in the air and 
resisting on the ground, Germany won the war in two days.
In this fictional account Douhet departed, however, in 
several respects from snroe of his earlier doctrinal positions. 
First, he had the German Independent Air Force forego the tre­
mendous advantage of the surprise attack, thereby allowing the 
initiative to pass to the Allies. Ostensibly this was done to 
permit the German government to score a propaganda victory. 
Secondly, he had the Independent Air Force utilize to advantage 
180 crack pursuit pilots, manning the entirety of the air force’s 
fifteen so-called "explorer" or reconnaissance squadrons, in 
individual air combat at a critical time and place during the 
air battle. Such employment seemed to prefigure a possible shift 
in Douhet’s concept of pursuit employment, but death intervened 
too soon to permit any certainty on this point. Thirdly, the 
author had the Germans elect to bomb major centers throughout 
France rather than concentrate on catching the air power of its 
adversary on the ground, although they did attack important air­
fields in the most critical area of operations. Such a shift in 
employment Douhet foreshadowed as early as 1928 and reiterated in 
19 29 when he indicated this as a possibility in situations where 
one air force enjoyed such superiority over that of its rival 
that it might decide to ignore it and strike directly and at once
20tiThe War of 19_," Revista Aeronautica (March, 1930),
in The Command of the Air, 299-393.
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21at the main centers of production and population. This question 
of initial target priorities, on which Douhet himself never laid 
down invariable rules, was to recur among and plague his American 
disciples.
Though he hoped that Italy might be the first in the field 
with a true Independent Air Force, Douhet was convinced that the 
first nation to create an air force "along rational, logical lines'' 
would enjoy an inestimable advantage over others. Inasmuch as 
all contemporary air forces were still modelled on concepts of 
employment dating from the World War, there was yet time, he 
thought, for a young, relatively poor but ambitious nation to 
turn its ingenuity to account. Hoever, as time passed and the 
fund of experience grew, the independent air forces of all nations 
would take on "a similar form, as long ago their armies and navies 
d i d . B y  1930, indeed, the spread of Douhet's ideas was already 
producing remarkably similar air force designs in the minds of 
American pioneers in air thought, both within and outside the 
Air Corps. Among the latter was now numbered William Mitchell, 
one-time scourge of the War and Navy Departments.
Finalization of Mitchell's Air Power Doctrine
During the last ten years of his life Mitchell continued 
his campaign for the cause of air power in America, though at an 
irregular pace. Shortly after he resigned his commission in 1926,
^̂ Ibid.; Probable Aspects of the War of the Future, 202, 
and Recapitulation, 24-5 in ibid.
Command of the Air, Part II, 129-132, 141.
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he wrote Trenchard that he would "keep up the fight" until this 
country could hoast an independent air force. 3̂ From time to time 
he undertook public lecture tours. In 1927 he investigated aero­
nautical progress during an extensive tour of Europe. He also 
published his memoirs, part of which appeared in the periodical 
press. Of several subseguent literary ventures during the late 
twenties, apparently the most successful was mother book. Skyways, 
an account of air power tailored for public taste and published 
early in 1930. Throughout the decade, 1926-1935, he also prepared 
numerous articles on various facets of air power, politics, and 
strategy, a number of which received wide circulation. He con­
tinued too his endeavors to change our organization of national 
defense, sometimes even proposing legislation to establish a 
separate department of aeronauticŝ *̂  and/or a unified department 
of defense.
In 1930 he insisted that there was "an indescribable mess 
about the defense arrangements," with no single air commander and 
nobody knowing who had charge of anything.By the latter part 
of 193M- his hopes apparently faded for any substantial change in 
the national defense; solemnly he concluded that the "mess" remained
2*3Harry H. Ransom, "Lord Trenchard, Architect of Air 
Power," AUQR, VIII (Summer, 1956), 6H.
"̂̂ Typescript; no title, with Attachment, A Bill to 
Establish a Department of Air, Middleburg, Va., n.d. (c. 1932), 
Mitchell Papers, Box 25.
259-260.
Skyways (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930), 251-252,
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and that the government lacked any real defense plan or policy.
The army proposal in 193M- to establish a semi-autonomous GHQ air 
force under the Army Chief of Staff he termed simply "a play on 
words.
Though his organizational plans for the nation's defense 
were not to be realized for another 11 years, his closely related 
writings in the more subtle field of doctrine yielded an earlier 
harvest.28 For it was during these years that Mitchell did much 
to popularize strategic bombardment and champion the associated 
concept of bomber supremacy, creating in the process the image of 
himself that is probably best remembered. A concise statement of 
his theory of war and the role of air power appeared in Skyways.
In support of strategic air warfare Mitchell repeated the same 
Douhetian arguments advanced in earlier years. Moreover, he now 
claimed that strategic bombardment had been "the one outstanding 
development that occurred in the European war," and predicted that 
it would be the deciding factor in any future major war. The 
heavily armed, lethal bomber was "the basis of air forcej_ power, " 
[italics added] and the pursuit ship would find it increasingly 
difficult to find, catch, and shoot it down.
^^Mitchell Testimony, Federal Aviation Commission, 
Proceedings, Oct. 2, 193%, 638.
27ped. Av. Comm., Proceedings, Oct. 2, 193%, 721.
2^Cate, AUQR I (Winter, 19%7), 17. Here Mitchell is given 
the entire credit for ACTS's "new" doctrine of strategic bombardment.
29Skyways, 271-279; cf. "Airplanes in National Defense," 
Annals (AAPSS), CXXXI (May, 1927), %0 and "Building a Futile 
Navy," The Atlantic Monthly, CXLII (Sep., 1928), %08.
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In the following years Mitchell went on to assert, repeated­
ly, that no force could stop a bombing attack. Bombers could fly 
through the substratosphere and converge on the target from all 
directions. A fighter might sometimes be lucky enough to inter­
cept one, but such occasions would be rare.^O Accordingly, like 
Douhet he urged that national defense be centered around "the 
bomber as the principal instrument of war.Resources should 
not be wasted on auxiliary aviation, for it was a mistake to think 
that it contributed anything to a nation’s air p o w e r . ^ 2  For the 
true measure of a nation’s air power was the threat it posed to 
the people and resources of opposing states. Since a modern 
nation expressed its strength by the air power it had in being, 
the United States should develop bombers "with sufficient range 
and striking power to threaten any nation that stands in the way 
of national p o l i c y . The strategy he recommended was eminently 
Douhetian: to resist on the land and to attack in the air. The
30ped. Av. Comm., Proceedings, Oct. 2, 1934, 504. Type­
script, "Behind the Smokescreen," n.d., 8, Articles, Mitchell 
Papers, Box 25; Typescript, no title, Jan. 27, 1935, 1, loc. 
cit.
^^Testimony; Fed. Av. Comm., Proceedings, Oct. 2, 1934,
604.
^^Ibid., 603; Mitchell Testimony, Fed. Av. Comm., Public 
Hearings, Nov. 24, 1934, 4133-34, 4136; see also typescript of 
statement before Fed. Av. Comm., n.d., 2, Mitchell Papers, Box 
25.
^^Typescript, no title, Jan. 27, 1935, 1, Box 25,
Mitchell Papers. Typescript, "Behind the Smokescreen," n.d.,
8; Mitchell Testimony, Fed. Av. Comm., Public Hearings, Nov. 24, 
1934, 4132.
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model air force he preferred was a European one, drawn according to 
typical Douhetian specifications: "an aeronautical striking weapon,
the Air Force, entirely independent . . .  designed to hit the vital 
centers of the enemy at once in case of war and destroy the will
g LLof the whole hostile people to resist." Well concealed and 
dispersed, such a force could act from a distance, and, he implied, 
strike without warning. Truly Mitchell had become not ord.y a 
convert but also a fervent disciple of Douhetism.
Typescript, Address before Foreign Policy Association, 
Astor Hotel, New York, Mar. 3, 1939, 5, Mitchell Papers, Box 27; 
see also "Airplanes in National Defense," Annals (AAPSS), CXXXI 
(May, 1927), 38-91.
^^Mitchell Testimony, Fed. Av. Comm., Proceedings,




The history of ACTS during the decade after 1926 revolved 
largely around the struggle over retention of Douhetian theory as 
initially adopted in Combined Air Force and subsequently expanded 
to include the master’s final testament. While it would be help­
ful to establish the identities of all the dramatis personae in­
volved, this goal defies complete realization, partly because of 
the vagaries of an army correspondence and publications code which 
encouraged anonymity and plagiarism on the one hand and misrepre­
sentation of authorship on the other, and partly because of limita­
tions imposed by the extent of resources at the writer’s disposal. 
Nevertheless, the main outlines of the story are discernible and 
some of the chief protagonists identifiable.
At the heart of the struggle were two questions : (1)
whether the chief arm of the air force was pursuit or bombardment, 
and (2) whether bombardment was to be used primarily for tactical 
or strategic purposes. The Douhetists, of course, favored the 
latter position in each case^ and their antagonists the former.
^This was true in essence, but the Douhetists usually
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In any event, the School resolved these doctrinal questions of 
employment not by means of pragmatic tests and proofs but rather 
by theoretical argumentation revolving around the concept of 
modern war. How is one to account for this highly untypical 
Anglo-Saxon reaction? Essentially, it is submitted, by recog­
nizing the full extent of the continued appeal and power of Douhe- 
tism, a completely integrated doctrine —  the whole inserted in­
tact into a vacuum created by the failure to establish a specific 
organization for the express study, evaluation, and testing of 
doctrines of employment for the Air Corps. Abetting this movement 
toward strategic bombardment was Mitchellism, itself a hybrid 
which owed a great deal to Douhetian inspiration. Reinforcing 
the whole process and making possible the concrete realization 
of the doctrine of bomber supremacy was the trend of aeronautical 
technology which after 1930 increasingly favored the large airplane. 
Although, owing to aforementioned limitations, it has not proved 
possible to ascertain the precise relationship between air doctrine 
and air technology, it is indisputable that the Douhetian theory 
occurred first chronologically ; that the first major iiipulses for 
development and procurement of heavy bombardment airplanes origi­
nated in the late twenties from the same air base where the Douhetian
advocated tactical use against the enemy air force as an inter­
mediate step requisite to launchiiig the strategic air campaign. 
The question of priority between these objectives tended to as­
sume increasing importance once the primacy of bombardment was 
established in the thirties. Infra, chap. XI.
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theory was first expounded and propagated -- Langley Field; and 
that the big bombers came later, beginning in the early thirties, 
first the B-9 and B-10, then the XB-15 and B-17.^ Augmenting the 
force behind the entire movement after the turn of the decade was 
the changing climate of world politics which saw in rapid succes­
sion the onslaught of the Great Depression, the failure of several 
naval and air arms limitation conferences, the rise of new and 
menacing totalitarian regimes in Europe and the Far East, and the 
beginning of the forcible overturn of the status quo. In this 
charged international atmosphere the United States government de­
cided to reevaluate its security policy, and by 1933 the War De­
partment -- which had always been cool to the development of long 
range, strategic aircraft for the Army -- expressly recognized for 
the first time the dual need to develope far-ranging bombers for 
coastal defense and to create a special tactical organization to 
direct their use in that capacity. During the following year, the 
concept for the employment of that force was expanded from that of 
a simple, temporary expedient designed for patrolling our shores 
and carrying out initial attacks upon any hostile force approaching 
them to one which encompassed all of the combat elements of the 
army's air arm.^ With the creation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935
^AAF Historical Studies, No. 6, 7-15; 74-75; Robert W. 
Krauskopf, ’̂The Army and the Strategic Bomber, 1930-1939Mil 
Affairs, XXII (Summer, 1958), 83-93; Summary in Evolution of 
Aerial Warfare (Hq AFRDTC, Maxwell Field, Ala.: May, 1959),
53-58.
^McClendon, Autonomy of the Air Arm. 1907-1945, 153-55, 
169-173. This is the best single study of the organizational 
aspect.
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the Air Corps brought to fruition the long advocated concept of 
a unified, striking force —  the independent Air Force idea —  and 
when it subsequently began to equip it with the new heavy bombers —  
the first B-17's being assigned to the GHQ Air Force Headquarters 
at Langley Field —  doctrine, technology, and organization were 
marching hand in hand.
While these elements of air power were inextricably inter­
woven into the fabric of the nation's military air force during the 
thirties, this account treats systematically and from a special point 
of view only the first in this triumvirate, ideas —  primus inter 
pares. The year 1928 may be taken as a convenient watershed for 
doctrinally dividing the decade, 1926-1935, for, despite Combined 
Air Force in 1926, until 1928 resistance to Douhetism within the 
school remained acute, while thereafter it tended to give way appre­
ciably and after 1930 declined markedly.
Part of the early resistance manifested itself in a sharp 
cleavage over the proper function and place of bombardment. A 
notable instance was the express repudiation of the strategic doc­
trine enunciated in Combined Air Force by the anonymous authors of 
the ACTS bombardment text for 1927. They contended that strategic 
bombardment should simply "take up where the tactical leaves off." 
Hence they insisted that bombers operate primarily "in support of 
or in conjunction with large forces of ground troops."^
^ACTS, Bombardment. 1926-1927. 54-, 73.
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Furthermore, while admitting that there was an important 
relationship between bombardment of enemy air force targets, parti­
cularly his pursuit airdromes, and the mastery of the air, the 1927 
bombardment text flatly declared that aerial supremacy depended 
upon pursuit and that bombardment could only assist it in that ef­
fort. Thus it also expressly contradicted the command of the air 
thesis enunciated the year before.^ This opinion was at that time 
shared at the highest echelon of the school, for in early January 
1928 the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Culver, averred em­
phatically, in reply to a query from OCAC regarding attack and pur­
suit tasks, that pursuit's main function was "to gain and maintain 
air superiority by operations against aircraft in the air."̂  (Ital­
ics added) He further recommended to headquarters that if hostili­
ties threatened, it should direct all manufacturing efforts be con­
centrated initially upon pursuit production —  "thus to gain and 
maintain air superiority as soon as possible
Fortunately for the school and the air arm, the War Depart­
ment unexpectedly took a hand in matters in April by ordering all 
arms and branches to think afresh the problems of war and weaponry.®
^Ibid.. 58-59, 69.
^Ist Indorsement (ind.), Jan. 7, 1928 to letter from Chief 
of Air Corps, Attack Aviation, Nov. 15, 1927.
^Ibid.
QLetter, AGO to Chief of Air Corps, Progress Reports on 
Development Work, Apr. 23, 1928.
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Perhaps aware that such requirement was impending or perhaps coin­
cidentally, the commandant one week later submitted a remarkably 
frank proposal for revamping air doctrine along Douhetian lines.
It was entitled "The Doctrine of the Air Force." In his letter of 
transmittal on April 30, 1928, Colonel Culver, in a volte face, 
asked OCAC and the War Department to accept the proposed doctrine 
as the foundation for the development of Air Corps tactics. He 
added that the principles incorporated in the proposals formed the
9basis for texts being produced at the school. The ACTS paper pro­
posed adoption of the following doctrinal positions:
1. Concept of War and the Role of the Air Force in National Defense. 
"Perfect team play" among all components of the armed forces is 
essential to insure success in war, but primacy should be ac­
corded the Army as the principal component of the nation's 
forces. Hence in a major war the Air Force (as it was signifi­
cantly referred to) would always support the ground forces, "no 
matter how decisive" air operations mi^t be, or however indin 
rect they might ,be. But ACTS was quick to add that a preponderant 
Air Force might, "by its destructive action, so break the enemy's 
will to resist that the decision may be gained by the action of 
the Air Force alone (Italics added)
2. Concept of Employment: Bombardment
^Letter, Culver to Chfef of Air Corps, The Doctrine of the 
Air Force, Apr. 30, 1928. One enclosure: The Doctrine of the
Air Force. Hereafter cited as "Doctrine of the Air Force, 1928."
10"Doctrine of the Air Force, 1928," 1.
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Every plan for air force employment is built up around the 
use which is to be made of the available bombardment and 
attack; then the pursuit is disposed accordingly. In addi­
tion, in almost every situation it will also be found that 
the use to be made of attack is more or less dependent upon 
what the bombardment is to do. Therefore, the chain of 
thought in formulating an Air Force plan is:
(1) decide what to do with bombardment;
(2) select targets for attack so that its action either sup­
ports the bombardment or dovetails with its employment;
(3) provide for adequate reconnaissance by observation:
(M-) arrange pursuit si^port for the other components.
3. Bombardment therefore may be said to be the basic Air Force 
arm. It is employed against targets located in an area 
whose doser limit is the effective range of artillery fire 
[tacticall and whose outermost limit is determined by the 
radius of action of the bombardment plane strategic 3 .
The effect sought is the destruction of the objective against 
which it is dispatched. . . . Its machine guns are . . .  to 
be used only in defense against hostile airplanes. Bombard­
ment delivers the 'main blow* in all Air Force operations, 
regardless of how it operates (with or without air support) 
[italics added] .12
These statements obviously embraced several interrelated
parts of the Douhet theory:
(1) Overriding importance of offensive action by bombardment 
against surface objectives;
(2) Necessity for complete destmction ;
(3) Operation of the bombers on distant strategic missions, as 
well as tactical;
(M-) Battle plane concept of bombing operations ;
(5) Subsidiary role of pursuit planes
lllbid., 2. 
^^I b i d . . 2 - 3 .
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(6) Bombardment the basis of air force firepower and hence of 
the air force.
M-. ATTACK is a supplementary means of bringing Air Force fire­
power to bear on the enemy. It supports bombardment either 
directly, by neutralizing or destroying the ground anti­
aircraft defenses seeking to prevent bombardment from ac­
complishing its mission, or indirectly by attacking person­
nel and light materiel objectives. In operations against 
a hostile Air Force, attack supplements bombardment in 
destroying enemy aviation establishments on the ground.
. . . Against an enemy ground force it is used to reduce 
. . .  combat efficiency by . . . harassment, and . . .  by 
delaying arrival on the battlefield. . . .  It delivers its 
main blow with its b o m b s . 3̂ [̂ Italics added!
Here the school followed not only Douhet*s injunction to "blind”
the anti-aircraft batteries, but, in the most important new role
proposed for attack aviation, wished to employ it to destroy the
enemy's "nests" on the ground.
5. Observation assists in gathering the information necessary 
to the selection of proper targets for bombardment and at­
tack. 0, 0 . It reports promptly the results of attack.
Such use of observation contrasted markedly with the con­
temporary notion that its role was mainly to gather and report 
information for the ground forces. It followed logically from 
the premise of bombardment's primacy in the scheme of things. 
Reconnaissance was the only other function besides bombing ac­
cepted by Douhet.
6. PURSUIT has as its chief characteristic speed and the re­
sultant ability to engage offensively in an air fi^t. In 
air force operations it is employed primarily to support'day­
light operations of the other classes of aviation. This is 




friendly ground establishments from the enemy's air force.
. . . Pursuit's destruction of enemy pursuit in the air is 
indidental to the accomplishment of its missions; neutrali­
zation of enemy pursuit is all that is necessary. Only in 
defending against hostile bombardment, attack, or observa­
tion does its mission require it to destroy enemy aircraft 
in flight.LItalics added3
Here the task of the fighters was seen as one in which the func­
tion of sky fighting played a minor part in winning command of 
the air. Its role was asserted to be what Douhet always claimed 
it was —  purely defensive, protective. Pursuit forces would 
now be expected primarily to "support" the bombers and attack 
planes in their daylight operations to the extent of their 
limited radius of action.
7. The Air Force has the primary mission of gaining freedom of 
action for itself in the air, and consequently, for the sup­
ported forces on the ground. It has the perpetual mission 
of maintaining that condition. Direct support by the Air 
Force of tactical ground operations will be limited to 
sporadic raids whose effect will be more or less uncertain, 
unless that Air Force has a reasonable freedom of action. 
However, absolute freedom of action will probably never be 
attained; when it is the war is won. . . .16 ^Italics added"]
Here is evident Douhet's emphasis upon
[1) gaining command of the air;
[2) decisiveness of such command, once won; and
[3) importance of a command of air to ground force operations.
The authors of this proposed American air power doctrine went be­
yond Douhet, however, in declaring that, once the Air Force had 
achieved the command of the air, the war was won. Douhet, it may 




that could not explo.lt command of the air, once gained. Actually, 
that the Air Tactical School sou^t to develop an air force that 
could exploit command of the air was evident in its introductory 
declaration that a preponderant air force by its destructive, 
i. e., bombardment powers, might win the war alone. Thus, while 
paying lip service to the superiority of ground over air compo­
nents in national defense, the Air Corps Tactical School advanced 
a coherent Douhetian doctrine for a powerful "Air Force" built 
around bombers. In short, if adopted, the doctrine of the Air 
Corps Tactical School would :
(1) Make bombardment the basic arm;
(2) Pose strategic air warfare as the major task of bomber
forces, once command of the air was won;
(3) Transform the role of attack aviation from close support to 
that of a powerful complement to bombardment;
(M-) Invert pursuit aviation’s function to one of
(a) supporting bombardment and attack aviation, and
(b) defending surface units and installations against hostile 
marauders.
(5) Make observation expressly responsible for gathering target 
data for bombeb and attack operations;
(6) Provide tactical support to ground forces primarily by assur­
ing general air control rather than close support;
(7) Gain control of the air primarily by using bombardment and 
attack to destroy the hostile air force.
Shortly after this paper from ACTS arrived at OCAC,
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headquarters dispatched two officers from the Training and Opera­
tions Division, Majors Lyon and Pratt, to Langley Field to inves­
tigate the situation there and to discuss doctrinal matters with 
the school authorities. The school^s doctrinal statement was 
accordingly reformulated and resubmitted to OCAC on June 9, 1928 
under the title "Doctrine of Employing an Aerial Force"^^ (no 
copy found). But official reaction may be gauged from a memo­
randum sent by Major Edwin B. Lyon to the Chie^ Training and 
Operations Division. Referring to the role of pursuit, Lyon com­
mented as follows:
This paragraph, if not wrong, is at least misleading. . . .
The statement is made that the ’end is not the pursuit los­
ses effected in the fight.’ This statement is no doubt 
based on the assumptions that: (1) absolute aerial suprem­
acy can never be gained; (2) the best place to destroy air­
craft is on the ground. By the first assumption . . . the
School is trying to get away from the World War time idea 
that pursuit’s chief end was to do away with enemy pursuit,
whether or not it tied in with the plans for bombardment and
attack. By the second assumption they mean that to hope to 
find enemy aircraft after they have taken to the air is much 
more difficult than locating them on the ground when the air­
planes themselves are defenseless. I cannot but believe that 
they have gone too far.18
A formal reply to the school was dispatched early in 
September 1928, about the same time that Colonel Culver initiated
a formal inquiry. It demanded that the school’s proposed doctrine
be rewritten in accordance with instructions contained in attached
l^Letter, Culver to Chief of Air Corps, Doctrine of Em­
ploying an Aerial Force, Jun. 9, 1928, with two attachments. Both 
are missing, and cannot be located in National Archives or USAF 
Archives at Maxwell AFB.
l^Letter, Schools Sec. to Chief, Trng. & Oper. Div., Jun. 
13, 1928, Comments on ACTS’s Study: Doctrine Employing an Aerial
Force.
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19comments. OCAC declared that it did not endorse the view that 
the air component always supported the ground forces, and as­
serted that in a future war the air force might attain a decision 
in the air even before the land or sea forces came into contact.
It would appear here that OCAC chose to ignore entirely the seem­
ingly transparent ACTS effort to circumvent the plaguing issue 
of the primacy or subordination of one service .0 another.
OCAC further rejected virtually in toto ACTS's formula­
tion of doctrine on command of the air, the primacry of bombardment, 
the emphasis on attacking enemy aviation on the ground, and the 
essentially support nature of both observation and pursuit avia­
tion. If any air component were to be regarded as the basic 
arm, it would be pursuit, not bombardment. Yet, surprisingly, in 
another passage, headquarters clearly indicated its espousal of
^^Ist Ind, War Dept., OCAC, Sep. 1, 1928, to Commandant, 
ACTS, reference Basic Letter, Doctrine of Employing an Aerial 
Force, Jun. 9, 1928. The author of the extended criticism of 
ACTS is not known with certainty, but the headquarters coordina­
tion sheet attached to the letter from OCAC would seem to indi­
cate that Major Thomas Dewitt Milling, former Officer-in-Charge 
at ACTS and later Assistant Commandant, was the principal author 
of the letter. His initials appear on the marginal routing file 
under the office designation T.O. in addition to the initials 
C.S., perhaps referring to Carl Spaatz, and F.O. for Personnel. 
More significant perhaps is the fact that TDM Sr. appears on the 
top of the page of the fiirst endorsement of Sep. 1, 1928, dis­
patched Sep. i+. The biographical register of West Point officers 
shows that Milling was Chief, War Plans Sect., T & 0 Div., OCAC, 
from June 1927 to July 1930. It may also be observed that there 
was a new Chief of Air Corps in office at the time, Maj. Gen.




at least the Douhetian concept of the objective in war and its
attainability by means of air power:
If the true objective can be reached without the necessity 
of defeating or brushing aside the enemy’s force on the 
ground or water and the proper means furnished to subdue 
the enemy’s will can bring the war to a close, the object 
of war can be attained with much less destruction and last­
ing after effects than has heretofore been the case. At 
present, the air force provides the only means for such anaccomplishment.22
Accordingly, it would seem that, on the one hand, OCAC accepted, 
probably via Mitchellism, the Douhetian thesis that strategic 
bombing of cities, industries, etc. would break the enemy’s morale 
and will to resist, and yet, on the other, rejected both the means 
Douhet specified as essential to attain that end, viz., bombard­
ment per se and the method he urged, viz., command of the air by 
destroying enemy aviation, especially on the ground —  a role 
which again underscored the importance of bombers. OCAC’s think­
ing reflected, too, the standard doctrinal terms of thought preva­
lent since the close of the World War that the air force’s major 
role would almost certainly be, initially at least, the disruption 
and possible prevention of mobilization of rival service forces. 
Nevertheless, it was emphatically clear that the Office of the 
Chief of Air Corps had summarily rejected an explicit doctrine 
of air power which would have made bombardment the basic arm of 
the air force.
This interpretation differs markedly from the hitherto 
generally accepted view that "the ideas set forth as school
22lhid.. M-.
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doctrine in 1928 were extremely conservative,” that "the general 
support of the school paper was to place the air arm as an 
auxiliary to the ground force," that it required OCAC inter\ren- 
tion to "correct this view," and that "the conservative position 
of the Tactical School . . .  in 1928 is unexplained" fUSAF His­
torical Study, No. 89. i|-8) . It should be added that this Air 
Force study was only following however in the path of Professor 
James L. Chte who marked out thisyposition in a paper delivered 
at the fortieth annual meeting of the Mississippi Valley Histori­
cal Association, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-, 194-7. According to 
Cate, the Air Corps radicals, as he called them, "were willing 
to accept the whole of his |TlHfi.tchell’s'] doctrine," and in the 
early 1930 ŝ came to dominate the Air Corps Tactical School where 
for the most part . . .  their lectures could have been written with 
Mitchell as sole authority." To prove that this had not always 
been so, he asserted that as late as 1928 the Chief of Air Corps 
rejected the ACTS paper, ’The Doctrine of the Air Force,’ because
? 3it subordinated the air force to the ground force. It is evi­
dent not only that the School was unfairly criticized but that the 
influence of Douhet was not discerned.
Of significance for the immediate future was OCAC’s loose­
ly worded, ambiguous statement that "the main effort in war should
23ttThe Development of Air Doctrine, 1917-194-1," AUQR, I 
(Winter, 194-7), 11-22; Office of Air Force History, The Army Air 
Forces in World War II. eds. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate (6 vols.; 
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 194-8— ), I, 4-6, 51-52.
23M-
be exerted against the main objectives and secondary operations 
disregarded. *̂^ It left the door seemingly open for future doc­
trinal accommodation.
pn1st Ind., War Dept., OCAC, Sep. 1, 1928 to Commandant. 
ACTS, reference Basic Letter, Doctrine of Employing an Aerial 
Force, Jun. 9, 1928, 1-5,
CHAPTER XI
CONSOLIDATION AND INTEGRATION OF DOUHETISM:
1929-1935
For several years after 1928 the Air Corps Tactical 
School^s relations with OCAC remained troubled,^ but this fact 
did not deter the dominant, Douhetian group from promptly re­
asserting its doctrinal independence within the confines of the 
institution’s stucco walls. Nor did the coolness of headquarters 
dampen for long the School’s ambition to be officially recognized 
as the chief, if not sole, center of doctrine within the entire
pair arm. As might be expected after the 1928 debacle, OCAC 
turned down these requests, together with associated ones for 
means of practical field testing of school theory.^ The latter 
development was especially unfortunate from the larger standpoint 
of the national interest, as this denial of on-the-spot testing 
at Maxwell Field, Alabama (ACTS moved from Langley in July 1931) 
negatively influenced the development of School doctrine, forcing
^Annual Reports (including enclosures) , ACTS to OCAC,
1930 and 1931. See also correspondence between ACTS and OCAC.
^Annual Reports, 1931-1933.
^Memo, Lt. Col. J. E, Cheney, Plans Div. to Chief, T &




it into a largely, if not purely, academic mould.^ On the credit 
side of the doctrinal ledger must be placed the faculty’s willing­
ness to modify the Douhetian thesis that enemy resistance could 
best be undermined and broken by attacking the civilian element 
of the national structure; in its place the school gradually sub­
stituted the national economy, to be attacked at points of maximum 
stress and vulnerability, a concept dating back to the twenties. 
With this major exception, the Douhetian system was retained intact. 
This result was achieved chiefly by maintaining or refining the 
following distinctive elements in Douhet’s theory and methodology:
(a) a method of exposition, outlined in Combined Air Force, which 
sought to root air doctrine in the characteristics of the air 
weapon and the principles of war;
(b) the concept that war was essentially a strategic, not a 
tactical, struggle— the major objective, then, being the enemy 
nation and the national structure;
(c) a tactical system for gaining control of the air that had as 
its primary objective the enemy’s air force on the ground;
(d) a force structure that included as many bombers as possible, 
of the self-sufficient battle plane type, and little or no 
auxiliary aviation; and
(e) a grand strategy for the nation that placed chief reliance 
upon massing in the air for the attack and resisting with smaller 
forces on the surface.
"̂ Exercises took place elsewhere of course, but not under 
the aegis of the school.
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How the schoolmen did this during the late twenties and early and 
mid-thirties constitutes the essence of this chapter. Insofar as 
possible, each of the aforementioned topics will be treated as 
ranked above.
Methodology: Characteristics
Perhaps the most convincing exponents of the Douhetian 
rationale for bombardment were Lieutenant Kenneth Walker, Major 
Donald Wilson, and Captain Harold Lee George. Echoing Combined 
Air Force, Walker in 1929 insisted that any doctrine for employing 
an air force must be based upon the characteristics of the air 
weapon and the principles of war.^ Radius of action (flexibility), 
speed, maneuverability, and weight-lifting power (firepowe:̂ ) were 
outstanding performance characteristics cited by Walker and those 
who followed him in succeeding years. By virtue thereof, an air 
force unit operating from a single base could "attack with equal 
facility enemy objectives several hundreds of miles removed from 
each other," and an air force might readily extend the size of the 
threatened area by its ability to shift units from one base to 
another "within a few hours."® These characteristics, jointly 
considered, then led Walker and later schoolmen— like Douhet— to 
posit the existence of "the immense striking power" of even a
^Lecture, "Doctrine of Employment of an Air Force," Oct. 23, 
1929, 6. (All citations which follow are lectures, unless otherwise 
noted.) In deriving and developing doctrine, attention would also 
be paid to technical factors and utilization of the best thought of 
military men throughout the world. Ibid.
®Ibid., 5-7, 9; Bombardment, 1933, 82.
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relatively small number of aircraft loaded with bombs and chemicals. 
In 1930 the text for the Air Force course stated flatly that most 
targets could be destroyed by comparatively small numbers of air­
craft.^ In 1939, speaking officially for the Air Corps Tactical 
School, Major Donald Wilson, then chief instructor in the Air Force 
course, asserted not only that the airplane had brought the entire 
nation within the combat zone but that relatively few of them 
would be required in a future war to cause a quick collapse of 
industrialized northeastern United States and the attendant defeat 
of the nation.^ In a lecture during the same year, Wilson, prob­
ably the most ardent, capable, persistent, and vocal of the bomber 
enthusiasts, declared that the rapidity with which air forces 
effected destruction permitted one to characterize their tactical 
action during wartime as strategically continuous for all practical 
purposes.^ Captain Harold Lee George, another vocal champion of 
the bomber and disciple of Douhet at the school, told the Federal 
Aviation Commission (FAC) that "air forces have the power to destroy 
any vital objective on the face of the e a r t h . B u t ,  conversely, 
the airplane could not be used for air defense in any literal sensç, 
lecturers maintained, for there were no positions in the sky, no
^Air Force, 1930, 69.
QWilson Testimony, Testimony Presented before the Federal 
Aviation Commission, Washington, D. C.: (n.p., n.d.), £a. Oct.
1939, 5. (Hereafter cited as FAC.)
^Wilson, "Characteristics & Org.," Mar. 27, 1939, 5.
*̂̂ Harold Lee George Testimony, FAC, Oct. 1939, 5.
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trenches which might be dug. Again and again this Douhetian analogy
was c i t e d . B y  virtue of its characteristics, then, air power was
inherently offensive in nature and correct employment dictated its 
1?use for attack. “
Principles of War: Offensive
While the nine traditional principles of war were familiar
to American military students, it was reiteration of Douhet’s
interpretation and use of a few of them that proved especially
significant in developing American military air doctrine, notably
those of the offensive, mass, objective, and economy of force.
This process, first applied in 1926 and reformulated by Walker in
1929, persisted despite temporary divergences of view within the
school and in relations with Air Corps Headquarters. Though
instructors changed, most of them in time adopted Douhetian
interpretations and arguments, even to the extent of borrowing
some of the master’s favorite analogies and phrases. A 1930 text
stated unequivocally that "an air force never assumes a defensive
position," that "a striking force once in the air cannot be
stopped," and that victory would accrue to him who struck first,
1 ̂struck hardest, and struck most often. Major Hume Peabody, who 
taught the Air Force course during the early 1930’s, declared that
l̂ Maj. Hume Peabody, "Prins. of War," Apr. 20, 1932, 2; 
Capt. H. L. George Testimony, FAC, 193k, k; Capt. Robert M. 
Webster Testimony, FAC, 2.
^^Wilson, "Characteristics and Org.," Mar. 26, 193k, 7. 
107-8, 115,
^^ACTS, Air Force, 1930, 66-7 Cf. Douhet, Faber ed., 93-k,
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"the only way an air force can defend an area is to destroy or 
neutralize the attacking force, either in the air or on the ground. 
In 1934, Donald Wilson emphasized that "regardless of the whole 
national effort being defensive, the air force as a whole must wage 
an offensive action, . . .  principally because that is the only 
kind of action for which an air force is suited. ( I t a l i c s  added) 
There was no defense against "a strong, well-equipped, and properly 
indoctrinated air force" except through offensive action.He 
further argued that the nation's defense could be provided "only 
by preventing the establishment of the hostile air force within 
striking distance, which, of course, requires a readiness and a 
willingness to declare war before such an unfavorable situation is 
brought about.Wilson asserted that "when war is inevitable 
only the unprepared will sit back and wait to be attacked. Regard­
less of the ethics involved, we can rest assured that air action 
will be tactically offensive even though xt is designed to produce 
national defense. Air forces have no other choice. . . .  The 
benefits of initiative derived from the offensive are perhaps . . .  
more manifest in air force action than in any other form.
'̂̂ Peabody, "Prins. of War," Apr. 20, 1932, 2.
^^Wilson, "Air Force Prins.," 27 Mar, 1934, 2. See also 
ACTS, Lecture, Oct. 28, 1929, 32, 34, and similar lectures in 
succeeding years; Air Force, 1931, 21, 35; Air Force, 1935.
l^Wilson, "Air Force Prins. & Strategy," Mar. 22, 1935, 2.
^^Wilson, "Characteristics," Mar. 26, 1934, 4.
l^Wilson, "Prins. of War Applied . . .," Mar. 28, 1934, 6. 
See also Air Force, 1931, 20, 35; ACTS, "Air Force Prins. & 
Strategy," Mar. 22, 1935, Prins. 2, 18, and 19, pp. 1, 6.
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Pointing out that "an Air Force is powerless to delay the air
offense of the enemy in order to gain time . . the Air Force
text for 1935 declared that "the aim of air strategy is the
assumption of the immediate strategical air offensive in war. . . .
Any other course, the author warned in words reminiscent of Douhet,
invited "complete defeat,
Surprise.— Not only did the air weapon lend itself well to
utilization of the principles of offensive and initiative, but to
that of surprise as well. "Air forces possess, to a greater degree
than any other military force, a flexibility which empowers them
with the greatest capabilities for surprise. This mobility
made it difficult if not impossible for the enemy to predict future
points of attack while the speed of aircraft precluded any but the
21slightest warning of impending attack. In like manner this 
characteristic also facilitated the massing of one's air power for 
the attack.
Mass.— Douhet's insistence upon operations in mass was re­
iterated most effectively during the early thirties. His concept 
of attack by successive waves of aircraft became the vogue at the 
school. The authors of the Air Force text for 1930 were the first, 
it appears, to refer to the concept of attack by " w a v e s . I n
l^ACTS, Air Force, 1935, Part I, para. 32. See also Air 
Force, 1936, 21.
^^Wilson, "Prins. of War Applied," Mar. 28, 1939, p. 6.
Zllbid.
^^Air Force, 1930, 66.
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1932 Peabody, speaking of this concept, credited Italy with the 
achievement:
The leading aerial nations are in accord on one point, at 
least— that mass is necessary for effective air force employ­
ment. The Italians are perhaps the most radical of all nations 
in this respect. Their conception of successful air force 
employment is an almost continuous succession of waves of 
bombardment. They believe that nothing can stop'such an 
attack unless it be vastly superior pursuit forces— that is, 
stop one or more waves. They cannot conceive of all waves 
being stopped, even in the daytime.23
Mass need be attained however only at the objective. Air forces 
would take advantage of the tactical mobility afforded by the air­
plane’s speed, range, and flexibility to converge from varying 
points on the target area. Factors other than the purely quantita­
tive were to be considered in determining mass, viz., "superior 
leadership, training, discipline, morale, physical condition, 
weapons, equipment and supply. This would appear to be an
almost direct reference to the role which such factors played in 
the success scored by the German Independent Air Force in "The War
of 19_," though Douhet had already referred to such factors as
early as 19 28 in The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future. 
Captain Claire Lee Chennault, senior pursuit instructor at the 
School in the early thirties, says that "publication of . . .
Douhet’s 'The War of 194- ' [sic^ . . . stirred bomber enthusiasts
to a new pitch of fanaticism. . . . The Douhet book . . . became
Peabody, "Prins. of War," Apr. 20, 1932, 2. For his 
references to Douhet, see below, 244, 246.
^^Peabody, 2C, "Prins. of Air Force Employment," 1933, 2.
2̂ 3̂
the secret strategic bible of the Air C o r p s . "^5 Authors of the 
Air Force text also observed that an air force could make the 
fullest use of the prineiple of mass by operating in daylight, 
whereas at night it would have to resort to a series of indi­
vidual sorties.In 1932 Peabody argued: "We want mass, and we 
can attain mass in daylight operations. . . .  When we arrive at 
our objective, the better the visibility,the better our chances 
of accomplishing the desired destruction." It is notable that 
Douhet, who for long did not appear particularly to favor one 
over the other and insisted only upon the necessity of concentrat­
ing upon one, came out in 1930 for daylight operation. In any 
event, Douhet’s advice that mass was the first governing principle 
of actual employment was well received at ACTS. It was refined 
still further by Wilson, Peabody’s successor, who judiciously 
combined the principles of mass and economy of force. He pointed 
out that mass could be obtained either by means of numerically 
strong bomber formations, one blow of which would destroy the 
objective, or through the cumulative effect of repeated blows
pg
administered by weaker formations." In certain cases the latter 
represented a more efficacious application of the principle of 
economy of force, one highly valued by Douhet and of special 
importance during the Depression years.
^^Way of a Fighter (New York: Putnam, 1949), 20-21,
^^Air Force, 1930, 52.
^7Peabody, 3C, "Daylight Ops.," Apr. 22, 1932, 1.
^^Wilson, "Prins. of War Applied," Mar. 28, 1934, 6.
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Economy of Force and Objective.— In a tactical or opera­
tional sense, economy of force required that the air force expend 
"just enough, and no more, effort on each mission to produce the 
desired results.” Viewed strategically, however, this principle 
dictated that the size and apportionment of types or classes of
aircraft be commensurate with the demands posed by the most
29critical situation that would confront the force. But, so
considered, this principle could not be divorced from constant
reference to another most crucial one, that of the objective.
Thus Wilson saw that "the principal guide for the direction of
air force effort is strict and determined adherence to the
principle of the objective.Quickly, in the fashion of Douhet,
he related military to national objectives:
Without question the objective for military effort is that 
which will give the greatest return consistent with our 
national aims. . . . The ultimate military aim is the
destruction of the enemy’s material and moral means of
resistance. . . . The selection of major air force objec­
tives is the very essence of proper employment.31
Peabody the year before had explicitly credited Douhet on this
point: "As Douhet has said, ’The art of air strategy consists
3 pmainly in choosing the objectives.’" Here future air force
commanders would show their mettle. This would involve ability 
to detect the enemy’s most vulnerable features, for in the latter
29lbid., 7.
^^"Air Force Prins.," Mar. 27, 1934, 4.
31"Prins. of War Applied," Mar. 28, 1934, 5.
32"prins. of War," Apr. 6, 1933, 1.
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would be found the best objectives for the air force.
Concept of War and Military Objectives
Since the determination of military objectives was in large 
part a function of one’s concept of war— strategic or tactical, 
surface or air oriented— the Tactical School’s resolution of the 
problem of objectives hinged upon1he philosophy espoused by its 
dominant group. In almost monotonously identical form the 
Douhetian concept of war was invoked throughout these years.
The major proposition of course was that the air weapon made it 
possible for a nation with a properly constituted air force (a) 
to by-pass the opposing surface forces interposed between it and 
the true objective, the enemy nation per se, and thus (b) to win 
readily by proper, i. e., offensive, employment of its air 
organization against the enemy people.
While there was general agreement that the major objective 
was therefore the enemy nation, not its army and navy, there was 
considerable doubt as to whether the weakest, most vulnerable 
element in the nation was civilian morale or the economic fabric 
of society. While Bouhet had refused to lay down any invariable 
rule for selection of objectives in Command of the Air, and usually 
conjoined the material and moral resistance of a nation, he had 
nonetheless increasingly attached ever greater weight to attacking
^^Wilson, "Air Force Objectives," Apr. 6, 1934, S.
^^George Testimony, FAC, 1934, 1; H. L. George, An 
Inquiry into the Subject: War, Fall 1935, Air Force course.
In USAFHA, 248.11-9.
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morale. In this connection it is interesting to note the shift 
of Major Hume Peabody’s views on objectives as illustrative of 
the changing position of the School. Peabody moved step by step 
during the early thirties from a tactical-ground force oriented 
view of air power toward a Douhetian posture; seemingly more 
skeptical and conservative than most, he came to accept fully 
the Italian’s counter-air force theory, characterizing it as 
"the preliminary to the main bout,"^^ but explicitly questioned—  
perhaps he was the first to do so— Douhet’s advocacy of "action 
particularly against the morale of the p e o p l e . H e  was 
apparently the only lecturer in the Air Force Course, the cap­
stone of the curriculum, to make specific reference to Douhet, 
though he did not always do this. Admitting that most of the 
professional opinions cited by the School favored air attacks 
against morale and might well lead to the suspicion that it 
advocated such attacks— which he denied— Peabody went on to 
present the case for strategic bombing of industrial centers on 
a presumably humane and scientific basis:
Eliminating political objectives, and operations against the 
hostile air force, most air force operations will be against 
strategic objectives. . . . The aim of the air force may be 
said to be the disintegration of the enemy’s resources for 
military production, and his means of securing the arrival 
at the port of men, materiel, and supplies. . . .  Dis­
organization and paralysis, rather than complete destruction, 
is the aim because it is more economical, and is equally
3 CLecture, AF5C, "Air Force versus Air Force," Apr. 27, 
1932, 1; _cf. same lecture for 1930-31, p. 4.
^^Lecture, "Objectives," Apr. 6, 1933, 6.
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effective. . , . For example., if the enemy’s fuel supply 
could be destroyed, or kept from arriving at airdromes, it 
would be unnecessary to destroy engines, airplanes, pilots,
e t c . 37
Peabody, who was doubtless familiar with Sherman’s identical
philosophy fAir Warfare, 1926), proceeded to quote approvingly
Royal Air Force Wing Commander A. G. R. Garrod, writing in the
January 1930 R. A. F. Quarterly on selection of objectives:
This implies a knowledge of the channels of supply and dis­
tribution of all commodities required for the upkeep of the 
forces. . . . And when all the data have been collected, a 
sound appreciation must be formed regarding the particular 
sphere whose disorganization will lead to the most profitable 
results. Here is a whole new field of study for the air 
strategist. . . .38
Perhaps taking this advice and following Peabody’s lead, Wilson
soon questioned Douhet’s view on morale as a major objective,
without mentioning his name. He pointed out that the thoughts
and reactions of people to happenings like air attack were too
nebulous to be determined definitely, and believed therefore that
it would be "much better to choose physical necessities for the
principal objectives of the air f o r c e ."39 He concluded that
interruption of the modern industrial economy would lead to
defeat, and that this interruption should constitute the primary
wartime objective for an air force. Yet, he admitted in the next
breath, that it was possible the moral collapse effected by this
3 7 i b i d ., 7-8.
33Quoted in Peabody, "Objectives," Apr. 6, 1933, 8.
3^"Air Force Objectives," Apr. 6, 1934, 7.
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breakup of the "closely knit web" would suffice to determine the 
i s s u e . Subsequently both Lee and George presented this latter 
view before the Federal Aviation Commission, George^s exposition 
favoring the change was quite Douhetian in spirit. He believed 
attacks should not be directed against populated centers— not 
because some precept of humanity might be violated, but because 
the object could be achieved more easily and efficiently in 
another way.^^ That means was to paralyze a nation’s war industry. 
In either case, it was a matter of strategic air warfare, and the 
instrument required was the same.
But this was not the end of the matter, for had not the 
master indicated the prime necessity— and his own preference—  
first to gain command of the air? As Captain Webster, who later 
succeeded Wilson as Air Force instructor, told the FAC, technical 
progress was constantly serving to enhance the power of the air 
offensive, while "the inadequacy of all means of defense" was
M Obecoming ever more pronounced. Nothing would avail against the 
onslaught of the enemy air force, once underway. But if one could 
defeat the air adversary, the way would be open for complete 
victory. After reiterating these Douhetian precepts, Webster 
expressed the same preference as the master— to make destruction 
of the enemy air force the immediate primary o b j e c t i v e . Still
^^"Prins. of War Applied," Mar. 28, 1934, 3; Wilson 
Testimony, FAC, 1934, 3.
^̂ Ĝeorge Testimony, FAC, 9.
Webster Testimony, FAC, 2.
43Ibid., 9-11, 22-24.
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another variation was provided by Walker who identified both the 
industrial structure and the hostile air force complex as primary 
objectives.But precise and lasting agreement on the ordering 
of objectives eluded the School, and the consensus reached in 
1935 reflected a compromise. The hostile air force would in­
evitably be the first objective for attack in any modern conflict 
between major air powers, but the opening phase would also see 
air forces, when radius of action permitted, strike directly at 
the nation’s economic structure. A major reason for the school’s 
seeming inability to stick to its own principle of the objective 
lay in the air weapon’s remarkable adaptability to various kinds 
of missions, roles, or tasks and consequently different force 
structures.
Employment and Structure
The principle of economy of force required that there be 
no repetition of earlier mistakes in designing, producing, and 
employing the various types of airplanes needed to achieve the 
objectives of the air force. The school felt that for too long 
a preponderance of air strength had been mistakenly devoted to 
essentially defensive and ancillary tasks— air combat and ground 
support— at the expense of the decisive, striking arms of
*̂ Ŵalker TestimonyT FAC, 5.
*̂ ÂCTS to OCAC, A Study of Proposed Air Corps Doctrine 
Based upon Information Furnished by WPD, General Staff, in 
Memorandum, dated Dec. 21, 1934-, Jan. 31, 1935, 6 (para. 18). 
Hereafter cited as Proposed A.C. Doctrine (1935). In N.A.,
RG 18, CDF 321.9.
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aviation.*̂ ® Thus the school complained about the obsolescent Air 
Corps tables of organization which at the turn of the decade still 
provided for "pursuit aviation at the ratio of about 60% of the 
entire Air C o r p s . I t  also thought that much of attack aviation 
was being misused because it was largely allocated to field 
armies. 8̂ As for ACTS’s own views. Combined Air Force in 1926 
and the "Doctrine of an Air Force" in 1928 clearly showed that it 
predicated its doctrine of employment solidly upon the funda­
mentally Douhetian concept of the prime efficacy of bombardment 
in modern aerial warfare. Upon that basis the School in subsequent 
years developed the concept of bomber invincibility and made it 
the hinge upon which all else depended. The expressions, "bombard­
ment, with and without support," and "bombardment, the basic arm," 
became commonplace thereafter. Attack aviation was accorded a 
similar but subordinate status by virtue of its exceptional 
functional value in light bombardment operations against anti­
aircraft batteries and enemy air forces on the ground. The only 
certain way, of course, to achieve security for one's own force 
was to strike the enemy air force on the ground before he could
*̂ ®Walker, "Passive Defense of Airdromes," Oct. 28,
1929, 1+3; Wilson, "Characteristics and Org,," Mar. 28, 1934,
6. See also Annual Reports, including inclosures, 1930-32.
*̂^Ibid. , 32-33; Walker, "Personnel and Trng.," Oct. 25,
1929, 27.
^^Wilson, "Characteristics and Org.," Mar. 28, 1934,
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attack.
As early as 1928 the School adopted Douhet’s concept of the 
battle plane. Subsequently, the ideal or prototype it held up for 
emulation was Douhet’s self-sufficient bomber fleet, graphically
depicted in "The War of 19__"— a force able to hold its own even
if outnumbered. The text, Air Force, in 1930 read:
In air force operations, numerical superiority is un­
necessary provided the striking force be strong enough to 
force its passage through whatever hostile pursuit may be 
brought against it, . . .  An air force gains superiority 
over its enemy, ground or air, through superior leadership 
. . .; by fortitude, including physical and moral courage, 
and the ability to maintain a high morale under adversity; 
and above all through the realization that a striking force 
once in the air, cannot be stopped,50
Bombardment texts of course elaborated this theme.Deep un­
supported daylight penetrations were already contemplated in the
S21930 Air Force Text, using heavily armed, wave-like formations.
It was accepted that bomb loads would include chemicals and 
incendiaries as well as explosives.
Walker, "Doctrine of Employment of an Air Force," Oct. 23,
1929, 17; Air Force, 1930, 26, 37; Air Force, 1931, 69-70; 
Bombardment, 1931, 69-70; Wilson, "Characteristics and Org.,"
Mar. 26, 1934-, 7; ACTS, Proposed A.C. Doctrine (1935), Sec. IV,
4- (Prins 6 & 7).
^^Air Force, 1930, 66-67. Cf. Douhet, Command of the 
Air, Faber edit., 4-5, 92, 107-8, 115; "The War of 19 " in ibid., 
276-77, 285, 297-98, 303.
^̂ Bombardment, 1931, 69-70; Bombardment, 1933, 21-2; 
Bombardment, 1935, 16; 34-5; 14-1.




Concomitantly too, as in the Douhet system, pursuit and 
pursuit pilots increasingly lost status, and from 1928 on this 
arm was thrust aside more and more until it reached its nadir in 
the middle thirties, not only at the school but even within the 
Air Corps i t s e l f . A s  Chennault, the school’s leading pursuit 
advocate, put it, the issue became "not how many or what kind of 
fighters we should have but simply whether there should be any 
fighters at all,” an attitude that infected even OCAC.^S For 
several years he contended vainly against Wilson, George, and 
Walker, his foremost protagonists, all of whom later became 
influential staff planners under General Arnold. At one time 
the School went so far as to drop its course in fighter tactics. 
Though Chennault was sure he had uncovered a critical error in 
the Douhet thesis that bombardment alone sufficed to win, he was 
unable to convince anyone of it. He believed that pursuit’s in­
effectiveness in the past was due to lack of definite, continuous 
information concerning the whereabouts of the air-borne bombers, 
and pursuit performance in the Fort Knox air exercise in May 1933 
seemed to bear out his contention.In any event. School doctrine
"̂̂ ACTS, Ass’c Commandant to OCAC, 1st Ind. dated Nov. 25, 
1939 to basic letter. The School Treatment of Pursuit Aviation, 
Nov. 15, 1939. Harmon gives 1934-36 as "the all-time low in 
Pursuit instruction."
^^Chennault, Way of a Fighter, 26.
SGlbid., 20, 26-7, 29.
^^Chennault, The Role of Defensive Pursuit, Maxwell Field, 
Ala.: n.d., ca. 1933, 12-13, in USAFHD 248.282-4, 24-38.
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on pursuit employment remained unchanged. BefLng primarily 
defensive in character and limited in radius of action, fighters 
were not expected even to try to gain control of the air. But 
pursuit did constitute a valuable mobile defense force for the 
protection of airdromes, and by destroying hostile aircraft it 
also aided in defeating the enemy air force.Insofar as 
pursuit was able to accompany and provide some measure of support 
to the bombers, it would of course be at the expense of reducing 
the striking force’s strength. The School applied this eminently 
Douhetian principle not merely to specialized types of aircraft 
like fighters but to auxiliary aviation as w e l l . T h e  economy 
of force principle, as taught by Douhet, not only demanded such 
rigorous negative pruning of non-essentials but also positive 
direction of all resources toward the most efficacious attain­
ment of the air force’s objectives within the context of the 
national defense in peacetime as well as wartime.
The purpose of air strategy in peacetime, the School 
suggested, was to extend air power outward from our frontiers 
into "the spheres of military influence recognized by national 
policy" in the interest of national security. This over-all 
objective could not be achieved without the carefully planned
S ÂCTS, Proposed A.C. Doctrine (1935), Prin. No. 10,
Sec IV, 1; Wilson, "Characteristics & Org.," Mar. 26, 1934, 3.
Wilson, "Air Force Prins. & Strategy," Mar. 22, 1935,
2; ACTS, Proposed A.C. Doctrine (1935), Sec. IV, 1,
60ACTS, Proposed A.C. Doctrine (1935), Sec. IV, 1,
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creation of the required air force in being, the establishment of 
the necessary complex of bases in strategic world areas, and 
provision for adequate logistical support therein.Thus the 
School seemed here too to be following Douhet’s precepts as to 
the composition and strategy of air power, much as an earlier 
generation of naval strategists was influenced by Mahan’s thinking 
on the composition, influence, and employment of sea power. Cer­
tainly, in the strategy recommended for the country, the School 
followed Douhet closely: "The ideal strategical combination in
modern war is the air offensive and the ground defensive, 
Conclusion
Careful examination and comparison of the thought of 
Mitchell, Douhet, and the Air Tactical School— period by period—  
prove beyond any doubt that the School’s doctrine derived not 
primarily from Mitchell, as asserted by leading air historians, 
but rather from Douhet, This study has also shown that Mitchell 
himself fell increasingly under the influence of Douhet’s thought, 
beginning around 1922-23 and culminating around 1929-30 with his 
acceptance of all important points, including the battle plane 
concept of 1927, To the extent that Mitchell exercised influence 
at the School, to that extent it reinforced the Douhetian pattern 
of thinking there. But that it was not dependent on Mitchell—  
who was never mentioned in lecture or text— as the source of
^^Wilson, "Air Force Prins, & Strategy," Mar, 22, 1935,
2.
G^ACTS, Proposed A,C. Doctrine (1935), Sec, IV, 1.
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its inspiration is shown in the School’s espousal of the entire 
Douhetian system not only before Mitchell himself accepted it in 
its entirety but in the very rendering of the text in many 
instances.
While the School throughout the period 1920-1935 was of 
course subject to various influences of an intellectual order, 
there was none so pervasive or significant as that of Douhet.
The very fact that his was a carefully integrated theory, with 
all constituent elements derived from and dependent upon his 
philosophy of strategic air warfare, helps account for his 
penetrating influence there. For the school embraced during the 
decade 1925-1935 his unique counter-air force strategy, battle 
plane concept, minimization of pursuit, conversion of observation 
and attack roles to support bombardment, rationale for concentrat­
ing all possible resources on the striking force, self-sufficiency 
of the air organization— including dispersal for security, and 
passive air defense, as well as his war-winning formula for using 
massed air power to destroy the most vulnerable elements of the 
enemy nation.
But of course this does not intrinsically explain why the 
School acted as it did. Although all the motivations involved in 
the drama will perhaps never be fully known, a suggested explana­
tion is proffered. The attractiveness of Douhet’s theory cannot 
be understood apart from the peculiar postwar milieu of the Air 
Service world. Condemned as a service arm to perpetual subordina­
tion to the infantry— a role not only confirmed by its own World
256
War experience and seemingly fated to continue indefinitely by 
virtue of the immense superiority of the defense— the Air Service 
was looking for a way out of the doldrums. In the vacuum thus 
created, the Douhet theory rushed in. Shining vistas were opened 
which not only lent new meaning to air power but showed that an 
air force, if properly constituted, was the only arm needed for 
victory in the war of the future. As early as 1923 the formula 
in its original form stood ready to hand in the Air Tactical 
School Library, and from then on it was simply a question of 
time before airmen would put it to use.
The schoolmen’s faith in the new dispensation— itself 
finalized in the latter testament of 1927— was manifested first 
in 1926 in the publication of Combined Air Force; then in 1928 in 
the evangelical effort to persuade the hierarchy to propagate 
these articles of belief; and thereafter in the persistent efforts 
of the School to make itself the central shrine for the interpreta­
tion and development of doctrine. True, modification occurred—  
but not at the hands of others; the chief doctrinal reform did 
not affect the philosophical core but only increased the efficacy 
with which the central aim could be realized. Within a mere 
decade, then, the School, largely by virtue of its inspired and 
infallible doctrine, had established itself as the intellectual 
center of the Air Corps and had propagated its influence so 
suceessfully that by the mid-thirties its tenets were Air Corps 
tenets. Its modified Douhetian doctrines served as the founda­
tions for AAF strategy in the Second World War and provide the
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rationale for the Strategic Air Command of the thermonuclear age.
Thus Douhet’s influence has ranged widely from his lifetime
to the present, although often those who reflect that influence
are seemingly unaware of its source. Generals Arnold and Eaker,
commenting in 19M-1 on the German Air Force’s destruction of its
Polish rival on the ground, wrote:
This was in accord with the best modern air teachings. Our 
airmen said, ’They have done it according to the book.’ We 
have always thought that the enemy air force was the first 
target for attack. Our school books talk about destroying 
the enemy air force on its own airdromes— ’shooting the eagle 
on its nest. ”'63 ^Italics added]
Several other important Douhetian tenets are repeated in the
remainder of the book, including those associated with bomber
invincibility (despite the Battle of BritainJ).®^
The Germans reaJized fully that they were following Douhet, 
for, as General Galland points out, "the main thesis of German 
air strategy was always: first, the destruction or elimination
of enemy air power, including its armament industry and sources 
of power," and the German Air Force was structured in 1939 accord­
ing to Douhetian ideas, with 39 bomber groups to 13 fighter groups.
In the United States the Defense Department is constantly 
devising new means of dispersing our air power and otherwise
63Winged Warfare (New York & London: Harper, 1941), 131.
64fbid., 127, 132, 137-38, 140, 144-45, 150. Cf. Arnold 
and Eaker, This Flying Game (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1935,
rev. 1938), especially 129, 136, 139.
®^"Defeat of the Luftwaffe: Fundamental Causes," AUQR,
VI (Spring, 1953), 23.
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reducing the vxiJ.nerability of our air forces (another Douhetian 
tenet); concern is expressed in Pentagon circles over the potential 
enemy's capability "to attack American birds in their own nests."®® 
Even the Kennedy-Johnson Administration's strategy/ of 
nuclear response is apparently predicated on the Douhetian concept 
of the primacy of the counter-air force attack, for the initial 
and primary response to a hostile attack is reportedly to be a 
selected effort to knock out the enemy's "birds" on the ground.®^ 
Air Force manuals on doctrine confirm, this emphasis on counter­
force strategy.®^ Of course the Eisenhower Adminis+ .don's 
emphasis on "massive retaliation— aimed at cities, primarily—  
was just as Douhetian. It is evident that Douhet's air power 
doctrine fits the weapon system of the nuclear and thermonuclear 
age remarkàily well, and hence it may be anticipated that his 
thought will continue to exert a powerful influence on mankind 
so long as those or similar aero-space weapons are available.
®®William Beecher, "Future Missiles: Defense Experts
Weigh Many Means to Lessen Weapons' Vulnerability," Wall Street 
Journal, Jun. 25, 1964, 1, 6.
®^Ibid., "Mightier Missiles: U. S. Shifts Ençhasis from
Quantity to More Power and Reliability," Wall Street Journal, 
Nov. 11, 1963, 1, 6.
®®Air Force Manual 1-2: United States Air Force Basic
Doctrine (Washington: Dec., 1959), 11, 13.
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1. That power that arises from man's ability to fly in a 
vehicle or to cause a vehicle to go through the air or 
through space, and to exploit in lesser or greater degree
the complex relationships that result from this ability. . . .
Note: In this sense, air power is essentially a
phenomenon, the nature of which has certain inherent attri­
butes or characteristics. Its full exploitation and use de­
pend upon the soundness of man's concept of it. It emerges 
from three quite different abilities. The first of these is 
the ability to fly. The second is the ability to evolve new 
tactics, strategy, and methods of transport— all based upon 
hitherto unrealized speeds, range, mobility, and flexibility. 
The third is the ability to turn these first two abilities 
to account in political, diplomatic, military, cultural, and 
economic affairs.
In the first of these, the 'ability to do something 
in the air' (Mitchell) depends upon knowledge of certain 
laws of science coupled with inventiveness, . . . raw materi­
als and industrial plants, . . . fuels, and mastery of the 
techniques of aircraft control, air navigation, maintenance, 
etc., to the end that flight is achieved with greater ease. .
In the second, the ability depends upon understanding 
and exploiting certain dynamic relationships and principles 
that arise from new speeds, flexibility of movement, elimina­
tion of geographic barriers, etc.
In the third, the ability, akin to the ability that 
gives dominion or sway to a farsighted leader, depends upon 
recognizing and exploiting the political, diplomatic, mili­
tary, and economic opportunities opened up by the development 
of the first two sources of this power.
2. An instance of this power as it exists in a particular 
nation . . . .
Concept
1. A notion or idea about the nature of a thing, e. g., of 
matter, electricity, or air power, as in 'Einstein's concept
*Taken from The United States Air Force Dictionary.
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that mass and energy are forms of the same thing was yet 
untested.’
2. A mental image or idea of how a thing should be done 
or established, i. e., an idea that guides, as for example, 
a concept on how to carry out an operation, or how to set 
up an organization, or what elements should inhere in com­
mand, etc.
Note: In sense 1, the concept is of a phenomenon.
The concept is sound or unsound in proportion to its approxi­
mation of the true nature of the phenomenon. (See phenomenon 
and air power.)
In sense 2, the concept is not of a phenomenon; 
hence, it is not judged by the criterion of trueness. It 
is, rather, an idea or plan of what can be or has to be 
done, e. g., concept of strategic bombardment. "Concepts 
are conceived, doctrines taught."
Doctrine
. . . Specif., 1. A teaching on the nature of a thing and 
on what can be done with it, which teaching is cast in the 
form of a proposition or of propositions that are either 
true or false. . . .
2. A teaching on how to do something, or on what to do in
a given situation. . . .
Note: In sense 1, doctrine on the nature of air
power or war is either true or false as the concept is true
or false. In sense 2, doctrine is evolved to give guidance
in particular situations. . . .
It is not uncommon to regard concepts as doctrines, 
and in a manner of speaking they are, for the differentia­
tion between the tv;o is often one of aspect rather than sub­
stance, and the two, esp. in military contexts, are so much 
a part of each other that one cannot be considered without 
the other.
Phenomenon.
In positivistic usage, any real entity, as an object, event, 
development, or set of dynamic relationships, that shows it­
self as an instance of the operation of some natural law, 
and is actually or theoretically subject to analysis and 
explanation.
Note: To regard a thing as a phenomenon is to regard
it in a particular manner, that is, as a manifestation of 
some inner law or principle. The attention is upon the thing 
not as something merely to be outwardly observed and recognized, 
but as something to be explained and related. In observing 
it, the mind is occupied in formulating a concept of it. For 
example, when we say, ’The airplane has become an instrument 
of national policy,’ we are thinking of the airplane as a
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phenomenon, relating it as a symbol of air power to principles 
that may be employed in developing national policy. But when 
we say, ’Four airplanes landed,’ we are not considering the 
airplanes as phenomena, rather, in this instance, the event 
of their landing is the phenomenon. That the phenomenon has 
existence apart from man’s concept of it is indicated by the 
fact that the concept we have may be true or false. Many 
things dealt with in the Air Force are looked upon as phenomena. 
These include air power, compressibility, flight, radioactivity, 
etc. See ’concept,’ n., sense 1. For example of use, see 
’air power, sense 1, note.
Strategy
1. The art or science of using such factors as time, space, 
geography, politics, and trends of events, together with avail­
able or potential power, to achieve a previously-conceived 
objective.
2. The use of these factors to create advantageous conditions 
for meeting the enemy in combat, either to compel surrender or 
to achieve some other objective; the process of working out an 
operation so as to strengthen a nation or force, or to lessen 
the effects of its defeat, in its ultimate position.
Strategic concept
A particular notion or idea on how to use a force, condition, 
event, or anything else, so as to achieve or maintain a stra­
tegic advantage, a particular idea on how to fight a war.
2. A concept as to the nature of air power or war that leads 
to an emphasis upon strategic operations. (See concept)
Note: In sense 2, with specific reference to air power,
the concept embraces the idea that air power, if properly 
understood and employed, is a means of destroying the war- 
making potential of an enemy, esp. by means of strategic 
bombardment.
Tactical
In sense 1, of or pertaining to tactics, i. e., to the ar­
ranging, positioning, or maneuvering of forces in contact, or 
near contact, with the enemy so as to achieve an objective in 
an air campaign, air battle, or surface battle.
Tactics
1. . . . the art or science of using equipment e.nd weapons, 
or using military persons or units, or using positive action 
or passivity— all with the purpose of achieving in a combat 
situation some immediate advantage or ameliorating a disadvan­
tage with the force or forces at hand.
2. A maneuver or positioning carried out in a combat or 
battle situation in accordance with such art or science, as in 
’the pilot’s tactics were to come in firing.'
Tactical air doctrine
Detailed doctrine in respect to how to employ air vehicles
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in tactical air operations. . . .
Tactical air operation 
An operation carried out by aircraft or air units against, 
or in the presence of, a hostile force, including cooperation 
with surface forces.
Mote; In its broad and most acceptable sense, the 
term . . . includes any air operation in which tactics are 
employed against a hostile force. Thus, an air defense opera­
tion would be a species of tactical air operations the same 
as close air support is a species of tactical air operations. 
Likewise, the use of tactics to penetrate defenses to a stra­
tegic target is, in fact, a tactical air operation. . . .
In tactical air operations, the targets are either hostile 
forces or geographic positions essential to hostile forces. 
This is in contrast with strategic air operations, where the 
targets are factories, storage plants, railroad yards, other 
war-making facilities or installations, and long-range air 
installations not immediate to a battle area.
Tactical concept
1. A particular notion or idea as to how to fight a battle.
2. In military theory, a concept of war or air power that 
leads to an emphasis on tactical operations as the best means 
of achieving victory.
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